• Journal of Agricultural Extension & Community Development
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.61-70
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• 1995

The decentralization of local extension authority is due to several aspect of improper law on extension. First, extension authority has not treated the extension law properly though it has many local office in province, counties, villages. Second, the authority concentrated too much on the service ignoring the local offices are under the improper law. Third, the authority lost their dignity when other institutions argue for their work on the extension services, Extension Institution should change, but the change should come with proper law environment.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.54
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• pp.71-110
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• 2018

Starting from the agenda that we should determine the function of local government at each level in order to facilitate decentralization, this article is dedicated to demonstrating problems in the practice of Korean legislation today. On the one hand, in the "local autonomy act", the local governments' function is designated by the term "affairs of local governments" which includes autonomous duites and the duties delegated by the State to local governments. Meanwhile, all of acts by which governments are granted the power of execution, upon the principle of "the reservation of law", does not distinguish the nature of each authority as well. On the other hand, as regards the legal status of the territorial collectivity, the practice in the legislation does not clearly distinguish between territorial representation and national delegation. If we want to achieve the decentralization, we should reevaluate and determine EVERY authority and responsibility of administrative service in terms of its nature whether it is for the local diversity or for the standardization of public service in the State. In following, we should have the terminology by which we can designate the territorial collectivity which is distinguished from the national organ at the local level in the legislation.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.529-540
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• 2020

The objective of this research paper is to study the simultaneous relationship between fiscal decentralization, corruption, and income inequality among Vietnamese provinces. We use a balanced panel data set of 63 provinces/cities in Vietnam in the period from 2011 to 2018. The study used 3SLS-GMM (Three Stage Least Squares - Generalized Method of Moments estimator) and GMM-HAC (Generalized Method of Moments - Heteroskedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator). Empirical evidence shows a strong simultaneous relationship: increased corruption will increase regional income disparities, income inequality, and increase fiscal decentralization. In addition, the results also suggest that an increase in per-capita income will reduce the level of corruption, or better control corruption of each province. The degree of increase in income inequality, which reduces fiscal decentralization, is the same for trade liberalization. All demonstrate that there is a simultaneous relationship between fiscal decentralization, corruption, and income inequality. In a region of high public governance quality, fiscal decentralization positively effects its economic growth. This issue will indirectly increase income inequality between provinces within a country. Our findings imply that a country's fiscal decentralization strategy should be linked to improving corruption control and local governance effectiveness, indirectly improving income inequality between localities or regions.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.144-150
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• 2013

The devolution of central government's affairs to local governments for several occupational safety and health(OHS) administration affairs was tried by Lee Myungbak's government in 2010. It seems that the trial was eventually failed since only trivial 3 items among 25 trials were made for the devolution. It was found that there was a procedural fault since stake-holders and experts were excluded during preparing the plan. Therefore validity and problems were not properly reviewed. It was also found that the devolution of the OHS administration affairs from the central government to local governments has several disadvantages such as high possibility of deregulation. The devolution of the OHS affairs to local governments is contradictory to uniform principle of safety standards and principle of coincidence of empowerment and responsibility. Therefore it is concluded that the devolution of the OHS affairs to local governments is inappropriate.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.19-30
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• 2018

Social overhead capital(SOC) is an essential element for society to be developed and operated normally. In spite of the increase in the importance of SOC, It is difficult to present the criteria for the appropriate investment of SOC. and The discussion on making SOC investments of local government is insufficient. If the local autonomy has been guaranteed, local government increases investment in regional public goods that residents prefer. Reflection of such residents preferences is the driving force to bring the efficiency of resource allocation in the decentralization theorem. In this study, the authority and autonomy of local governments are measured through local finance. and the decision-making of local governments for SOC investment is examined in point of decentralization theorem. In the empirical analysis, the elasticities of fiscal resources are estimated for facilities(road, water and sewage, irrigation canal and flood control) that local governments are involved in investment. These decisions made by metropolitan cities and provinces were different. The difference was most evident in the effect of per capita local tax on investment. These results show that metropolitan cities and provinces that have different situation made investment decisions differently. It shows that local governments reflect the preferences of the residents in making an investment. The main implication of this study is as follow. In case the role of local government in social overhead capital investment is increased, the increase in efficiency of resource allocation occurs. and The fiscal resources must be raised by local taxes rather than the financial resources from the central government.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies
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• v.49 no.3
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• pp.35-60
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• 2018

