• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.151-191
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• 2016

Kant and Lacan strongly criticized the epistemological premise of formal logic. However, Lacan was opposed to Kant in terms of subject, object, knowledge and truth. From the viewpoint of Kant's transcendental logic, formal logic does not have the ability to represent the nature of truth. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Lacan's psychoanalytic logic, Kant's transcendental logic misunderstands or only partially represents the state of things. But I would like to try to criticize the epistemological premise of the two forms of logic. Transcendental logic takes the evident and new function in that it has studied the necessary condition of content rather than the form of thinking which formal logic considers as his object of study. Transcendental logic evidently studies the categories which dominate our way of thinking. Can we say that the 12 categories which Kant provided are sufficient in explaining the necessity of thinking? Lacan's psychoanalytic logics tells us that Kant's categories are only a kind of metaphor related with hypothesis that tries to explain the possibility of synthetical judge a priori. Is Lacan's psychoanalytic logic sufficient in explaining the possibility of science? It is not sufficient in explaining the objectivity and strictness of science, for it depends on metaphor and metonymy which are useful to literature and unconsciousness. I would like to try to synthesize Kant's transcendental and Lacan's psychoanalytic logic in terms of structure-constructivism which combines both formal and dialectical logic, which is consistent with the ideal of human science, and not blinkered science. My conclusion is that Kant's ethical and esthetical theory should be modified though Lacan's psychoanalytic logic, and Lacan's theory of the unconsciousness revised by Kant's transcendental logic.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.145
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• pp.1-43
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• 2018

This article intends to look for the desirable form of Confucian familism in the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution. First of all, the concept of the fourth industrial revolution is a very vague concept. Therefore, it would be more meaningful to analyze the situation of the family in present Korean society and to find an alternative to it in Confucian familism. But the problem is that it is very burdensome to bring out the Confucian familism idea again. Since Confucian Confucianism was criticized in 1915 during the New Cultural Movement, many people have criticized Confucian familism as patriarchal and authoritarian, and thus an anti-democratic value that seriously damaged the equality of men and women. Therefore, the discussion starts with looking at the justification of such an evaluation. I wanted to see if their evaluation of Confucian familism is legitimate or an unjustified evaluation resulting from misunderstanding, and if it is an inappropriate evaluation, where they are based. In addition, I examined whether the cause of such an evaluation was attributed to the subject who made the evaluation, or because the spectrum of significance contained in the Confucian familism thought formed over 2500 years was too wide. I sought to reassess criticism of the existing Confucian familism by looking for answers to these questions. Through such a reevaluation, I has found that the wrong criticism of Confucian familism was because we saw the Confucian scholarship and the Confucian scholarship without distinguishing the ideological Confucianism from the Qin(秦) Dynasty. In the end, I tried to show that Confucian familism can function as an alternative to resolve family problems that are occurring in today's Korean society through the illuminating work of the ideas of Confucian familism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.111-140
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• 2014

In this paper, the main subjects with which I deal are as follows: (1) Is Distancing Philosophy from the real ruling power a way of practical-philosophical resistance, based on social reformation as a axiological directivity of Kim Tae-Gil's ethical thought, though it is negative type of resistance? Or is it a sort of transformed value-free opportunist behavior which allows antidemocratic ruling group to coerce the people into submission, assuming an uncompromising stand seemingly? (2) Is Kim's defense argument on the opening of the course of National Ethics and the all-out activation of National Ethics education under Park's Yushin Regime derived from his own philosophical belief? Or is it brought out from the external conditions and circumstances surrounding Kim Tae-Gil which forces him to participate in the national undertaking for the settlement of the course of National Ethics in the university? The 'provisional' answers about the two subjects are as follows: (1) Kim's Distancing Philosophy is a type of practical philosophical revolt against the dictatorship power under Yushin Regime, though it is negative form of resistance. We can accept this philosophical elucidation above all by confirming the fact that the reform of reality is the main ethical trait running through his entire ethical thought system. However distancing philosophy disclose the crucial limits to allow itself to boil to the philosophical practice compromising with real ruling power eventually, though it is intended upon its own social ethical directivity and conviction. (2) The primary factor which affects Kim to propose such an advocation argument on the course of National Ethics and the education of National Ethics is the external conditions and circumstances surrounding him, especially the power-relation between he and ruling group and intimate human relation between he and his superior philosophers who carries out the role of a ideologue for the Yushin Regime, rather than his own philosophical belief. But no matter what primary factor, Kim's action to make a advocating argument to support the course and the education of National Ethics is to blame, on that account that he cannot adequately his social responsibility and role given to him as a reformist moral philosopher who will pursue the realization of righteous democratic society. Along with that, It is not too enough to criticize him sharply for such defending action. The reason is that his supporting stance for National Ethics education is brought out, by not adhering closely to the philosophical way of distancing from the dictatorial power devoid of political legitimacy and moral justification.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.77-103
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• 2014

