Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology (한국항행학회논문지)

The Korean Navigation Institute (한국항행학회)
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Simulation of GNSS Spoofing Detection Method Using Encrypted Ranging Signal

암호화 신호원을 이용한 위성항법 기만 검출기법 모의

  • Received : 2016.09.21
  • Accepted : 2016.10.19
  • Published : 2016.10.30
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Abstract

It is well known that the encrypted ranging signal, such as GPS P(Y) code, is immune to spoofing attack. However, in order for users to use the signal, there needs permission from the operator. And also there are many restrictions for use because of security issues. In this paper, a ground reference station equipped with high-gain directional antenna and a user receiver were simulated. In the reference station, the encrypted code can be demodulated from the high-gain signal. And then the code can be used to detect spoofing attack in the user receiver. This paper proposes the spoofing detection method using the encrypted signal and deals with simulation results.

GPS P(Y) 코드와 같은 암호화 항법 신호원은 재생이 불가능하므로 기만에 강건하다. 하지만 암호화 신호원을 이용하기 위해서는 위성항법시스템 운용국가로부터 허가를 얻어야 하고 이용에 있어서도 상당한 제약이 따른다. 본 논문에서는 고이득 지향성 안테나를 이용하는 지상 기준국과 일반 위성항법 사용자를 모의하였다. 지상 기준국은 특정 항법위성에 대한 고이득 신호로부터 해당 위성이 방송하는 암호화 신호 코드를 복조하였다. 복조된 암호화 신호코드는 사용자 수신기 모의 데이터의 이상여부를 판단하고, 기만여부를 판단할 수 있었다. 본 논문은 이와 같은 방식을 적용하는 기만검출 기법을 제안하고 GPS 시뮬레이터를 이용한 모의 분석 결과를 다룬다.

Keywords

References

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