• SUVANNABHUMI
• /
• v.10 no.2
• /
• pp.157-180
• /
• 2018

Area studies, including Asian and Southeast Asian studies, in the post-Cold War era have been facing an epochal challenge that is rooted in two conditions: on the one hand, the end of the Cold War and the fading geopolitical rationale, and on the other, the emergence of the technology-driven transformation of the global economy and society. The consequences thus far are paradoxical: 1) While the technology-led transformation needs a workforce with critical and innovative abilities, higher education becomes more hyper-utilitarian; 2) While the transformation instigates increasing diversity of identities in global cultures, many countries thrive for STEM education at the expense of learning languages and cultures, including area studies which are essential for diversity. Southeast Asian studies programs need to change in response to these new conditions. These changing conditions and paradoxes, nevertheless, take different forms and degrees in the American, European and Asian academies, thanks to their different histories of higher education. The prospects for Southeast Asian Studies in these various academies are likely to be different too.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.37
• /
• pp.177-192
• /
• 2015

The Chinese government portrays the One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) and South Korea President Park Geun-hae's Eurasia Initiative as a win-win opportunity which will hurt nobody's interests, but some South Korean commentators have interpreted it as much more than just a trade and development deal: they focus on the geopolitical implications and the possibility that the balance of power in Asia will be disturbed. South Korea depends upon its maritime-oriented Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in focusing on its alliance with the US to deter North Korean threats and explore its export-based economic growth and development, and yet cannot afford to be left out of these initiatives which could transform the economic and logistical linkage between South Korea and Europe. Given its negative reception by the some pundits, however, South Korea should be more precautious for expressing only full-fledged supports for the BRI and Eurasia Initiative. Opponents of these two initiatives doubt that its putative benefits can be realized, at least in the short term, arguing that creating the necessary rail interconnections may be too costly.

• SUVANNABHUMI
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.91-128
• /
• 2023

In recent decades, Indonesia and the Middle Eastern countries have increased and expanded their political, security, economic, and socio-cultural ties. Qatar is one of the Middle Eastern countries which have fortified ties with Indonesia. This article aims to analyze the nature and scope of Indonesia-Qatar relations through the five-dimensional framework developed by George Eberling, which consists of political-diplomatic, economic-trade, military-security, cultural, and petroleum-energy relations (Eberling 2017). Despite being significantly distinct in history, demography, geographic size, and location, Jakarta and Doha have been provided opportunities to expand their cooperation on multifaceted dimensions by way of common economic, geopolitical, and cultural interests. Throughout the paper, the primary drivers of the cooperation are also discussed, alongside its future prospects.

• SUVANNABHUMI
• /
• v.16 no.1
• /
• pp.205-228
• /
• 2024

The ASEAN and ROK have played a crucial role in fostering regional peace and economic development. Nevertheless, the recent strategic competition between the US and China has turned the region into a contested arena. The relationship faces challenges due to the ROK's growing alignment with the US, prompting a rising interest in minilateralism as an alternative collaboration model. This paper scrutinizes the impact of ROK's foreign policy behavior, with a focus on minilateralism as a preferred cooperation model with ASEAN. The study centers on BIMP-EAGA, investigating its effectiveness in sustaining collaboration amid geopolitical rivalry. The paper concludes that BIMP-EAGA, as a manifestation of minilateralism, serves as an alternative platform for ROK and ASEAN cooperation. However, the study reveals that the implementation of BIMP-EAGA falls short of expectations. This paper emphasizes the need for greater subregional focus and comprehensive coverage of BIMP-EAGA to truly reflect the shared interests of ASEAN member states.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.4 no.1
• /
• pp.1-56
• /
• 2022

Why has India become a key actor in the maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region? There are some external factors, but for India, its geo-strategic frontier encompassing its geopolitical and maritime interests is expanding rapidly beyond its territorial space across both the Indian and Pacific oceans amidst an increasingly arduous geopolitical and security environment. India must, therefore, acquire the ability to influence events within this strategic arena using all facets of national power, including maritime-military power. Lately, therefore, New Delhi has invested much intellectual capital to review its maritime-security strategy. India's new strategy is premised on the concept of holistic security involving the 'softer' aspects of maritime-security, and a rekindling of maritime consciousness in India, a nation that has traditionally been beset by 'sea-blindness'. The strategy adopts a region-wide, inclusive, and a more proactive approach than hitherto, as is evident in its title 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy'. While it deals with the growing concern of new non-traditional threats in the Indian littoral and the need for military deterrence and preparedness, it also addresses the imperatives for India to seek a favorable and rules-based benign environment in its immediate and extended maritime periphery, including through multi-vectored strategic partnerships dictated by its enduring principle of strategic autonomy. For a more profound and comprehensive understanding of India's maritime-security strategy, this paper examines the key unstated and implicit factors that underpin the strategy. These include India's historical and cultural evolution as a nation; its strategic geography; its geopolitical and security perceptions; and the political directions to its security forces. The paper deals specifically with India's response to maritime threats ranging from natural disasters, crime and state-sponsored terrorism to those posed by Pakistan and China, as well as the Indian Navy's envisaged security role East of the Malacca Straits. It also analyzes the aspects of organizational restructuring and force planning of India's maritime-security forces.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
• /
• v.20 no.3
• /
• pp.267-286
• /
• 2017

