• Title/Summary/Keyword: Local Reserve Forces

Search Result 8, Processing Time 0.027 seconds

Priority Selection of Firearms and Ammunition for the Local Reserve Forces using Dynamic Programming (동적계획법에 기반한 지역예비군 총기, 탄약 분배 우선순위 선정에 관한 연구)

  • Cho, Sangjoon;Ma, Jungmok
    • Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
    • /
    • v.21 no.8
    • /
    • pp.67-74
    • /
    • 2020
  • One of the missions of active-duty units in charge of managing reserve forces is providing combat supplies to reserve forces to exercise their combat capabilities quickly when declaring a mobilization order. Rear area active-duty units must support large local reserve forces. On the other hand, military units have difficulties due to a lack of forces and the storage of large quantities of firearms and ammunition. For this reason, local reserve forces should move to an integrated storing place and receive their firearms and ammunition. The existing distribution plan (existing plan) is a first-in-first-out plan that can produce inconsistent distribution orders. The inconsistent distribution orders can increase the complete distribution time, which will affect the combat power of local reserve forces. Therefore, firearms and ammunition should be distributed quickly. Accordingly, this paper proposes the priority selection of firearms and ammunition for local reserve forces with a minimum complete distribution time using Dynamic Programming. To verify the proposed model, the existing plan was compared with the proposed model using real data, and the result showed that the proposed model outperformed the existing plan.

A scheme on strengthening of R.O.K reserved force (예비전력 정예화 방안)

  • Kim, Jae-Sam
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
    • /
    • s.5
    • /
    • pp.1-45
    • /
    • 2007
  • Reserved forces of ROKA are in charge of replacement of TOE in the wartime and mission of rear area operation. But there is institutional inertia in the law and organization oriented to fill human resources rather than take mission. We need to prepare for the investment and arrangement of reserved forces as military power that would be replaced standing forces. In this portion, to reinforce reserve forces elite, First, efficient mobilization regulations and systems are suggested. I covered a maintenance of relevant mobilization ordinances which need to legislated and approved by national assembly for wartime and development of mobilization system which might lose the appropriate time for mobilization due to complicated declaration procedures and measures to overcome the panic at the initial stage of the war and organization and employment of nationwide transportation system and mobilization center. To ensure efficient resource management and mobilization of reserve forces with a number of approximately 3 million, there's a necessity of organization for integration and conciliation. To make it real, I suggested establishing and employing the mobilization center, on first phase, employ the mobilization center focusing on homeland divisions, on second phase, it is advisable to convert to national level mobilization system and develop to central mobilization center focusing on national emergency planning committee. During peacetime, in conjunction with Mobilization Cell, mobilization center can conduct resource survey and integrate and manage mobilization resources and take charge of mobilization training of subordinate units, and during wartime, in conjunction with mobilization coordination team and Cell, can ensure the execution of mobilization. Second, Future oriented reserve forces management system such as service system of reserve forces and support system of homeland defense operations. Current service and trainings of reserve forces by the year have very low connection, as it is very complex to manage the resources and trainings, and service and training lack the equity, re-establishment of service system is required. Also in an aspect of CSS and cultivation support for reserve forces, as the scope and limitation of responsibility between the armed forces and autonomous organization is obscure, conditions to conduct actual-fighting exercises are limited. Concentrated budgetting is extremely difficult because reserve forces training fields are scattered nationwide, and facilities and equipments are rapidly getting older. To improve all these, I suggest the organization of homeland defense battalion with a unit of "City-Gun-District" and supporting the local reserve forces. Conduct unit replacement or personal replacement for those who have finished their 1 or 2 years and homeland defense operation duty for those with 3-5 years for consistency and simplification. Third, I suggest Future oriented Reserved Training(FRT) and Training Center oriented training management to establish a reliable reserve training. Reserves carry out expansion of unit, conventional combat mission, homeland defense and logistics support during wartime, and actual-fighting exercise, and disaster relief, peace keeping activities. Despite diverse activities and roles, their training condition still stays definitely poor. For these reasons, Modernization of weapons and facilities through gradual replacement and procurement is essential to enhance mobilization support system.

  • PDF

A Study on the Establish and Operating Plan of Reserve Components Emergency Response Forces (재난상황 시 예비군 긴급대응부대 창설 및 운용방안에 관한 연구)

  • Seo, SeungBae
    • Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
    • /
    • v.14 no.1
    • /
    • pp.9-16
    • /
    • 2018
  • In the event of a disaster, we need people who specialize in rapid regional disaster recovery. However, in the present disaster response system, disaster relief is carried out at the level of public support, volunteer service, etc. There are various problems such as initial response due to lack of expertise, delays in disaster recovery, and inadequate response to disasters. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a unit with early ability to respond to local governments in the event of a disaster and expertise to enable rapid disaster recovery. Therefore, this study limited the preparation of the reserve forces emergency response units for the direction of local security, disaster relief and disaster relief through emergency disaster recovery under the disaster situation.

