• Journal of Satellite, Information and Communications
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.128-133
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• 2012

In this paper, we analysis the effect of error of code tracking and frequency tracking according to the chip delay of spoofing signal through the simulation. Firstly, we investigate the type of spoofing signal and defense technical of spoofing attack. For simulation, we generated the intermediate spoofing signal using the software GNSS signal generator simulator(SGGS), the intermediate spoofers synchronize its counterfeit GPS signals with the current broadcast GPS signals. The software GPS receiver simulator(SGRS) received the spoofing signal and normal signal from SGGS, and process the signals. In paper, we can check that the DLL and PLL tracking loop error are generated and pseudo-range is changed non-linear according to chip delay of spoofing signal when the spoofing signal is entered. As a result, we can check that navigation solution is incorrectly effected by spoofing signal.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.173-180
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• 2015

In this study, an algorithm that detects a spoofing signal for a GPS L1 signal was proposed, and the performance was verified through RF spoofing signal simulation. The proposed algorithm determines the reception of a spoofing signal by detecting a correlation distortion of GPS L1 C/A code caused by the spoofing signal. To detect the correlation distortion, a detection criterion of a spoofing signal was derived from the relationship among the Early, Prompt, and Late tap correlation values of a receiver correlator; and a detection threshold was calculated from the false alarm probability of spoofing signal detection. In this study, an RF spoofing environment was built using the GSS 8000 simulator (Spirent). For the RF spoofing signal generated from the simulator, the RF spoofing environment was verified using the commercial receiver DL-V3 (Novatel Inc.). To verify the performance of the proposed algorithm, the RF signal was stored as IF band data using a USRP signal collector (NI) so that the data could be processed by a CNU software receiver (software defined radio). For the performance of the proposed algorithm, results were obtained using the correlation value of the software receiver, and the performance was verified through the detection of a spoofing signal and the detection time of a spoofing signal.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.127-138
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• 2018

Spoofing attacks including meaconing can provide a bogus position to a victim GPS receiver, and those attacks are notably difficult to detect at the point of view on the receiver. Several countermeasure techniques have been studied to detect, classify, and cancel the spoofing signals. Based on the countermeasure techniques, we have developed an anti-spoofing equipment that detects and mitigates or eliminates the spoofing signal based on raw measurements. Although many anti-spoofing techniques have been studied in the literatures, the evaluation test system is not deeply studied to evaluate the anti-spoofing equipment, which includes detection, mitigation, and elimination of spoofing signals. Each study only has a specific test method to verify its anti-spoofing technique. In this paper, we propose the performance evaluation test system that includes both spoofing signal injection system and its injection scenario with the constraints of stand-alone anti-spoofing techniques. The spoofing signal injection scenario is designed to drive a victim GPS receiver that moves to a designed position, where the mitigation and elimination based anti-spoofing algorithms can be successively evaluated. We evaluate the developed anti-spoofing equipment and a commercial GPS receiver using our proposed performance evaluation test system. Although the commercial one is affected by the test system and moves to the designed position, the anti-spoofing equipment mitigates and eliminates the injected spoofing signals as planned. We evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing equipment on the position error of the circular error probability, while injecting spoofing signals.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.394-400
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• 2016

It is well known that the encrypted ranging signal, such as GPS P(Y) code, is immune to spoofing attack. However, in order for users to use the signal, there needs permission from the operator. And also there are many restrictions for use because of security issues. In this paper, a ground reference station equipped with high-gain directional antenna and a user receiver were simulated. In the reference station, the encrypted code can be demodulated from the high-gain signal. And then the code can be used to detect spoofing attack in the user receiver. This paper proposes the spoofing detection method using the encrypted signal and deals with simulation results.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.32-38
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• 2011

In this paper, code and carrier tracking error which resulted from spoofing signal was analyzed by simulation. For a start, the types of spoofing signals and methods were classified. For the simulation, search spoofing method is assumed because a perfect position and velocity are not generally informed to spoofing device. In most cases, the tracking error is increased but a complete deception does not happen because of the inherent anti-spoofing characteristics of the GPS signal.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.57-65
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• 2015