It is well known that Nietzsche insists on the affirmation of life, and the subject of 'affirmation of life' is a familiar one in Nietzsche literature. We want to throw an unfamiliar light on this familiar subject, connecting the theme of affirmation with that of redemption, and insisting on the centrality of the theme of redemption in Zarathustra's teaching of ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$. For Nietzsche, the redemption of human life means that its life is endowed with some meaning and its existence is positively justified. With this redemption, an active affirmation of life is possible, which means that we not only endure this life once but also request it for indefinite times. According to Nietzsche, for this kind of redemption and active affirmation we need an ultimate ground of meaning and only the excellence of life, that is, of 'will to power' can serve as this ultimate ground. Accepting the Greek way of identifying virtue with excellence, Nietzsche thought that life can justify itself at the ultimate form of life in ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$. Then, through ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$ the way is opened for man to endow meanings on and justify its life. That is, ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$ is not only the one who affirms its life, but also the very condition in which humanity can justify its life in general. With the goal and ideal of ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$ accepted, the affirmation and redemption of an individual life depends on how it manages to create its own life in relation to this goal and ideal. According to Nietzsche, though we cannot go back to the past, we still can recreate it and change its meanings through working on the future. Only those who try to create a meaningful future and thus recreate the past could redeem and affirm their own lives. That is, for Nietzsche, to affirm and redeem one's life means not just to change one's attitude to life but to create and recreate it with the eye for ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.145
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• pp.351-380
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• 2018

In every society, citizens must decide how to punish criminals, uphold the virtue of justice, and preserve the security of the community. In doing so, the members of society must ask themselves how they will punish those who carry out the most abhorrent of crimes. Many common responses to such a question is that death is an acceptable punishment for the most severe crimes. But to draw some theoretical distinction between a crime that deserves incarceration and a crime that is so heinous that it deserves capital punishment is subject to three errors. First, what possible line could be drawn? To decide on a particular number of deaths or to employ any standard would be arbitrary. Second, the use of a line would trivialize and undermine the deaths of those whose murderers fell below the standard. Third, any and all executions still are unjust, as the State should not degrade the institution of justice and dehumanize an individual who, although he or she has no respect for other human life, is still a living person. Simply put, all murders are heinous, all are completely unacceptable, and deserve the greatest punishment of the land; however, death as punishment is inappropriate. Also, while this article arrives at the conclusion that the death penalty is an inappropriate form of punishment, I have not offered an acceptable alternative that would appease those who believe capital offenders deserve a punishment that differs in its quality and severity. This is a burden that, admittedly, I am unable to meet. I finally conclude that the death penalty is unjustified retribution. This is the only claim that can effectively shift the intellectual paradigms of the participants in the debate. The continued use of the death penalty in society can only be determined and influenced by the collective conscience of the members of that society. As stated at the outset of this article, it is this essentially moral conflict regarding what is just and degrading that forms the backdrop for the past changes in and the present operation of our system of imposing death as a punishment for crime.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.96
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• pp.39-70
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• 2012

