• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.6 no.12
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• pp.3133-3151
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• 2012

The optimal price strategy selection of two bounded rational cognitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a duopoly spectrum sharing market is investigated. The bounded rational operators dynamically compete to sell the leased spectrum to secondary users in order to maximize their profits. Meanwhile, the secondary users' heterogeneous preferences to rate and price are taken into consideration. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) is employed to model the dynamic price strategy selection of the MVNOs taking into account the response of the secondary users. The behavior dynamics and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the operators are derived via replicated dynamics. Furthermore, a reward and punishment mechanism is developed to optimize the performance of the operators. Numerical results show that the proposed evolutionary algorithm is convergent to the ESS, and the incentive mechanism increases the profits of the operators. It may provide some insight about the optimal price strategy selection for MVNOs in the next generation cognitive wireless networks.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.5819-5840
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• 2018

Considering the topology of hierarchical tree structure, each cluster in WSNs is faced with various attacks launched by malicious nodes, which include network eavesdropping, channel interference and data tampering. The existing intrusion detection algorithm does not take into consideration the resource constraints of cluster heads and sensor nodes. Due to application requirements, sensor nodes in WSNs are deployed with approximately uncorrelated security weights. In our study, a novel and versatile intrusion detection system (IDS) for the optimal defense strategy is primarily introduced. Given the flexibility that wireless communication provides, it is unreasonable to expect malicious nodes will demonstrate a fixed behavior over time. Instead, malicious nodes can dynamically update the attack strategy in response to the IDS in each game stage. Thus, a multi-stage intrusion detection game (MIDG) based on Bayesian rules is proposed. In order to formulate the solution of MIDG, an in-depth analysis on the Bayesian equilibrium is performed iteratively. Depending on the MIDG theoretical analysis, the optimal behaviors of rational attackers and defenders are derived and calculated accurately. The numerical experimental results validate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed scheme.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.330-337
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• 2000

This paper proposes a new concept of coordinating green this which controls 10 traffic intersection systems. For instance, if we have a baseballs game at 8 pm today, traffic volume toward the baseball game at 8 pm today, traffic volume toward the baseball game will be incr eased 1 hour or 1 hour 30 minutes before the baseball game. at that time we can not pred ict optimal green time Even though there have smart elctrosensitive traffic light system. Therefore, in this paper to improve average vehicle speed and reduce average vehicle waiting time, we created optimal green time using fuzzy rules and neural network. Computer simulation results proved reducing average vehicle waiting time proposed coordinating green time better than electro-sensitive traffic light system. Therefore, in this paper to improvevehicle speed and reduce average vehicle waiting time, we created optiual green time fuzzy rules and neural network. Computer simulation results proved reducing average vehicle waiting time which proposed coordinating green time better than electro-sensitive traffic light system dosen't consider coordinating green time.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.9
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• pp.4220-4241
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• 2017

For the downlink energy-harvesting small cell network, this paper proposes an interference management algorithm based on distributed coalitional game. The cooperative interference management problem of the energy-harvesting small cells is modeled as a coalitional game with transfer utility. Based on the energy harvesting strategy of the small cells, the time sharing mode of the small cells in the same coalition is determined, and an optimization model is constructed to maximize the total system rate of the energy-harvesting small cells. Using the distributed algorithm for coalition formation proposed in this paper, the stable coalition structure, optimal time sharing strategy and optimal power distribution are found to maximize the total utility of the small cell system. The performance of the proposed algorithm is discussed and analyzed finally, and it is proved that this algorithm can converge to a stable coalition structure with reasonable complexity. The simulations show that the total system rate of the proposed algorithm is superior to that of the non-cooperative algorithm in the case of dense deployment of small cells, and the proposed algorithm can converge quickly.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2000.05a
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• pp.292-297
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• 2000

This paper proposes a new concept of coordinating green time which controls 10 traffic intersection systems. For instance, if we have a baseball game at 8 pm today, traffic volume toward the baseball game at 8 pm today, traffic volume toward the baseball game will be increased 1 hour or 1 hour and 30 minutes before the baseball game. At that time we can not predict optimal green time Even though there have smart elctro-sensitive traffic light system. Therefore, in this paper to improve average vehicle speed and reduce average vehicle waiting time, we created optimal green time using fuzzy rules and neural network. Computer simulation results proved reducing average vehicle waiting time which proposed coordinating green time better than electro-sensitive traffic light system dosen't consider coordinating green time.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.41 no.5
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• pp.414-424
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• 2015

In this research, we consider a smart grid network of electricity with multiple consumers connected to a monopolistic provider. Each consumer can be informed the real time price changes through the smart meter and updates his consumption schedule to minimize the energy consumption expenditures by which the required power demand should be satisfied under the given real time pricing scheme. This real-time decision making problem has been recently studied through game-theoretic approach. The present paper contributes to the existing literature by incorporating storage appliance into the set of available household appliances which has somewhat distinctive functions compared to other types of appliances and would be regarded to play a significant role in energy consumption scheduling for the future smart grid. We propose a game-theoretic algorithm which could draw the optimal energy consumption scheduling for each household appliances including storage. Results on simulation data showed that the storage contributed to increase the efficiency of energy consumption pattern in the viewpoint of not only individual consumer but also whole system.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.41 no.5
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• pp.585-598
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• 2019

A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a new mechanism controlled or monitored by computer algorithms that intertwine physical and software components. Advanced persistent threats (APTs) represent stealthy, powerful, and well-funded attacks against CPSs; they integrate physical processes and have recently become an active research area. Existing offensive and defensive processes for APTs in CPSs are usually modeled by incomplete information game theory. However, honeypots, which are effective security vulnerability defense mechanisms, have not been widely adopted or modeled for defense against APT attacks in CPSs. In this study, a honeypot game-theoretical model considering both low- and high-interaction modes is used to investigate the offensive and defensive interactions, so that defensive strategies against APTs can be optimized. In this model, human analysis and honeypot allocation costs are introduced as limited resources. We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies and obtain the optimal defensive strategy under limited resources. Finally, numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed method is effective in obtaining the optimal defensive effect.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.42 no.1
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• pp.65-72
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• 2016

Curling is compared to the Chess because of variety and importance of strategies. For winning the Curling game, selecting optimal strategies at decision making points are important. However, there is lack of research on optimal strategies for Curling. 'Aggressive' and 'Conservative' strategies are common strategies of Curling; nevertheless, even those two strategies have never been studied before. In this study, Markov Decision Process would be applied for Curling strategy analysis. Those two strategies are defined as actions of Markov Decision Process. By solving the model, the optimal strategy could be found at any in-game states.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.75-94
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• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.49-55
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• 2009

A cooperative game often arises from domination problem on graphs and the core in a cooperative game could be the optimal solution of a linear programming of a given game. In this paper, we define a {k}-fractional domination game which is a specific type of fractional domination games and find the core of a {k}-fractional domination game. Moreover, we may investigate the balancedness of a {k}-fractional domination game using a concept of a linear programming and duality. We also conjecture the concavity for {k}-fractional dominations game which is important problem to find the elements of the core.