• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.281-285
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• 2024

Within five years of Kim Jong-un's rise to power, North Korea conducted four nuclear tests and launched the Hwasong-15, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in 2017, declaring the completion of its nuclear forces. During the period when Kim Jong-un completed nuclear forces to maintain the regime, foreign policy factors of the United States, China, Russia, and South Korea drove North Korea's accelerated nuclear development. The main motivating factors were the hostile policies and external threats as security factors. The completion of nuclear forces is also the result of the interplay of domestic political factors, normative factors, and hereditary factors. North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons and missiles for the survival of its regime. To achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, a new modus vivendi must be sought. It is necessary to set the ultimate goal of North Korea's complete denuclearization and engage in strategic thinking for a realistic and effective phased approach.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권6_1호
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• pp.75-87
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• 2014

집권 3년차의 김정은 시대 북한의 지속과 변화 분석은 나름대로 의미를 부여할 수 있을 것이다. 분석한 결과 보다 합리적이고 통계적인 방법을 적용하기 위하여 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 시대의 신년사를 활용하였다. 북한에 있어서 신년사만큼 영향력 있는 사항은 드물며 북한사회의 제 분야에 있어서 한해의 길라잡이 역할을 수행하고 있다. 현재까지 발표된 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 시대 신년사를 종합적으로 고찰하여 정리하였다. 종합된 신년사를 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 시대로 구분하여 발표방법, 내용구성, 기타사항을 등을 비교 분석하였으며, 이어서 북한 정권별 신년사 특징과 함의를 살펴보았다. 이와 같은 분석 결과를 바탕으로 김정은 시대의 지속과 변화를 전망해 보았다. 먼저 지속적인 사항으로 제시한 사항은 사회주의 체제 고수와 선군정치의 통치방식이다. 변화사항으로는 (1) 경제난 타개를 위한 부분적인 개방문제, (2) 북한의 핵문제, (3) 자본주의 성격의 유입과 사회주의 통제력 약화, (4) 김정은의 해외 유학경험 등을 4가지 사항을 변화요인으로 제시하였다. 이러한 김정은 시대의 북한 사회의 변화와 지속요인은 복합적으로 작동될 것이다. 김정은 시대의 북한의 지속과 변화문제는 남북문제를 해결해 나가는데 핵심 사항들이다. 전 국민적 공감대를 형성하면서 국론결집 노력 강화와 변화 상황에 능동적으로 대처할 수 있는 대북정책의 유연성을 확보하는 자세가 필요한 시점이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.115-162
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• 2022

2021년 8차 당대회에서 개정된 조선노동당 규약은 김정은 정권의 북한의 사회주의·공산주의에 대한 이데올로기 규정변화, 새로운 전략적 노선 및 최근 정세변화를 반영하는 한편, 중앙과 지방을 포괄하는 당 조직체계 상 주요 변화를 포괄한다. 본 연구는 9차례 개정된 조선노동당 규약 전체를 대상으로, 2021년 1월 개정 당규약이 명시한 '당중앙의 유일적 영도체계'의 조직적 변화를 분석함으로써 김정은 정권의 권력구조, 즉 수령제 및 당·정·군관계를 평가한다. 2010년 3차 당대표자회 후계구도를 거쳐 2012년 4차 당대표자회 이후 공식출범한 김정은 정권은 2022년 4월 집권 10년을 앞두고 당 수반이자 국가 수반인 김정은을 중심으로 한 유일영도체계를 제도화하고 새로운 당·정·군 조직 재편을 통해 일원적 지도·집행체계를 확립했다. '당중앙의 유일적 영도체계'는 당 수반-총비서의 당중앙위원회 기구를 통한 '조직영도'의 체계로 구축되며 김정은 시대 당-국가체제의 제도화와 일원화를 동시에 보여준다. 이러한 조직적 개편은 2020년 코로나19 팬데믹 이후 '삼중고'를 겪고 있는 김정은 시대 북한의 위기관리체제 확립의 특성을 보이며 향후 김정은 정권의 통치구조를 이해, 전망하는 데 중요한 함의를 가진다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• Progress in Superconductivity
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.62-67
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• 2007

The effects of the heat-treatment temperature on the carbon (C) substitution amount, full width at half maximum (FWHM) value, critical temperature ($T_c$), critical current density ($J_c$) have been investigated for 10 wt % malic acid ($C_4H_6O_5$)-doped $MgB_2/Fe$ wires. All the samples were fabricated by the in-situ powder-in-tube (PIT) method and heat-treated within a temperature range of $650^{\circ}C$ to $1000^{\circ}C$. As the heat-treatment temperature increased, it seemed that the lattice distortion was increased by a more active C substitution into the boron sites from the malic acid addition. These increased electron scattering defects seemed to enhance the $J_c-H$ properties in spite of an improvement in the crystallinity, such as a decrease of the FWHM value and an increase of the $T_c$. Compared to the un-doped wire heat-treated at $650^{\circ}C$ for 30 min, the $J_c$ was enhanced by the C doping in a high-field regime. The wire heat-treated at $900^{\circ}C$ resulted in a higher magnetic $J_c$ of approximately $10^4\;A/cm^2$ at 5 K and 8 T.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.