In order to locate Kant's concept of the highest good within ethics and the theory of moral religion, it needs to be approached with some qualifications: there are two rough ways to be suggested. The first way is to focus on the concept of the highest good that is explained in terms of the happiness in proportion to a rational being's virtue or to his/her worthiness to be happy. But the happiness determined in the sense outlined above would be (increasingly or decreasingly) changeable according to each one's individual morality-this is what is meant by each one's 'worthiness' here-, and would not be seen as the perfect one. It might even be said that this kind of happiness is possible in a sensible world generally taken, if the existence of God thought of as harmonizing natural phenomena and the moral order is successfully presupposed. The other way is to understand the concept of the highest good literally: in this view, the highest good shows that a rational being's character is completely appropriate to the moral law and for him/her, its corresponding idea, i.e., the perfect happiness, is considered with full justification. But the highest good in the sense sketched above-along with the existence of God and the immortality of the soul-is expected to be realized only in an intelligible world generally taken. This means that it should be appraised as an ideal of the highest good that includes the so-called 'physical happiness' specified in terms of the first way as its element. In this regard, it is seen to be somewhat restricted. Between the two concepts of the highest good already touched upon, the highest good of the possible world would be the one established in terms of the first way. In other words, it is not the highest good in an intelligible world, but the highest good in this world. Of course, it is true that we cannot help but assume the existence of God-a being as higher, as moral, as most holy, and as omnipotent-in order to explain the highest good in this world (namely, in order to establish the possibility of the combination of the happiness and the worthiness). For as long as both morally good acts and the happiness are considered to happen in a natural world, the cause of the nature (i.e., the existence of its creator), that is, God, must be able to be presupposed. In this vein, Kant interprets that most people view that the key of the Bible is to show that the best world which is characterized by an intelligible or heavenly kingdom is also actually feasible in this world. The wish of the people who have the morally good character is that God's kingdom comes and his will is properly achieved in this world. But we cannot know what God really does in order to realize his world in this world. Nonetheless, we are fully aware of what we should do in order to make ourselves a member of his world. It is specified like this: we should do our ethical duties and further proceed to establish an ethical community. Viewed this manner, it is concluded that an ethical community is not a merely ideal thing like the kingdom of the ends, but a human apparatus or institution that exists in this world.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.195-217
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• 2018

Inaction inertia effect refers to the phenomenon wherein people who missed attractive opportunities in the past do not take any action when they are given the opportunity to receive discounts (sale). The main objective of this study was to find out how such inaction inertia effect influenced the expected regret from the action, expected regret from inaction, and purchase intention depending on the two types of consumption purposes-for pleasure and for practical use. As the personal disposition of each consumer differs from one another, it was expected that habitual purchase behavior and maximization behavior would influence the inaction inertia. An experiment was thus conducted by using a scenario to satisfy the objective of this study. Results showed that in the case of consumers whose consumption purpose was for pleasure, those who habitually purchased the same brand showed a higher level of expected regret from the action and expected regret from inaction. In the case of maximization behavior, no differences were found in the expected regret from the action between practical consumption purpose and pleasurable consumption purpose. On the other hand, differences were found in the level of expected regret from inaction, which is the case wherein consumers who missed their first opportunity to receive discounts (sale) did not make any purchase on their second opportunity for discounts (sale). Thus, inaction inertia was shown in accordance with habitual purchase behavior in the case of consumption purpose for pleasure, but it was not clearly shown in the case of consumption for practical use. This is because there is a relatively low level of justification on consumption, in the case of consumption for practical use. On the other hand, it was found that consumers with maximization behavior felt a stronger sense of regret in the case of their expected regret for inaction in consumption for practical use than in consumption for pleasure. Also, with regard to purchase intention, it turned out that only consumers with pleasurable consumption purpose had purchase intentions. Through these study results, it would be necessary to consider the consumption purpose behind the purchase of products or services, with regard to inaction inertia, depending on personal dispositions. In accordance with these study results, several theoretical and practical implications were discussed.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.73
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• pp.153-184
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• 2018

