• 한국사회정책
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.69-96
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• 2013

This paper is to critically review the economic reasoning of non-sustainability of welfare state due to its intrinsic incentive problems and to see how the nordic welfare state responds to them. The welfare state as a political design of state to pursue equality has social insurance as its main economic function. It survives market failure of private insurance to contribute to human capital investment and industrial restructuring. The universal tax-financed welfare state, however, has the problem of tragedy of commons such as reduced work incentive and work ethics. But, the existing nordic welfare state overcomes it through employment-focused policy arrangements, maintenance of work ethics and benefits moral, incentive mechanism of wage-compression, public educational investment and its complementation with social security. The Nordic model shows that problems of incentive and moral are not about those of theory and reasoning, but about their reality which policies and institutions could respond to.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.840-842
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• 2005

Since 2001, Korea government has been purchasing the generation from renewable generation facilities with the higher incentive prices than market price in order to increase the penetration of renewable energies. Generally, the incentive purchase tariff is calculated on the base of the generation cost of renewable power facilities. This paper constructs the input data for economic analysis and evaluates the generation cost of PV, wind power, LFG and small hydro power using LCCA model.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.11-40
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• 2004

Organizations have attempted to develop Knowledge Management Systems for achieving competitive advantage by effectively managing organizational knowledge. However, if Knowledge Management Systems are not user-oriented, organizations may not attain desired goals. That is, it must be utilized and accepted by organizational members to be successful systems. This study proposes an extended Technology Acceptance Model and empirically validates it. For that purpose, a research model is set UP that consists of antecedent variables, perception moderators, and intention to use the system. Empirical data analysis found significant relationships among research variables, as suggested in research hypotheses. The results of the analysis indicated that perceived usefulness, ease of use, job relevance and information quality should be considered as important factors in designing Knowledge Management Systems. In addition, perceived value, incentive, affect, self-efficacy, and image were found to influence the perception of users in the usage situation.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.621-639
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• 2000

High population and economic growth leads to ever increasing demand for water resources, prompting many regional conflicts for the water. With the observation, this paper examines the allocation problem of flowing water between upstream and downstream regions, We offer a two- region model in which the downstream region pays a portion of product to the upstream region in order to induce the upstream region to share the water. Our model shows that the "side-payment" does not always work, because the ex post income of the downstream region could be lower than the income without the side-payment This happens when the externality the upstream region imposes on the downstream region is small. The paper derives the condition under which the incentive mechanism like side-payment is likely to fail (or work). The model also shows that the higher the degree of externality is, the less amount of side-payment should be. The results of the paper suggest that the incentive scheme can help the regional conflicts be solved if the externality effect generated by the water use of upstream region is big enough, which is in fact the case where the conflict is severe.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.564-568
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• 2005

Recently, Knowledge Management (KM) has been applied to construction industry. Surprising, there is few studies that address the most fundamental problem in KM: people may prefer not to share their knowledge so as to preserve their intellectual or unique values in the organization. Without the premise of each individual's willingness to share knowledge, there will be no valuable input for the IT system and, thus, no knowledge management at all. This paper aims to model the behavioral dynamics of knowledge sharing and to design an incentive system that may facilitate knowledge sharing for construction companies. In this paper, a game-theory based model will be developed, and the framework for designing an incentive system will be proposed according to the model.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.12
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• pp.321-332
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• 2020

Decentralized approaches are extensively researched by academia and industry in order to cover up the flaws of existing systems in terms of data privacy. Blockchain and decentralized learning are prominent representatives of a deconcentrated approach. Blockchain is secure by design since the data record is irrevocable, tamper-resistant, consensus-based decision making, and inexpensive of overall transactions. On the other hand, decentralized learning empowers a number of devices collectively in improving a deep learning model without exposing the dataset publicly. To motivate participants to use their resources in building models, a decent and proportional incentive system is a necessity. A centralized incentive mechanism is likely inconvenient to be adopted in decentralized learning since it relies on the middleman that still suffers from bottleneck issues. Therefore, we design an incentive model for decentralized learning applications by leveraging the Ethereum smart contract. The simulation results satisfy the design goals. We also outline the concerns in implementing the presented scheme for sensitive data regarding privacy and data leakage.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.23-32
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• 2023