The main purpose of this paper is to identify the spatiality of North Korea and China border regions through investigating the exceptional characteristics of the regions with the concept of positionality, which allows us to realize the relative position between subject and object. Border regions could be identified appropriately by considering the concept of switching positionality, as it is a kind of multiple space in which its sudden closure and opening should be configured in accordance with geopolitical and geoeconomic changes centering around border line. The main arguments of this research concerned with border regions with the concept of switching positionality are fallen into three. Firstly, changes in border regions should be analyzed by investigating more broader contexts and conjunctural perspectives, and even an internal condition stemmed from locality. Secondly, trajectories of border regions could be analyzed by the assemblages of various powers. Finally, the positionality of economic actors should be examined by identifying dynamic relations between geoeconomics and geopolitics. In particular, the concept of positionality has led to a number of insights into discussions on time-space, and spatiality in relational-dialectical, socio-spatial, and power-topological perspectives. Based upon this concept of positionality, the research has identified exceptional characteristics in North Korea and China border regions. It argues that the exceptionality of the region has stemmed from the intersection between the unstability of geopolitical security and various geoeconomic benefits.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
• /
• v.9 no.3
• /
• pp.297-313
• /
• 2003

Problems caused by the U.S. military bases have attracted little attention until recently due to the national security of S.Korea and the peace of North-Eastern Asia, emphasized from the perspective of macro-geopolitics. However, since the political regime has been democratized and political discourses have been liberalized from the 1990s, those problems become a nation-widely serious social issue, though they have been brought about on the local areas. Thus, it can be suggested that micro-geopolitics is highly relevant and significant in approaching the local problems caused by the U.S. military bases, and ultimately resolving the macro-geopolitical problem of longstanding unfair relations in the SOFA and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. This paper aims to consider local problems caused by the U.S. military bases and resolving strategies from the perspective of micro-geopolitics. First of all, it discusses some significance of the micro-geopolitical perspective, as it has been recently emphasized in political geography in considering local problems and politics of life on the basis of place, then looks on empirically criminal and environmental problems caused by the U.S. military bases, analyses the questionnaire date on the perception of local dwellers around the military camps in Nam-gu Daegu, and finally suggests strategies to resolve those problems, which level up from the micro to the macro-scale of geopolitics.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
• /
• v.19 no.2
• /
• pp.173-188
• /
• 2016

This paper argues that the establishment of the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone (KEPZ), the first EPZ in East Asia, is a compromise of cold-war geopolitical economy in the 1960s. The KEPZ is part of the liberalization policy advise of the US Aid agency which intended to push the KMT (Kuomintang) government to downsize the nationalized sectors and foster private enterprises and encourage foreign investments. However, the KMT state hesitated to embrace the advice wholeheartedly but was forced to implement selectively the policies. To meet the compromise between liberalization and control, the KMT government takes advantage of the KEPZ to grab the geoeconomic opportunities emerging from the new international division of labor in the 1960s without losing the geopolitical support from the US. The idea that zoning as a space of compromise would provide a subtle re-examination of the rise of the KEPZ which is conventionally explained by the functionalist arguments such as increase of employment opportunities, foreign investments and export by the far-sighted developmental state.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
• /
• v.12 no.4
• /
• pp.475-495
• /
• 2006

This paper is to analyse a changing space of energy flows in Northeast Asia from geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives that have been recently promoted for energy security of countries in this region. The research is based on an analytical framework in an integration of political ecology and political economy. Because of an ever-increasing input of energy resources for economic growth and of dramatically increasing price of crude oil and recent instability of oil market, South Korea, China and Japan have been deeply concerned with energy security and conducted very actively geopolitical strategies. And hence the space of energy flows in the region is now in a process of dynamic reconfiguration, in which the project for development of oil and natural gas fields in East Siberia and construction of pipelines to transport them can be seen as one of competitive issues among these countries. In spite of worrying about stagflation due to rapid increase of oil price, such geo-strategies for energy security and reconfiguration of space of energy flows seem to keep the accumulation of capital in this region continue with generation of huge privatized oil companies.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.37
• /
• pp.104-143
• /
• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.