A study on the use of reserve power in wartime by private guards (민간경비원 전시 예비전력 활용에 대한 연구)

  • JaeKeak Jung
    • Convergence Security Journal
    • /
    • v.23 no.4
    • /
    • pp.153-158
    • /
    • 2023
  • Massacres of civilians are being committed in the Russia-Ukraine war, and the war is becoming a long-term war due to a lack of support for reserve combat forces. Considering the reality that South Korea is experiencing a rapid population decline and is rapidly entering an aging society, we are at a point where the nature of the war with North Korea must change. Among them, if private security guards are placed under the control of the police as regular security and crime prevention personnel and used as an alternative resource for reserve forces to ensure the safety of wartime areas and residents and prepare for long-term wars, it will help preserve combat power and maintain sustainability.Regarding private security, considering Japan's further development, we compared it with ours and looked into ways to utilize it as a reserve force for a divided country. In a future where low birth rates will lead to a decrease in military strength, if private security guards are used in local security vacuums during peacetime and participate in local defense during wartime, it could help improve the Korean military's reserve force.

South Korea's strategy to cope with local provocations by nuclear armed North Korea (핵위협하 국지도발 대비 대응전략 발전방향)

  • Kim, Tae-Woo
    • Strategy21
    • /
    • s.31
    • /
    • pp.57-84
    • /
    • 2013
  • North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

  • PDF

A Study on the appropriateness of Public Facilities Scale (기능전환에 따른 동사무소 공간의 적정규모에 관한 연구)

  • Lee Jeong-Ho
    • Journal of the Korean housing association
    • /
    • v.16 no.1
    • /
    • pp.65-72
    • /
    • 2005
  • With the changing consciousness of community people and the rising standard of living, there has recently been an emphasis on the creation of public facilities' new functions and their role as local community facilities. This changing trends are accordingly requiring a change in spatial structure of the public facilities. In this study, an analysis was conducted with 24 public facilities situated in the Buk-gu district of Daegu to identify the adequacy of their space scale after functional variation. The results of this study are summarized as follows. 1) The site area of public facilities has been being widened after functional variation since more spaces are needed to provide an outdoor resting space with community people, expand a parking space, and operate a community center. 2) The factors that had a direct effect on the change in the use of space are the reduced space for administrative work and the expanded scope of the community center's function. Specifically, the areas of activities for civil service and administrative work and for reserve forces have been reduced due to reduction of function, and floor division by each function group has been becoming stricter due to addition of a community center's function. 3) It was shown that in terms of the space for functions of public facilities, spaces for civil service and waiting have increased mostly after function variation. After functional variation, the scale of spaces for civil service and administrative work has been being planned within the range of $200\~300 m^2$, regardless of the number of population to be covered by public facilities. 4) The space for public use is showing the greatest increase in public facilities which have been built after functional variation. The major factors seem to be the increased moving passages, the expanded convenient facilities for community people, and the increased convenient facilities for disabled. Facilities scale plans have been being made more systematically, compared to the conventional facilities.

A Study on Strengthening Consequence Management System Against CBRN Threats (CBRN 위협에 대비한 사후관리체계 강화방안)

  • Kwon, Hyuckshin;Kwak, Minsu;Kim, Kwanheon
    • KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
    • /
    • v.40 no.4
    • /
    • pp.429-435
    • /
    • 2020
  • North Korea declared itself complete with nuclear force after its sixth nuclear test in 2017. Despite efforts at home and abroad to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the prospects for the denuclearization are not bright. Along with political and diplomatic efforts to deter NK's WMD threats, the government is required to strengthen its consequence management capabilities against 'catastrophic situations' expected in case of emergency. Accordingly, this study was conducted to present measures to strengthen follow-up management against CBRN threats. The research model was partially supplemented and utilized by the THIRA process adopted and utilized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security among national-level disaster management plan development models. Korea's consequence management (CM) system encompasses risk and crisis management on disaster condition. The system has been carried out in the form of a civil, government and military integrated defense operations for the purpose of curbing the spread or use of CBRNs, responding to threats, and minimizing expected damages. The preventive stage call for the incorporation of CBRN concept and CM procedures into the national management system, supplementing the integrated alarm systems, preparation of evacuation facilities, and establishment of the integrated training systems. In the preparation phase, readjustment of relevant laws and manuals, maintenance of government organizations, developing performance procedures, establishing the on-site support systems, and regular training are essential. In the response phase, normal operations of the medical support system for first aid and relief, installation and operation of facilities for decontamination, and development of regional damage assessment and control guidelines are important. In the recovery phase, development of stabilization evaluation criteria and procedures, securing and operation of resources needed for damage recovery, and strengthening of regional damage recovery capabilities linked to local defense forces, reserve forces and civil defense committees are required.

The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
    • /
    • s.8
    • /
    • pp.49-168
    • /
    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

  • PDF