• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.638-642
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• 2005

This paper presents incentive application strategies and delay prevention strategies as schematic approaches to improve time performance of highway construction contracts. This research recognizes the importance of improving time performance during highway construction. Strategic solutions of the most core issues on time performance incentive contracting are identified. The suggested incentive application strategies develop criteria for applying time classification to projects, for assigning project time classifications to contractors and designers, and for determining appropriate incentive values in A (cost) + B (time cost) and other performance incentive contracts. The suggested delay prevention strategies develop criteria for determining the appropriate subsurface utility engineering (SUE) level and to develop best practices for avoiding utility relocation delays. A schematic approach for each strategy is developed. This paper also introduces current incentive contracting practices in Florida. The researchers obtained the information from experienced persons in the highway construction industry, including key highway contractors, designers, and Department of Transportation (DOT) and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) personnel. The major focus of this research is to develop strategies and suggest approaches to improve time performance of highway construction contracts. For future study, practical tools to facilitate implementation of the suggested strategies should be developed, so that the criteria, implementation processes, and best practices developed may contribute to the current industry-wide effort to improve time performance.

• Land and Housing Review
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.115-124
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• 2020

Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) contract is designed for minimizing any disruption of traffic flow in road construction projects. I/D contracting projects have been evaluated with regard to time and cost performance in various states, more than 35 states. However, construction project managers and planners have little understanding of the project factors that affect the project time and cost performance of highway construction projects using I/D regulations. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to find factors that affect I/D project success or failure to improve the decision-making process for the implementation of I/D projects. In order to achieve the objectives of this research, the researchers collected I/D road construction project data from FDOT and performed evaluation for each collected project. Then, project data analysis to identify key factors that affect I/D project performance was performed. In conclusion, five significant factors for project time performance and six significant factors for project cost perfornace were identified and summarized.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2013.01a
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• pp.328-331
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• 2013

Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) contracting experiences in many states have been evaluated in terms of time and cost performance and substantial project time savings were found in many project cases. However, there is little understanding on individual project success factors for I/D projects during construction. This paper explores the significance of I/D clause in the success of the MacArthur Maze reconstruction project and summarizes a list of group causes that explains and elaborates on the detailed factors. The methods used for carrying out this study started with a search of online media and news reports and contract documents were also obtained from Caltrans. After review of the preliminary information, Interviews were performed with the Caltrans Resident Engineer and the contractor's project manager who were in charge of the MacArthur Maze reconstruction. In conclusion, the evaluation of their responses hinted at six significant cause groups responsible for the project's success. These groups can be listed as: 1) Motivation, 2) Policy, 3) Teamwork, 4) Communication, 5) Expectation, and 6) Resource Management.

• Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.51-54
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• 2010

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2004.10a
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• pp.539-553
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• 2004

This paper models and solves contracting schemes for both when quality is perfectly observable and when quality is not perfectly observable in supply chain. When quality is perfectly observable, the first-best optimal solution which is that the marginal utility of procurer obtained from the quantity and quality supplied by suppliers (the price) is equal to the marginal cost to produce the quantity and quality is obtained. However, when quality is not perfectly observable to procurers the optimal solution cannot be the first-best but the second-best where the price is greater than the marginal cost to produce the quantity and quality and social welfare is less than that of the first-best solution.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.25-36
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• 2006

Consider a supply chain in which a vendor supplies a product to a buyer. We assume that the buyer's and vendor's inventory cost structures are different, resulting in differences in inventory order/delivery cycle times. Here, if one party insists on its individually optimal order/delivery quantity, the other party will suffer from mismatches in cycle times. Under this scenario, coordination contracts that make use of either a Net Term/Two parts Term Trade Credit or a Quantity Discount are designed to align individually optimal order Quantities. We compare and analyze the perform ances of these contracts. The focus of the comparison is the ability of contracts to generate a lower cost for the supply chain. We show that a Trade Credit policy can be effectively used to coordinate a supply chain. In many cases it will result in a lower supply chain cost compared to that achieved by using a Quantitative Discount policy.

• Kyungpook Mathematical Journal
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• v.64 no.3
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• pp.371-393
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• 2024

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a highly contagious viral disease with high mortality rate. There is no vaccine against SARS, but the spread can be limited by masking or social distancing. In this paper we implement a game-theoretic model of voluntary precautions against SARS. We build on the compartmental ODE model of the 2003 SARS epidemic. We assume that susceptible individuals can mask and/or limit contacts with others in order to decrease their chances of contracting SARS. Since the risk of SARS infection depends on the actions of others, this creates a public goods game. We find the Nash equilibrium, the solution of the game, which is the optimal voluntary level of precautions the individuals should take. We also study the effects of such actions on the spread of SARS and show that the effect significantly depends on the individual cost of the precautions. As soon as the cost rises above a critical threshold, the individuals will have no incentive to use any kind of voluntary precaution.

• Journal of Fashion Business
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• v.2 no.4
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• pp.102-111
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• 1998

The purpose of this study is to present the basic material for the competitive, high-quality products by analyzing employees' attitude toward their job and some factors which influence the enhancement of productivity, education of workers, and facilities. This project was mainly conducted the conditions of women's wear manufacturing industries in Taegu by interviewing 143 employees in the sewing department. The result of this dissertation can be summarized as follows; 1. When it comes to the division of task in the sewing department, one team is composed of chairpersons (33.5%), assistant members (27.4%) and sub-assistant members (26.6%). The inspection of commodities as well as the enhancement of work on ironing for elaboration was divided as completion (12.6%) and finally the forms of task were made up of design sampling team (49%) and contracting team (51%). 2. Among the needle workers, as many as 60% employees had received technical education, which was by means of being passed down from the predecessors (81.6%). In terms of the period of education, from 2 to 5 years topped the list. The contents of education comprise patterning, sewing (65.2%) and ironing (20.3%). 3. The department of design takes charge of the report on working directions up to 88.2% and the working directions were used by 69.9 % of technicians. The directors of working conditions and methods were chiefs of designing department (37.7%) and those of sewing department (30.8%). The factors of defective goods were low-quality materials (50.0%), the deficiency in skills of workers. In terms of methods for preventing defects, technical education of workers, standardization of task and investment for factory automation were suggested. 4. As for their perception of present work, most of employees (80%) look upon it as a way of earning a living and 11% of them wanted to derive many things from their work. 59.2% of workers were satisfied with the product. When it comes to the incentive system provided by company, 67.0% responsed that it was not bad, and 23.9% evaluated it as 'satisfactory'.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.398-407
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• 2018

Standard guidelines for marine accident investigation have been prepared through the enforcement of the Casualty Investigation code as of January 2010. In addition, as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) recommended contracting the state to manage a marine incident system established under this code, Korea also has newly established provisions for a marine incident system in the 'Act on the Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine Accidents' also as of 2010. The Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST) has made a multilateral effort to prevent marine accidents through the efficient operation of a marine incident system, but this system has not been properly activated. This study examines the operational status and problems of a marine incident system and analyzes the marine incident systems of foreign countries and similar transportation agencies such as railroads and aviation. Options include switching to voluntary reporting of marine incidents, transferring responsibility to a non judicial private organization, expanding incentive systems for a marine incidents, revising regulation and preparing detailed implementation guidelines.