The aim of this thesis was to examine the circumstances that led up to successful coin use across the entire nation in 1678 (the $4^{th}$ year of King Sukjong's reign), during the Joseon Dynasty. To this end, this thesis analysed the Sa-Mouk(事目, Provisions) that contained the institutional protocol for coin circulation, implemented by King Hyojong and the statesman Kim Youk(金堉) who had practical experience in these matters over the ten years of King Hyojong's reign(1649-1659). To regulate the problematic wide circulation of coarse cotton cloth as currency in the market of 1650 (the $1^{st}$ year of King Hyojong's reign), prohibition measures were implemented. Besides the superficial justification given for these measures(i.e., that the market price was disturbed by the use of coarse cotton cloth), there was another purpose to prohibiting the circulation of cotton cloth as money, following the standard ruled by the government: the state aimed to ensure momentum for the upcoming coin circulation policy, by strengthening its control of the current economy. In 1651 (the $2^{nd}$ year of King Hyojong's reign), the government fully cracked down on the use of coarse cotton cloth as currency, and simultaneously implemented its coin circulation policy in the Pyeongan(平安) region. The pretext for this policy was to raise finances to support people who were starving as a result of poor harvests and famine. People who received coins from government officials could purchase food in the market, and the coin circulation policy was judged to be successful. Subsequently, to extend coin circulation further throughout the region, the Sa-Mouk for Seoul was established. The Sa-Mouk included stipulations regarding the use of coin in transactions and for government expenditure; it aimed thereby to enhance the national policy's market credit. The hasty implementation of the policy for the expansion of coin circulation caused some problems that required its modification. In 1652 (the $3^{rd}$ year of King Hyojong's reign), coin circulation was increased to encompass the Gyeonggi(京畿) region, and some of the tax that had been paid in rice was now paid in coin. However, coins were in short supply, since there was insufficient copper, the main material used in coin production, and the policy faced a significant limitation. Therefore, in 1655(the $6^{th}$ year of King Hyojong's reign), a new Sa-Mouk for coin circulation was established. This Sa-Mouk included specifications regarding the determination of coin values based on rice and silver, and mandated the wide spread installation of stores for exchanging spot goods for coins throughout the region in which coins were circulating. This policy's objective was to secure stability for the national economy by further regulating coin circulation. The sustained implementation of the coin circulation policy for ten years by King Hyojong and the statesman Kim Youk offered the government an opportunity to accumulate experience in coin circulation in the market, and also to learn from institutional trial and error. This may have been one of the contributing factors to the nation-wide coin circulation that was established in 1678. The objective of the policy implemented during King Hyojong's reign was not to meet the market's requirements, but rather to ensure the preservation of the national economy, and this misjudgement constituted the policy's key limitation. At this time, the government urgently needed to secure finances to cope with the war against China's Qing Dynasty.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.29
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• pp.89-123
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• 2010

