• ETRI Journal
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.469-478
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• 2014

RSA signature algorithms using the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT-RSA) are approximately four-times faster than straightforward implementations of an RSA cryptosystem. However, the CRT-RSA is known to be vulnerable to fault attacks; even one execution of the algorithm is sufficient to reveal the secret keys. Over the past few years, several countermeasures against CRT-RSA fault attacks have tended to involve additional exponentiations or inversions, and in most cases, they are also vulnerable to new variants of fault attacks. In this paper, we review how Shamir's countermeasure can be broken by fault attacks and improve the countermeasure to prevent future fault attacks, with the added benefit of low additional costs. In our experiment, we use the side-channel analysis resistance framework system, a fault injection testing and verification system, which enables us to inject a fault into the right position, even to within $1{\mu}s$. We also explain how to find the exact timing of the target operation using an Atmega128 software board.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.30 no.6
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• pp.1247-1254
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• 2020

With the advent of the smart home era, equipment that provides confidentiality or performs authentication exists in various places in real life. Accordingly security against physical attacks is required for encryption equipment and authentication equipment. In particular, fault injection attack that artificially inject a fault from the outside to recover a secret key or bypass an authentication process is one of the very threatening attack methods. Fault sources used in fault injection attacks include lasers, electromagnetic, voltage glitches, and clock glitches. Fault injection attacks are classified into single fault injection attacks and multiple fault injection attacks according to the number of faults injected. Existing multiple fault injection systems generally use a single fault source. The system configured to inject a single source of fault multiple times has disadvantages that there is a physical delay time and additional equipment is required. In this paper, we propose a multiple fault injection system using heterogeneous fault sources. In addition, to show the effectiveness of the proposed system, the results of a multiple fault injection attack against Riscure's Piñata board are shown.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.515-524
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• 2012

Fault attacks are a powerful side channel analysis extracting secret information by analyzing the result after injecting faults physically during the implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. First, this paper analyses vulnerable points of existing Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) schemes secure against fault attacks. Then we propose a new signature algorithm immune to all fault attacks. The proposed DSA scheme is designed to signature by using two nonce and an error diffusion method.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.75-84
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• 2008

Recently, the straightforward CRT-RSA was shown to be broken by fault attacks through many experimental results. In this paper, we analyze the fault attacks against CRT-RSA and their countermeasures, and then propose a new fault infective method resistant to the various fault attacks on CRT-RSA. In our CRT-RSA algorithm, if an error is injected in exponentiation with modulo p or q, then the error is spreaded by fault infective computation in CRT recombination operation. Our countermeasure doesn't have extra error detection procedure based on decision tests and doesn't use public parameter such as e. Also, the computational cost is effective compared to the previous secure countermeasures.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.63-70
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• 2009

Many research results show that RSA system mounted using conventional binary exponentiation algorithm is vulnerable to some physical attacks. Recently, Schmidt and Hurbst demonstrated experimentally that an attacker can exploit secret key using faulty signatures which are obtained by skipping the squaring operations. Based on similar assumption of Schmidt and Hurbst's fault attack, we proposed new fault analysis attacks which can be made by skipping the multiplication operations or computations in looping control statement. Furthermore, we applied our attack to Montgomery ladder exponentiation algorithm which was proposed to defeat simple power attack. As a result, our fault attack can extract secret key used in Montgomery ladder exponentiation.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.48-52
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• 2015

In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on SSB having same structure in encryption and decryption proposed in 2011. The target algorithm was designed using advanced encryption standard and has advantage about hardware implementations. The differential fault analysis is one of side channel attacks, combination of the fault injection attacks with the differential cryptanalysis. Because SSB is suitable for hardware, it must be secure for the differential fault analysis. However, using proposed differential fault attack in this paper, we can recover the 128 bit secret key of SSB through only one random byte fault injection and an exhausted search of $2^8$. This is the first cryptanalytic result on SSB having same structure in encryption and decryption.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.3-13
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• 2010

Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is widely known for one of the most efficient method analyzing block cipher. In this paper, we propose a new type of DFA on DES (Data Encryption Standard). DFA on DES was first introduced by Biham and Shamir, then Rivain recently introduced DFA on DES middle rounds (9-12 round). However previous attacks on DES can only be applied to the encryption process. Meanwhile, we first propose the DFA on DES key-schedule. In this paper, we proposed a more efficient DFA on DES key schedule with random fault. The proposed DFA method retrieves the key using a more practical fault model and requires fewer faults than the previous DFA on DES.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers
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• v.50 no.7
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• pp.68-75
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• 2013

Recently, there has been introduced various types of pairing computations to implement ID based cryptosystem for mobile ad hoc network. According to spreading the applications of pairing computations, various fault attacks have been proposed. Among them, a counter fault attack has been considered the strongest threat. Thus this paper proposes a new countermeasure to prevent the counter fault attack on Miller's algorithm. The proposed method is able to reduce the possibility of fault propagation by a random index of intermediate values. Additionally, it is difficult to challenge fault attacks on the proposed method since a simple side channel leakage of 'if' branch is eliminated.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.33-41
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• 2010

Many experimental results shows that RSA-CRT algorithm can be broken by fault analysis attacks. We analyzed the previous fault attacks and their countermeasures on RSA-CRT algorithm and found an weakness of the countermeasure proposed by Abid and Wang. Based on these analyses, we propose a new countermeasure which uses both double exponentiation and fault infective computation method. The proposed method efficiently computes a fault verification information using double exponentiation. And, it is designed to resist simple power analysis attack and (N-1) attack.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.155-160
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• 2010

Since the RSA cryptosystem based on Chinese Remainder Theorem is vulnerable to many fault insertion attacks, some countermeasures against them were proposed. Recently, Kim et al. or Ha et al. respectively proposed each countermeasure scheme based on fault propagation method. Unfortunately, Hur et al. insist that these countermeasures are vulnerable to their opcode modification fault attack. In this paper, we show that the proposed attack can not apply to almost CRT-RSA countermeasures which use multi-precision operations in long bit computation. Therefore, the countermeasure against fault attack proposed by Kim et al. or Ha et al. are still secure.