• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 추계학술대회 논문집 전력기술부문
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• pp.60-62
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• 2001

This paper shows the optimal bidding strategy determination method using Nash equilibrium concept by defining bidding strategy vector. This vector is 2-dimension vector whose components are generation amount and generation cost. Thereby we are able to make all possible strategies and their's payoff table. And then we erase dominated strategies one by one so that we obtain Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategy of generation bidding game.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.75-83
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• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.

• 한국산학기술학회논문지
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• 제16권3호
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• pp.2178-2184
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• 2015

무선 네트워크기술의 발전으로 사용자들은 다양한 네트워크를 쉽게 사용하며 다양한 서비스를 이용할 수 있지만, 서비스 제공자들은 서비스의 질을 개선하고 네트워크 자원을 효율적으로 관리하여야 한다. 본 논문에서는 그레이 관계 분석(GRA)과 게임이론을 결합하여 효율 무선자원관리(RRM) 방안을 제시한다. 첫 번째 단계에서, GRA 방법을 이용하여 네트워크 선호도를 나타내는 GRC를 구하고, 두 번째 단계에서는 내쉬 균형점을 찾아 네트워크 제공자에게 최대 보상을 제공하는 서비스를 선택한다. 한 개의 WiMAX와 2개의 WLAN이 공존하는 이종 무선 환경에서, 4개의 응용서비스중 하나를 요청하는 서비스들을 처리하기 위해 게임은 반복적으로 수행하였다. 시뮬레이션 결과, WiMAX, WLAN 1과 WLAN 2의 게임에서, 각 경기자들은 각각 93, 90.6과 92.8로 최대 보수를 얻는 것을 알 수 있었다. 결과적으로 제안된 시스템은 이종 네트워크에서 사용자 서비스 요청이 있을 때, 네트워크 운용자의 보수를 최대로 할 수 있는 효과적인 자원관리 방법임을 알 수 있었다.

• 한국산림과학회지
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• 제80권3호
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• pp.287-295
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• 1991

국립공원(國立公園)을 포함한 자연휴양지(自然休養地)에서 과도한 개발에 따른 자원파괴나 무절제한 이용행위로 인한 환경오염현상은 Social Dilemma에 기인하는 현상으로 볼 수 있다. 자연휴양지(自然休養地)의 Social Dilemma는 공공자원(公共資源)인 산림휴양자원(山林休養資源)을 개발하고 관리하는 과정에서 발생하는 "개인의 이윤추구행위와 공공이익간의 갈등(葛藤)"을 말한다. Social Dilemma는 2가지 특성으로 요약된다. 첫째, 공동체의 구성원 각자가 자신의 이익만을 추구할 경우, 서로 협동하는 경우와 비교해서 더 큰 손해의 댓가를 치러야 하고, 둘째, 공동의 이익을 위해 협동을 하는 경우에는 구성원 각자는 더 큰 보상을 받게 된다. 국립공원(國立公園)에서 Social Dilemma의 해소방안(解消方案)은 크게 구조적(構造的)인 접근방법(接近方法)과 개별적(個別的)인 접근방법(接近方法)으로 구분되고, 구조적(構造的)인 접근방법(接近方法)에는 관리대표자(管理代表者)의 선출(選出), 선택적(選擇的) 보상제도(補償制度) 및 자원(資源)의 소유(所有)나, 관리(管理)를 개별화(個別化)하는 방법이 있으며, 개별적(個別的)인 접근방법(接近方法)에는 직접대화(直接對話)와 홍보(弘報) 및 교육적(敎育的)인 접근법이 포함된다. 본 연구에서는 실험실 연구와 공원현장실험연구의 결과를 Social Dilemma 이론에 의해 종합함으로써 자연휴양지자원에서의 Social Dilemma 이론의 적용을 위한 근거를 제시하였다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 1995년도 추계학술대회 논문집 학회본부
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• pp.213-215
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• 1995

This paper is concerned with a coplanar pursuit-evasion game of one inertial evader and two identical noninertial pursuers. The terminal time is fired and the payoff is the distance between the evader and the nearest pursuer when tile game is terminated. The value functions and the strategies is constructed for all the game surface. To get a value function, we use the generalization of the Bellman-Isaacs fundamental equation.

• 한국시스템다이내믹스연구
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2011

Seoul citizens are currently suffering from high housing price. Home prices have risen more rapidly than salaries so owning a housing unit (apartment, condominium, or single-family home) in Seoul is becoming more difficult than ever. Therefore, this research examines the behavior of average Seoul citizen in owning housing unit in Seoul, Korea, particularly in terms of the length of time required to afford a house unit. This research estimates that it will take about 18.75 years in maximum after getting a job (12.75 years after purchasing the housing unit) to own housing unit in Seoul that is currently valued at $300,000 where the growth rate of income is 2.97% and consumption price increases at a rate of 2.95% per annum. Finally in this research, the optimal growth rate of housing price is estimated ranged from 3.5 to 4.0% minimizing the loan payoff period.

• 경영과학
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.33-43
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• 2010

This paper presents a method for the estimation and analysis of the economic value of weather forecasts for CRM decision-making problems in the leisure industry. Value is calculated in terms of the customer's satisfaction returned from the user's decision under the specific payoff structure, which is itself represented by a customer's satisfaction ratio model. The decision is assessed by a modified cost-loss model to consider the customer's satisfaction instead of the loss or cost. Site-specific probability and deterministic forecasts, each of which is provided in Korea and China, are applied to generate and analyze the optimal decisions. The application results demonstrate that probability forecasts have greater value than deterministic forecasts, provided that the users can locate the optimal decision threshold. This paper also presents the optimal decision strategy for specific customers with a variety of satisfaction patterns.

• 경영과학
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.87-92
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• 1992

The purpose of this paper is to study the sensitivity analysis in the matrix game. The third type sensitivity analysis is defined as finding the characteristic region of an element of the payoff matrix in which the set of current active strategies is preserved. First by using the relationship between matrix game and linear programming, we induce the conditions which must be satisfied for preserving the set of current active strategies. Second we show the characteristic regions of active and inactive strategy. It is found that the characteristic regions we suggests in this paper are same with that of the type one sensitivity analysis suggested by Sung[3] except only one case.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제66권1호
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• pp.16-22
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• 2017

In order to reduce costs of electricity energy at periods of peak demand, there has been an exponential interest in Demand Response (DR). This paper discusses the effect on the participants' behavior in response to DR. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium point of the electricity market with DR is derived by modeling a DR curve, which is suitable for microeconomic analysis. Cournot model is used to analyze the electricity market of imperfect competition that includes strategic behavior of the generation companies. Strategic behavior with DR makes it harder to compute equilibrium point due to the non-differential function of payoff distribution. This paper presents a solution method for achieving the equilibrium point using the best response function of the strategic players. The effect of DR on the electricity market is illustrated using a test system.

• 로봇학회논문지
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• 제4권2호
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• pp.97-104
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• 2009

Recently, simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) approaches employing Rao-Blackwellized particle filter (RBPF) have shown good results. However, due to the usage of the accurate sensors, distinct particles which compensate one another are attenuated as the RBPF-SLAM continues. To avoid this particle depletion, we propose the strategic games to assign the particle's payoff which replaces the importance weight in the current RBPF-SLAM framework. From simulation works, we show that RBPF-SLAM with the strategic games is inconsistent in the pessimistic way, which is different from the existing optimistic RBPF-SLAM. In addition, first, the estimation errors with applying the strategic games are much less than those of the standard RBPF-SLAM, and second, the particle depletion is alleviated.