As above, as theoretical basis of critiques against School of Mohism, the researcher summarized the positions of the elder Confucian scholars including Meng Zi. In the body of text, taking it as promises, the researcher examined the critiques against Mo Tzu and School of Mohism as well focusing on the aspects and development of the theory of rejecting heterodoxy which had been introduced and strongly argued from the end of Goryeo kingdom to the late Joseon period. The summary of the body of this text is as follows: In the old literatures prior to Goryeo Kingdom, the researcher couldn't find any cases that either the School of Mohism or Mo Tzu including the Hundred Schools of Thought had been rejected explicitly. Having reached the end of Goryeo and the beginning of Joseon period, Meng Zi's viewpoints on the theory of rejecting heterodoxy had begun to emerge and come into play with the progress of accepting Neo-Confucianism, and, these critiques against Yang Zhu and Mo Tzu being given, the scholar-literati circle had started rejecting Buddhism and Lao Tzu. Basically the contents of the critiques against the School of Mohism in the early period of Joseon were in succession to Meng Zi's theory of rejecting heterodoxy and the views and thoughts of the elder Confucian scholars including Han Yu rather than any specific critiques against Mo Tzu' ideology itself. Until entering the middle of Joseon period, the critiques against the School of Mohism had been used as a tool to promote Confucianism in an affirmative manner, while arguing strongly against the viewpoint of Han Yu in the first place. Particularly, not only the original text of the Mo Tzu's writings were directly quoted, although it was partial, but also the contents of the critiques against the School of Mohism had been developed and stretched to the extent of their entire ideological system. Having approached to the late period of Joseon, the critiques against the School of Mohism had begun to be linked to those critiques against the study of state examination or of sentence patterns including Catholic Church, furthermore the critics raised their harsh tones against the irregularities of the society at large like the issue of corruptions of the government officials of those days instead, although they still had firmly stood on the ground of the theory of rejecting heterodoxy. Those scholars that belonged to the School of Practical Learning, in particular, said in justification of the School of Mohism arguing that the major ideologies of Mo Zi had usefulness in the real world, also they even evaluated that Meng Zi ' critiques against the School of Mohism were immoderate. To sum up, characteristics of scholars in the Joseon period to understand and critique the School of Mohism are that ideologies of Mo Tzu were mostly used as a tool for the sake of critiques against heresies in other sectors of society based mainly on Meng Zi's theory of rejecting heterodoxy, rather than opposing views against the ideologies or philosophies of the School of Mohism itself. Meanwhile, however, on the plus side, the critics praised Mo Tzu's individual efforts in order to put his ideology of peace into practice apart from the ideological system of the School of Mohism. Also, having reached the late period of Joseon, the researcher was able to have discovered the fact that the writings of Mo Tzu had been used as historical materials in order to ascertain historical truths of Confucian Scriptures, rather not having it regarded as an ideology text.

• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
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• no.39
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• pp.509-547
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• 2019

The cocoon breeding related national ritual ceremony exercised from the beginning time of Joseon is the 'clothing culture' that has taken its role in the ritual ceremony where it demonstrates the resolution of a state that placed importance in 'things to wear'. During the reign of King Seongjong, it enhanced the level of importance by adding the 'procedure to pick up the mulberry leaved by the queen personally'. During the reign of King Youngjo, the implication of the ritual ceremony was even more expanded that there was an new emergence of new type of national ceremony for the Joseon Era with its first ritual ceremony for woman to personally administer the memorial ceremony to the 'woman divinity' in addition to the 'Jakheonrye' procedure to personally present by the queen for the cocoon breeding. This is intended to meet the status of chingyeonguirye (farming-friendly ceremony) with King Youngjo to personally cultivate the dry field after administering Seonnongje (good harvest paying ceremony) that it is conspicuously demonstrating the importance of farming and cocoon breeding activities. As a result, the Chinjam (a type of ceremony that queen personally breeds cocoon for fabrics) related ceremonial rite that was rearranged during the reign of King Youngjo was settled into 11 ceremonial rites with the expansion of its contents. It ranges from the procedure to leave the palace for carrying out the ritual ceremony to the procedure for the crown princess and Hyebin-gung to accompany the queen, ritual for the queen to devote the Jakheonrye to exercise Chinjam, the ritual for the king to announce his royal message, johyeonui (morning assembly) exercised after completing Chinjam, it is the ritual for the queen to receive the box that contained the cocoon. This type of ritual ceremony is a significant expansion when compared with the exercise carried out earlier and it is part of characteristics displayed for ritual overhaul trend in the reign of King Youngjo. In the main procedures of these ceremonial rites, the music is accompanied and the music includes folk music, inspiration and so forth. The Chinjam related ritual ceremony in the reign of King Youngjo was established in the direction to establish it as the ritual ceremony for a woman who had the divine role of the seonjamje ritual to administer the ritual in a way of having the justification and reality to be consistent.