• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.215-240
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• 2020

In 2017, the U.S. DARPA coined 'mosaic warfare' as a new way of warfighting. According to the Timothy Grayson, director of DARPA's Strategic Technologies Office, mosaic warfare is a "system of system" approach to warfghting designed around compatible "tiles" of capabilities, rather than uniquely shaped "puzzle pieces" that must be fitted into a specific slot in a battle plan in order for it to work. Prior to cover mosaic warfare theory and recent development, it deals analyze its background and several premises for better understanding. The U.S. DoD officials might acknowledge the current its forces vulnerability to the China's A2/AD assets. Furthermore, the U.S. seeks to complete military superiority even in other nation's territorial domains including sea and air. Given its rapid combat restoration capability and less manpower casualty, the U.S. would be able to ready to endure war of attrition that requires massive resources. The core concept of mosaic warfare is a "decision centric warfare". To embody this idea, it create adaptability for U.S. forces and complexity or uncertainty for the enemy through the rapid composition and recomposition of a more disag g reg ated U.S. military force using human command and machine control. This allows providing more options to friendly forces and collapse adversary's OODA loop eventually. Adaptable kill web, composable force packages, A.I., and context-centric C3 architecture are crucial elements to implement and carry out mosaic warfare. Recently, CSBA showed an compelling assessment of mosaic warfare simulation. In this wargame, there was a significant differences between traditional and mosaic teams. Mosaic team was able to mount more simultaneous actions, creating additional complexity to adversaries and overwhelming their decision-making with less friendly force's human casualty. It increase the speed of the U.S. force's decision-making, enabling commanders to better employ tempo. Consequently, this article finds out and suggests implications for Korea armed forces. First of all, it needs to examine and develop 'mosaic warfare' in terms of our security circumstance. In response to future warfare, reviewing overall force structure and architecture is required which is able to compose force element regardless domain. In regards to insufficient defense resources and budget, "choice" and "concentration" are also essential. It needs to have eyes on the neighboring countries' development of future war concept carefully.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.127-139
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• 2015

The purpose of this research is to reevaluate the success factors and significance of the battle through the analysis of the only successful Chuncheon district battle during the defense combat in the early part of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. The research results are the matters that are analyzed from the viewpoint of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea, focusing intensively on the successful aspect of the early defense combat against North Korean army's surprise invasion of the South and on the battle that thwarted the North Korean army's intensive surprise attack intention. This research attempts to reanalyze the Chuncheon District Battle in connection with the Kim Il-sung's strategic course of action in consideration of the operation plan of North Korean invasion of the South. In other words, it is to reanalyze the enemy tactics in connection with North Korean army's plan of invasion of the South. The fact that the 6th Division of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea destroyed the North Korean army's operations plans that were in accordance with Kim Il-sung's strategic plans has more significance than a simple tactical success. The Chuncheon District Battle should be reevaluated as the "decisive battle" which went beyond a successful early defense combat in a Chuncheon region, and which fundamentally defeated North Korean army's war plan itself by thwarting the Kim Il-sung's strategic plan.

• Journal of Information Technology and Architecture
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.177-186
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• 2012

Navy establishes the Naval Task Forces (TF) for many kinds of maritime operations. Then the TF in the maritime environment performs simultaneous component operations such as ASUW (Anti-Surface Warfare), ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), AAW (Anti-Aircraft Warfare), and assault operations. The TF consists of many tactical systems for the completion of missions C4I, VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol), DMHS (Digital Massage Handling System), and TDLs (Tactical Data Links) such as LINK-11, 16, ISDL (Inter Site Data Link). When the TF executes naval operations to complete a mission, we are interested in the kill chain for the maritime operations in the TF. The kill chain is a standard procedure for the naval operations to crush enemy defenses. Although each ship has a procedure about a manual for 'how to fight', it leave something to be desired for the TF detailed kill chain currently. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the naval TF's kill chain to perform the naval operations. Then, the operational effectiveness of the TF in the kill chain environment is determined through operation scenarios of TDL system implementation. It is to see the operational information sharing effect to a data link model based on MND-AF OV 6c (statement of tracking operational status) in the maritime operations applied to TDL and is to identify improvements in information dissemination process. We made the kill chain of maritime TF for the effective naval operations.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.352-376
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• 2018