This paper investigates the effects of fiscal decentralization on public welfare finance, focusing that welfare status experienced a post-industrial society has proposed decentralization as a response. The decentralization includes local government responsibilities and expanded roles under the background of fiscal distress of center governments and new social risks. For the analysis, the first theory is established to find out the effect of fiscal decentralization on social expenditure. Also, the second theory is set up for the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralization and composition of social expenditure. Findings indicate that the level of social expenditure of state would decrease as the level of fiscal decentralization increases. Also, the more the level of fiscal decentralization increases, the more the in-kind benefits among total welfare expenditure increase.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2009.05a
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• pp.537-542
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• 2009

The Question is to expend Non-Provide Taxes(so on Local Income Tax and Local Consumption Tax). Can we legislate Non-Provide Taxes and levy them to a taxpayer? This Paper is to study a Scheme of Solution for Expansion of Fiscal Decentralization and search Laws and Ordinance, Theories and Case Law of the Major states. Therefore This Study is to aim for expanding at Legislation Power of Local Tax.

• Journal of Agricultural Extension & Community Development
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.175-189
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• 1995

Poitical demand for decentralization trends in Korea has led the government to plan to localize its agricultural extension system by changing the status of 6,696 extension personnel stationed at the provincial and county level from central government status to local government status as of January 1997. However, serious drawbacks of lowered morale of extension personnel and the financial burden of local governments has not yet been debated extensively for effective personnel management. Some of the findings that emerged from both the analytical and empirical research show the dangers of decentralization such as an increase in disparities, jeopardizing stability, and undermining efficiency. These problems should be considered along with the culture, tradition, and Koreans' attitude towards central and local government. The dangers of decentralization of agricultural extension services in Korea may cause serious problems in allocative efficiency because of a mismatch between available resources and promised expenditures, and in production efficiency because of unproven cost-effective provisions of local governments. It is accepted that the central government can invest more in technology, research, development, promotion and innovation in the agricultural sector. However, changing the status of extension personnel from central government to local government status may lead the best people to leave, lower morale, shake the sense of public service, break networks, and sacrifice investment in research, development and extension. In deciding the future directions for personnel management of agricultural extension services in Korea, maintaining or reinforcing the existing national status of extension personnel should be considered along with a reflection of the basic characteristics of agricultural extension services, linkages of research and extension, the financial burden of local government, specialization of extension personnel, unnecessary duplication of investment among local governments, possible national supports to agricultural research and development, and extension under the WTO systems.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.17 no.9
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• pp.61-70
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• 2019

This study was intended to analyze the effect of port decentralization on port management and port development, analyze whether port site centrality has mediated effect in relation between port decentralization and port management and port development. This study surveyed public officials and researchers who plan and execute port policies, and analyzed the influence relationship of variables and the mediating effect using multiple regression analysis. Results are as follows, First, it was analyzed that the port authority decentralization and regional-centered port policy have a positive influence on the port site centrality, and the port authority decentralization has a positive influence on port management and port development. Second, the port site centrality was confirmed to have a positive influence on port management and port development. Third, port site centrality was shown to mediate the relationship between port decentralization and port management and port development. This study suggested the positive effect of port decentralization to local government on efficient port management and port development, and the need to draw up port site-oriented policies.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.77-97
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• 2012

Estimated coefficients has serious problems including inconsistency, biasness, etc. because many researches about the effect of fiscal decentralization on a country's economic growth use the traditional OLS method. Researches use the data intactly so that so called "spurious regression" phenomenon exists. This causes fundamental fallacy. This research tries unit root test, cointegration test, and then estimates the United States' economic time series by using VECM. The analysis of the effect of the state level-fiscal decentralization on economic growth shows two long term-equilibriums. During short term-dynamic adjustment, fiscal decentralization and economic growth move the same or different directions. In case of prediction GDP increases steeply and then from 2015 gently; and fiscal decentralization index shows a general reduction trend and then decreases slowly. At local level it shows two long term-equilibriums. During short term-dynamic adjustment, fiscal decentralization and economic growth also move the same or different directions. Impulse response analysis shows the very negative effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth.