• Title/Summary/Keyword: Foreclosure effect

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An Analysis of Career Exploration and Career Decision-making by Identity Statuses of Vocational High School Students (실업계 고등학생의 자아정체감 상태에 따른 진로탐색 및 진로결정 분석)

  • PARK, Sung-Mi
    • Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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    • v.16 no.1
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    • pp.11-20
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    • 2004
  • The purpose of this study was to analyze of career exploration and career decision-making by identity statuses(diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, achievement) of vocational high school students. The research questions were formulated as follows. (1) Is there a difference in identity statuses by level of the career exploration? (2) Is there a difference in identity statuses by level of the career decision-making? (3) How much identity statuses-identity diffusion, identity foreclosure, identity moratorium, identity achievement-effect to the career exploration and career decision-making? 255 vocational high school students in Pusan were sampled. For the statistical analysis, Oneway, analysis of covariance structure by AMOS 4.0 was applied. The results of the study were as follows. (1) The identity diffusion was low in the level of career exploration, but the identity moratorium and achievement were high in the level of career exploration. (3) The identity diffusion was low in the level of career decision-making, but the identity achievement was high in the level of career decision-making. (4) The identity diffusion effected to negatively career exploration and career decision-making, identity foreclosure effected to low positively career exploration and career decision-making, identity moratorium effected to positively career exploration but negatively career decision-making, identity achievement effected to positively career exploration and career decision-making.

The Influence on the Stack effect that Pressure differential system to smoke control in High-rise buildings (초고층 건축물에서 급기가압제연이 연돌효과에 미치는 영향)

  • Lim, Chae-Hyun;Park, Yong-Hwan
    • Proceedings of the Korea Institute of Fire Science and Engineering Conference
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    • 2008.11a
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    • pp.235-238
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    • 2008
  • High-rise buildings with stack effect caused by the foreclosure, which significantly delayed the spread of a fire in effects of these stack effect driving force said. In this research on the stack effect of the lobby if the pressurization of the stairwell analysis of the pressure distribution of the CONTAMW. Overall, the pressurization of the lobby makes it stairwell amount of pressure(+) to the zone in pressure designed to prevent the spread of smoke control performance and found that, the way a normal state and sub-pressurization in the stairwell with stack effect of the turbulence Such as the formation of the upper flow, but, in the upper atmosphere with pressurization was formed by the underlying trend.

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A Review on the Dominant Undertaking's Abuse in the Medical Device Market (시장지배적 의료기기 사업자의 경쟁제한적 차별행위 - 지멘스 사건을 중심으로 -)

  • Jeong, Jae Hun
    • The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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    • v.23 no.1
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    • pp.81-119
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    • 2022
  • Medical device market is strongly related with health care market. Public regulation in medical device market tends to be more lenient than health care market. In this market, competition law, administrative law and intellectual property law are intertwined, and thereby a variety of legal issues could be developed. Recently, dominant undertaking's abuse case was dealt with KFTC(Korea Fair Trade Commission) and Seoul High Court. The issues were whether dominant undertaking discriminated trading partners and this discrimination was anticompetitive. In this case, Seoul High Court revoked the KFTC's decision, holding that the undertaking did not harm competition, though it has dominant power in the relevant medical device market. This decision would be a meaningful precedent, not only that there have been small numbers of dominance abuse cases in Korea, but also that this case happened in medical device market. This case dealt with various issues like market definition, market power, alleged abuse and its anticompetitive effect. The court held that medical device markets are distinguished from medical device repairing market. However, the court did not clarify that medical device repairing market is a single branded market only for repairing the plaintiff's medical devices. Second, plaintiff's dominance is based on the lock-in effect, which means that hospitals could not switch devices like CT or MRI from plaintiff to other competitors. This could be supplemented from the fact that medical devices are expensive and the using period are significantly long. However market definition based on single branded market theory could be applied in rare and exceptional cases. Therefore the general application of single branded market theory might result in overestimate of market power. This type of abuse pattern requires improper condition contrary to resonable trade practice. KFTC asserted free charge for plaintiff's copy right. However, it is not clear whether the cases for free charge are general or not. Even if so, the intention and motive of providers for free charge should be proved. The main issue of anticompetitive effect was whether plaintiff raised rival's cost. Competitor's cost was increased due to plaintiff's copy right and its license fee. However the charge for license could be within the scope of fair and legal exercise of copy right. If competitors are excluded due to legal exercise of copy right or efficiency, the exclusionary abuse could not be proved.

An Analysis of Imports by Domestic Producers of Competing Goods (메이커에 의한 수입(輸入)의 문제점(問題點)과 대응방안(對應方案))

  • Nam, Il-chong
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.14 no.2
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    • pp.55-75
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    • 1992
  • At the outset of import liberalization, most economists expected a significant drop in the prices of domestic goods that faced foreign competition. However, it is now generally acknowledge that a significant drop in prices of those goods has not occurred. A common claim is that the prices did not drop significantly because the major importers of many imported goods were also the domestic producers of competing goods. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effect of importation by domestic firms that produce competing goods, to identify the factors that facilitate such business practices, and to formulate a policy that could improve the welfare. We proved that importation by competing domestic firms definitely raises the prices of both imported and domestic goods compared to the situation where foreign goods are imported by non-producers, ceteris paribus. The intuition behind this result is that since a producer-importer is essentially a cartel, its overall profit maximization requires reduced competition between the products that it sells. On the other hand, if a producer-importer is more efficient at distrinbution than a simple importer, the comparison between the two cases is a priori indeterminate. We also find that the industries in which domestic producers are actively involved in importing competing goods are the ones in which the distribution channels are tightly controlled by importer-producers. This finding suggests that exclusive dealing contracts, which work as an entry barrier, may be the source of importing by domestic producers. We argue that in a country such as Korea, where financial market is highly incomplete, tight control of the distribution channels by oligopolistic manufacturers is likely to be an effective entry barrier that leads to importing by domestic producers of similar goods. We further argue that seemingly superior distribution costs of importer-producers is likely to be a result of market foreclosure which would disappear once the entry barrier of exclusive dealing contracts is removed. Above findings suggest that market imperfections are the source of importation by domestic competitors, which in turn constitutes a market imperfection in itself and reduces consumer welfare. As potential remedies, we considered three alternatives; direct price control by the government over the imported goods sold by major domestic producers, regulation of trade itself between major producers, and regulation of exclusive dealing contracts. For reasons both theoretical and pratical, we find that the last alternative is the most attrative. Prohibiting exclusive contracts between manufacturers and dealers in industries where exclusive dealing contracts are a significant entry barrier is expected to break up the importer-producer cartel and improve the welfare.

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