• 호남수학학술지
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• 제35권2호
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• pp.225-234
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• 2013

Many studies of experimental economics have produced outcomes which contradict the predictions of Nash equilibrium, which relies heavily upon the premise of selfishness of an individual. In the games involving contexts of social conflicts represented by the prisoners' dilemma game, the experiments yields outcomes quite different from what are predicted by the conventional wisdom. In order to fill this gap between the conventional Nash Equilibrium and experimental outcomes, non-selfish (or other-regarding) motives of human behavior are introduced and then a new equilibrium concept, RAE-equilibrium is developed. It is also proved that an RAE-equilibrium exists under quite general conditions. Then it is applied to the prisoners' dilemma game that some of the experimental outcomes can be explained.

• 대한수학회지
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• 제40권5호
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• pp.883-899
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• 2003

In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6] , we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we shall prove the existence of generalized Pareto equilibria in non-compact generalized multiobjective game.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제14권2호
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• pp.97-104
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• 1989

This paper extends the existence proofs of a Nash equilibrium to a more general class of differentila game models with constraints on the control spaces. With the assumptions of continuity, convexity, and compactness, the existence is proved using Kakutani Theorem and via a path-following approach. Furthermore, the proof for a period-by-period optimization of multi-period problems provides an insight to a numerical solution algorithm to differential game models with constraints.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.291-319
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• 2002

This Paper investigates imperfect competition and economy of scale on Korean energy markets based on computable general equilibrium model. Some industries like energy sector have exhibited that their economies have strong economies of scale and imperfect competition. Thus these industrial organization facts should be incorporated into CGE model. In our model, non-competitive markets are adopted and compare these results with convention perfect competition model.

• 대한수학회보
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• 제33권4호
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• pp.587-592
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• 1996

In 1950, Nash [5] first proved the existence of equilibrium for games where the player's preferences are representable by continuous quasiconcave utilities and the strategy sets are simplexes. Next Debreu [3] proved the existence of equilibrium for abstract economies. Recently, the existence of Nash equilibrium can be further generalized in more general settings by several athors, e.g. Shafer-Sonnenschein [6], Borglin-Keiding [2], Yannelis-Prabhaker [8]. In the above results, the convexity assumption is very essential and the main proving tools are the continuous selection technique and the existence of maximal elements. Still there have been a number of generalizations and applications of equilibrium existence theorem in generalized games.

• Structural Engineering and Mechanics
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• 제30권4호
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• pp.387-402
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• 2008

The Integrated Force Method (IFM) has been developed in recent years for the analysis of civil, mechanical and aerospace engineering structures. In this method all independent or internal forces are treated as unknown variables which are calculated by simultaneously imposing equations of equilibrium and compatibility conditions. The solution by IFM needs the computation of element equilibrium and flexibility matrices from the assumed displacement, stress-resultant fields and material properties. This paper presents a general purpose code for the automatic generation of element equilibrium and flexibility matrices for plate bending elements using the Integrated Force Method. Kirchhoff and the Mindlin-Reissner plate theories have been employed in the code. Paper illustrates development of element equilibrium and flexibility matrices for the Mindlin-Reissner theory based four node quadrilateral plate bending element using the Integrated Force Method.

• 무역학회지
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• 제47권4호
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• pp.125-135
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• 2022

This study is to analyze the economic effects of tariff reduction using computable general equilibrium(CGE) model. We set up the social accounting matrix for five-base equilibrium year. Our main findings are as follows. First, the impact of tariff reduction on GDP was different from time to time. It meas that the differentiated economics structure was affected by tariff reduction. As our economic grew up, the impact of tariff reduction was measured much higher. Second, until 1995 the impact of tariff reduction on total export and import was increased, then while 1995 the increase was dropped. This is because we reduced the tariff by the WTO negotiations. Third, the tariff reduction affected the price of imported goods, so it contributed to substitute effects between domestic and imported goods. According to these results, we found out the importance of the linkage between the tariff reduction and economic structure.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• 제29권3_4호
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• pp.603-619
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• 2011

To the best of our knowledge, it would probably be the first time in the literature that we clarify the relationship between Yamada's method and viscosity iteration correctly. We design iterative methods based on the hybrid steepest descent algorithms for solving variational inclusions, equilibrium problems. Our results unify, extend and improve the corresponding results given by many others.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• 제5권3호
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• pp.607-614
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• 1998

In this note we shall give a new existence theorem of equilibrium in social systems with coordination under general assump-tions by using the Kakutani fixed point theorem.

• 충청수학회지
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.691-698
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• 2010

In this paper, we first introduce a new model of strategic Nash game with insatiability, and next give two social equilibrium existence theorems for general strategic games which are comparable with the previous results due to Arrow and Debreu, Debreu, and Chang in several aspects.