Through this research, the current state of naval coordination and guidance of shipping is reviewed whereupon which a suggestion is made for a novel role which satisfies the needs of the people and the country asked of the Navy. Taking into consideration the dynamic security environment, the developing relationship between the two nations on the Korean peninsula, and the influence that the Republic of Korea has on maritime security, it is made more urgent that the Navy takes a proactive course of action in terms of naval coordination and guidance of shipping. The current form of Korean naval coordination and guidance of shipping is adapted from the logical and flexible concepts of NCAPS and NCAGS and is one of many tasks that the Republic of Korea Navy must perform. However, when the Republic of Korea Navy develops blue-water capabilities with the ambitions of protecting its people and their way of life, naval coordination and guidance of shipping could potentially become one of the primary functions of the Republic of Korea Navy that the it must champion. Already, there are indications that foreign navies are, through many developments and commitment towards naval coordination and guidance of shipping, protecting its people and states' interests wherever is necessary. In the case of Chile, its Navy has taken the helm of naval coordination and guidance of shipping and has integrated various maritime organizations including the coast guard and the National Customs Service for the sake of maintaining regional maritime security, showing immediate force if necessary. Presently, as the Republic of Korea Navy looks to be a global naval power, it is important that a reprioritization of the Navy's mission is undertaken, all the while sustaining military readiness posture on the Northern Limit Line. It cannot be any more emphasized how crucial thorough military readiness posture is as a natural stance against the enemy. That being said, contributing towards international maritime security is consistent with the nation's standing. It is a fact that maritime security has been conceptualized and developed merely as a study within the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Republic of Korea Navy, and other governmental organizations, forces, and academia. Naval cooperation and guidance of shipping suggested by this research as a practical operational field is a concrete solution to what once was an abstract concept. To stand firm on its status as a maritime nation, the Republic of Korea must establish a Maritime Security Organization within its Navy and develop the appropriate doctrines. Attaining experts, developing doctrines, and cultivating the capability to deploy maritime forces will allow for the Republic of Korea to execute a primary role in keeping international maritime security and naval coordination and guidance of shipping. To fully achieve its latent potential necessitates the Republic of Korea Navy to expedite the introduction of naval coordination and guidance of shipping concepts and to establish the appropriate doctrines, operation plans, and organizations.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.105-117
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• 2020

Analysis of combat effectiveness is required to consider the concept of tactical cooperative engagement between manned-unmanned weapon systems, in order to predict the required operational capabilities of future weapon systems that meets the concept of 'effect-based synchronized operations.' However, analytical methods such as mathematical and statistical models make it difficult to analyze the effects of complex systems under nonlinear warfare. In this paper, we propose a combat simulation model that can simulate the concept of cooperative engagement between manned-unmanned combat entities based on wireless communications. First, we model unmanned combat entities, e.g., unmanned ground vehicles and drones, and manned combat entities, e.g., combatants and artillery, considering the capabilities required by the future ground system. We also simulate tactical behavior in which all entities perform their mission while sharing battlefield situation information through wireless communications. Finally we explore the feasibility of the proposed model by analyzing combat effectiveness such as target acquisition rate, remote control success rate, reconnaissance lead time, survival rate, and enemy's loss rate under a small-unit armor reconnaissance scenario. The proposed model is expected to be used in war-game combat experiments as well as analysis of the effects of manned-unmanned ground weapons.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.47 no.4
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• pp.106-119
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• 2014

The $76^{th}$ National Treasure is consisted of seven volumes of Nanjung Ilgi (War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin; each titled by the author based on the zodiac name of the year covered, i.e. Imjin Ilgi, Gyesa Ilgi, Gabo Ilgi, Byeongsin Ilgi, Jeongyu Ilgi, Sok Jeongyu Ilgi, Musul Ilgi), Seogancheob (Letters of Admiral Yi) and Imjin Jangcho (Drafts of Imjin War Reports of Admiral Yi). These are currently in the custody of Hyeonchungsa shrine, the state-managed memorial shrine of Admiral Yi, and has been added to UNESCO's Memory of the World Register in June 2013 in the appreciation of its historical and academic importance as a commander's hand-written battlefield accounts during Japanese invasions of Korea. Imjin Jangcho, among these nine volumes, is a record of battles, including observations on the enemy fleets, suggestions on naval matters, battle expenditure, and methods of battle preparation, transcribed by someone else according to Admiral Yi's instructions. It is Admiral Yi's honest detailobservations on the war situation during Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 as a Naval Commander of Left Jeolla Province, till 1594 (Year 27 of King Seonjo's reign) as a Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the South. It is a draft of the war report to be submitted to the King in a single volume as a folio (each sheet folded once to produce one leaf) bound in a side-stitched binding with five holes and inner binding of twisted paper. This study explores the condition and the treatment performed on Imjin Jangcho which could have an implication for the conservation of cultural assets on paper of late Joseon Dynasty.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.85-112
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• 2022