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) including Global Positioning System (GPS) is an important element for navigation of both the military and civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Contrary to the military UAVs, the civil UAVs use the civil signals which are unencrypted, unauthenticated and predictable. Therefore if the civil signals are counterfeited, the civil UAV’s position can be manipulated and the appropriate movement of the civil UAV to the target point is not achieved. In this paper, spoofing on the autonomous navigation UAV is implemented through field experiments. Although the demanded conditions for appropriate spoofing attack exists, satisfying the conditions is restricted in real environments. So, the Way-point of the UAV is assumed to be known for experiments and assessments. Under the circumstances, GPS spoofing signal is generated based on the Software-based GNSS signal generator. The signal is emitted to the target UAV using the antenna of the spoofer and the effect of the signal is analyzed and evaluated. In conclusion, taking the UAV to the target point is hardly feasible. To implement the spoofing as expectation, the position and guidance system of the UAV has to be known. Additionally, the GPS receiver on the UAV could be checked whether it appropriately tracks the spoofing signal or not. However, the effect of the spoofing signal on the autonomous UAV has been verified and assessed through the experimental results. Spoofing signal affects the navigation system of the UAV so that the UAV goes off course or shows an abnormal operation.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.215-220
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• 2020

This paper deal with estimating the direction of arrival (DOA) of GNSS signal using two antennae for spoofing detection. A technique for estimating the azimuth angle of a received signal by applying the interferometer method to the GPS carrier signal is proposed. The experiment assumes two antennas placed on the earth's surface and estimates the azimuth angle when only GPS signal are received without spoofing signal. The proposed method confirmed the availability through GPS satellite placement simulation and experiments using a dual antenna GPS receiver. In this case of using dual antenna, an azimuth angle ambiguity of the received signal occurs with respect to the baseline between two antennas. For this reason, the accurate azimuth angle estimation is limits, but it can be used for deception by cross-validating the ambiguity.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.139-146
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• 2018

In recent years, a satellite navigation signal authentication technique has been introduced to determine the spoofing of commercial C/A code using the cross-correlation mode of GPS P(Y) code received at two receivers. This paper discusses the technical considerations in the implementation and application of authentication system simulator hardware to achieve the above technique. The configuration of the simulator consists of authentication system and user receiver. The synchronization of GPS signals received at two devices, data transmission and reception, and codeless correlation of P(Y) code were implemented. The simulation test result verified that spoofing detection using P(Y) codeless correlation could be achieved.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.137-144
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• 2016

In this paper, the performance of ranging measurement, which is generated using two receiver clock offsets in one receiver, was analyzed. A spoofer transmits a counterfeited spoofing signal which is similar to the GPS signal with hostile purposes, so the same tracking technique can be applied to the spoofing signal. The multi-correlator can generate two receiver clock offsets in one receiver. The difference between these two clock offsets consists of the path length from the spoofer to the receiver and the delay of spoofer system. Thus, in this paper, the ranging measurement was evaluated by the spoofer localization performance based on the time-of-arrival (TOA) technique. The results of simulation and real-world experiments show that the position and the system clock offset of the spoofer could be estimated successfully.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2023.07a
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• pp.215-216
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• 2023

군사 목적으로 사용되던 드론이 일반 사용자를 위한 범용 드론으로 활용 분야가 확장됨에 따라, 국방 및 운송, 물류, 농업과 같은 다양한 분야에서 활용되는 실정이며, 이와 관련된 산업의 발전에 기여하고 있다. 그러나 급격한 발전으로 인하여, 드론의 안전성은 고려하지 못한 한계점이 존재하였고, 이는 드론에서의 다양한 보안위협으로 나타났다. 본 논문에서는 4차 산업 혁명 시대의 핵심 기술인 드론의 안전성을 향상시키기 위한 목적으로, 드론의 신규 취약점을 발굴하고 실증하였다. 실험을 위하여, 최근 출시된 G 제품을 대상으로, 드론에서 발생 가능한 다양한 취약점 중 하나인 GPS 스푸핑 공격을 시도하였으며, 실험 결과, GPS 좌표를 변조함으로써, 비행이 가능한 구역에서 비행 금지 구역으로 인식하도록 좌표를 조작하였으며, 비행 금지 구역으로 인식한 드론은 준비된 동작에 따라, 강제로 착륙시키거나 다른 장소로 이동시키는 것이 가능하다. 본 논문의 결과는 드론의 안전성을 향상시키기 위한 참고 자료로 활용될 것으로 사료된다.