Purpose: This study examines the effect of full information disclosure on seller profit when there exists information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, focusing on the risk averseness of buyers. By investigating the interaction between product quality and perceived risk through online sales data, we attempt to figure out the incentive structure of full information disclosure specifically when buyers are risk-averse, so that we can suggest more feasible information disclosure strategy to sellers. Research design, data and methodology: Our empirical model analyzes the sales data of collectible goods from a major online seller using Poisson regression. In our model, we have specifically considered risk-averseness of buyers by estimating the interaction effect between the product quality and perceived risk on seller profit, aiming for a more precise empirical analysis on sellers' incentive structure of full disclosure. Results: Our empirical analysis strongly supports the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk, showing that the incentive for full disclosure is much stronger when product quality is higher, and vice versa. Therefore, sellers are strongly encouraged to voluntarily reveal product weaknesses when their product quality is higher than average, while it is more profitable to hide any product defects when quality claim is lower than average. Conclusions: This study supports the related literature by confirming economic incentives for full disclosure, and also supplements and strengthens previous studies by presenting that the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk strongly affects seller profit. Our unique finding supports both mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure arguments and presents practical implications to marketing managers by suggesting that seller's incentive for revealing weaknesses depends on the level of seller's product quality.

• Korean Journal of Organic Agriculture
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.247-265
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• 2015

This study analyzes the factors affecting farmers' recognition and acceptance of sustainable agriculture. To accomplish the objectives of the study a farm survey was conducted using target respondents which were made of the local correspondents and reporters of Korea Rural Economic Institute. The Heckman's model was employed for an empirical analysis on determining the extent of farmers' acceptance of sustainable agriculture. The analysis results show that the more farmers think it is important for Korea to adopt sustainable farming practices, the more they adopt sustainable agriculture. It is also shown that the high incomes farmers earn, the more interest they have in the environment and thus the more likely they are to adopt sustainable agriculture. Based upon the empirical results it is suggested that an adoption of economic incentive instruments, education of sustainable agriculture, research and development of sustainable agriculture technology, and an establishment of sustainable agriculture infrastructure to expand the scale of sustainable agriculture.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.1481-1501
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• 2019

In opportunistic network, the behavior of a node is autonomous and has social attributes such as selfishness.If a node wants to forward information to another node, it is bound to be limited by the node's own resources such as cache, power, and energy.Therefore, in the process of communication, some nodes do not help to forward information of other nodes because of their selfish behavior. This will lead to the inability to complete cooperation, greatly reduce the success rate of message transmission, increase network delay, and affect the overall network performance. This article proposes a hybrid incentive mechanism (Mim) based on the Reputation mechanism and the Credit mechanism.The selfishness model, energy model (The energy in the article exists in the form of electricity) and transaction model constitute our Mim mechanism. The Mim classifies the selfishness of nodes and constantly pay attention to changes in node energy, and manage the wealth of both sides of the node by introducing the Central Money Management Center. By calculating the selfishness of the node, the currency trading model is used to differentiate pricing of the node's services. Simulation results show that by using the Mim, the information delivery rate in the network and the fairness of node transactions are improved. At the same time, it also greatly increases the average life of the network.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.25-47
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• 2010

CS is one of the major concerns of managers in the world because it is well known to be a key medium construct for firms' superior outcome. One of the major agents for CS management is retailers. Firms try to manage not only employees but also retailers to promote CS behaviors. And so diverse incentives are used to promote their CS behaviors under diverse channel setting such as multi-channel. However in spite of the rising needs there has been scarce studies on the optimal incentive structure for a manufacturer to offer competing retailers at the multi-channel. In this paper, we try to find better way for a manufacturer to promote the competing retailers' CS behaviors. We investigated how to promote the retailers' CS behavior via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the possible incentive, CS bonus type reward introduced in the studies of Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt(1994) and Chu and Desai(1995). We build up a multi stage complete information game and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Stages of the game are as following. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price(w) and CS bonus($\eta$). (Stage 2) Both retailers in competition set CS effort level($e_i$) and retail price($p_i$) simultaneously. (Stage 3) Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the manufacturer's initial reputation and retailers' CS efforts.