The maritime blockade has long been used as a means of war in that it serves as a bridge for economic warfare by paralyzing enemy maritime transport, although it is not a decisive battle, and in the Korean War, U.N. forces have achieved significant results in the war with limited maritime blockade through the Clark Line. However, with China emerging as a maritime powers based on its strong naval power, there is a lack of consideration on how to set up a blockade to block maritime activities and how to respond neutral ships or carrying wartime contraband products if war breaks out again on the Korean Peninsula, In addition, since maritime blockade should be used as a sensitive and flexible naval force projection in that it has interests with neutral countries, it should be carefully reviewed in that it can be used only through careful and reasonable judgment considering the principle of ensuring the legality of maritime blockade Therefore, in this study, Reexamine the process of change in the application of the International Law of Blockade, and through this, Derive the basic principle of ensuring the legitimacy of maritime blockade. In addition, by reviewing the application of these basic principles in the waters off the Korean Peninsula at wartime, we presented answers to research questions by reviewing what needs to be done to neutral ships and ships carrying wartime contraband products, and considered the implications for us

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.157-166
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• 2024

The Army TIGER System, which is being deployed to implement a future combat system, is expected to bring innovative changes to the army's combat methods and comabt execution capability such as mobility, networking and intelligence. To this end, the Army will introduce various systems using drones, robots, unmanned vehicles, AI(Artificial Intelligence), etc. and utilize them in combat. The use of various unmanned vehicles and AI is expected to result in the introduction of equipment with new technologies into the army and an increase in various types of transmitted information, i.e. data. However, currently in the military, there is an acceleration in research and combat experimentations on warfigthing options using Army TIGER forces system for specific functions. On the other hand, the current reality is that research on cyber threats measures targeting information systems related to the increasing number of unmanned systems, data production, and transmission from unmanned systems, as well as the establishment of cloud centers and AI command and control center driven by the new force systems, is not being pursued. Accordingly this paper analyzes the structure and characteristics of the Army TIGER force integration system and makes suggestions for necessity of building, available cyber defense solutions and Army TIGER integrated cyber protections system that can respond to cyber threats in the future.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• The Korean Journal of Archival Studies
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• no.12
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• pp.137-178
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• 2005

The anticommunist guerrillas' activities that aretheconcern of this article took place largely in North Korea or behind the enemy-held lines. Verifying their history is accordingly difficult and requires careful attention, but despite their active operations the military as well as the scholarly community have been lax in studying them. The Korean War came to be perceived as a traditional, limited war with regular battles, so that the studies addressed mostly the regular operations, and guerrilla warfare is remembered as an almost 'exclusive property' of the communist invaders; a small wonder that the anticommunist guerrillas have not been studied much and the collection of materials neglected. Therefore, in contrast with the witness accounts concerning regular battles, witness resources were of a small volume about these "patriots without the service numbers." For the above reasons the guerrilla participants and their later-organized fellowships took to the task of leaving records and compiling the histories of their units. They became active preservers of history in order to inform later generations of their works and also to secure deserved benefits from the government, in a world where none recognized their achievements. For instance, 4th Donkey Unit published witness accounts in addition to a unit history, and left video-recordings of guerrilla witnesses before any institute systematized the oral history of the guerrillas. In the case of Kyulsa ("Resolved to Die") Guerrilla Unit, the unit history was 10 times revised and expanded upon for publication, contributing substantially to the recovery of anticommunist guerrilla history which had almost totally lacked documented resources. Now because the guerrilla-related witness accounts were produced through fellowship societies and not individually, it often took the form of 'collective memory.' As a result, though thousands of former guerrillas remain surviving, the scarcity of numerous versions of, or perspectives upon, an event renders difficult an objective approach to the historical truth. Even requests to verify the service of a guerrilla member or to apply for decoration or government benefits for those killed in action, the process is taken care of not at the hands of the first party but the veteran society, so that a variety of opinions are not available for consideration. Moreover, some accounts were taken by American military personnel, and since some historians, unaware of official documents or evaluation of achievements, tended to center the records around their own units and especially to exaggerate the units' performances, they often featured factual errors. Thefollowing is the means to utilize positively the aforementioned type of witness accounts in military history research. It involves the active use of military historical detachments (MHD). As in the examples of those dispatched by the American forces during the Korean War, experts should be dispatched during, and not just after, wartimes. By considering and investigating the differences among various perspectives on the same historical event, even without extra documented resources it is possibleto arrive at theerrors or questionable points of the oral accounts, supplementing the additional accounts. Therefore any time lapses between witness accounts must be kept in consideration. Moreover when the oral accounts come from a group such as participants in the same guerrilla unit or operation, a standardized list of items ought to be put to use. Education in oral history is necessary not just for the training of experts. In America wherethefield sees much activity, it is used not only in college or graduate programs but also in elementary and lifetime educational processes. In comparison in our nation, and especially in historical disciplines, methodological insistence upon documented evidences prevails in the main, and in the fields of nationalist movement or modern history, oral accounts do not receive adequate attention. Like ancient documents and monuments, oral history also needs to be made a regular part of diverse resource materials at our academic institutes for history. Courses in memory and history, such as those in American colleges, are available possibilities.