• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.29 no.2
• /
• pp.219-246
• /
• 2020

From the Phase II (2018~2020) of K-ETS, the offset credit from 'CDM projects that domestic companies and others have carried out in foreign countries' can be used in the K-ETS. As a result, stakeholders in the K-ETS market are actively developing overseas CDM projects, such as the 'high-efficiency cook stove project'. which can secure a large amount of credits while marginal cost is relatively low. This paper develops the investment decision-making model of offset project for the 'high-efficiency cook stove project' using the real option approach. Under the uncertainty of the emission allowance price, the optimal investment threshold (p^⁎) is derived and sensitivity analysis is conducted. As a result, in the standard scenario (PoA-S), the optimal investment threshold is 29,054won/ton, which is lower than the stock price (p^⁎_spot). However, allocation entities are not only economics in the CDM project, but also CDM risk factors such as non-renewable biomass ratio, cook stove replacement ratio, equity ratio with host country, investment period and submission limitation of emission allowance. In addition, offset project developers will be able to derive the optimal investment threshold for each business stage and use it for economic feasibility checks.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.27 no.4
• /
• pp.667-694
• /
• 2018

We analyze the learning-by-doing effects of the allowance pricing system on the Korea's emission trading scheme. The price of allowance (Korean Allowance Unit) is influenced differently by internal market factors and economic conditions variables in the first (January 2015 to June 2016 ) and the second commitment year(January 2016 to June 2017). The prices and transaction volumes of complementary credits (KCU and KOC) as well as economic conditions variables (such as call rate, exchange rate, stock price) are statistically significant only for the second commitment year. Thus, the learning-by-doing effect makes the market participation decision on K-ETS market more efficient in the second commitment year, adopting the previous experience and knowledge in the K-ETS market. The factors estimated significantly in both commitment periods include the institutional binary variable for requiring the submission of the emissions verification reports issued both on February and March.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.569-593
• /
• 2005

This study tests for the law of one price and Grander Causality between the EU ETS and Nord Pool $CO_2$ allowance prices. The Johansen cointegration test shows that there exists a long run equilibrium between EU ETS and Nord Pool prices and support the law of one price. The Granger casuality test suggests that the EU ETS leads Nord Pool for all vintages traded. The test results imply that the EU ETS can be regarded as the representative carbon market in the EU where many exchanges just started competing for the newly rising market for carbon.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.41-73
• /
• 2015

The Korea Emissions Trading System that was launched in Jan. 2015 is expected to be a crucial policy measure to abate domestic $CO_2$ emission. For accomplishing its purpose, prior information on the price discovery process needs to be presented in order to facilitate the trading of spot allowances with different vintages. We develope a customized pricing method for Korean ETS using the concept of term structure and the cost of carry model.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.21 no.2
• /
• pp.301-319
• /
• 2012

The primary purpose of Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is to facilitate investment in renewable energy technology. Since emission trading program has similar purpose, it is conceivable to attempt to link RPS and emission trading program through interlinked markets. RPS in Korea with single REC and emission allowance markets has particular advantages for constructing linkages between two markets. This paper provides a real option model to examine investment effects of linkage of RPS to the trading program. Emission permit price and REC price are assumed to follow stochastic processes and renewable investment is irreversible. The result shows that linked market provides further incentive for renewable investment by raising managerial flexibility for power companies.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.5A no.4
• /
• pp.311-321
• /
• 2005

A competitive generating company (GENCO) could maximize its payoff by optimizing its generation assets. This paper considers the GENCO's arbitrage problem using price-based unit commitment (PBUC). The GENCO could consider arbitrage opportunities in purchases from qualifying facilities (QFs) as well as simultaneous trades with spots markets for energy, ancillary services, emission, and fuel. Given forecasted hourly market prices for each market, the GENCO's generating asset arbitrage problem is formulated as a mixed integer program (MIP) and solved by a branch-and-cut algorithm. A GENCO with 54 thermal and 12 combined-cycle units is considered for analyzing the proposed formulation. The proposed case studies illustrate the significance of simultaneous arbitrage by applying PBUC to multi-commodity markets.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.24 no.4
• /
• pp.607-627
• /
• 2015

As observed and experienced in EU ETS, allowance price volatility is one of major concerns in decision making process for $CO_2$ abatement investment. The problem of linearly non-separable profits functions could emerge when one power company holds several power plants with different technology specifications. Under this circumstance, conventional analytical solution for investment option is no longer available, thereby calling for the development of numerical analysis. This paper attempts to develop a Monte-Carlo least squares model to analyze investment options for power companies under emission trading scheme regulations. Stochastic allowance price is considered, and simulation is performed to verify model performance.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.23 no.4
• /
• pp.719-746
• /
• 2014

This study attempts to estimate the value of the water quality improvement by deriving the equilibrium price of the water pollutant emission permit for the imaginary water pollutant emission trading market. It is reasonable to say that there is already an implicit social agreement for the unit value of water pollutant, when the government set the Total Water Pollutant Loading System for the major river basin as a part of the Comprehensive Measures for Water Management, particularly for the Nakdong River Basin. Therefore, we can derive the unit value of water pollutant emission, which is already implied in the pollution allowance for each city or county by the Total Water Pollutant Loading System. Once estimated, it will be useful to the economic assessment of the water quality related projects. An imaginary water pollutant emission trading system for the Nakdong River Basin, where Total Water Pollutant Loading System is already effective, is constructed for the estimation of the equilibrium price of water pollutant permit. By estimating marginal abatement cost curve or each city or county, we can compute the equilibrium price of the permit and then it is regarded as the economic value of the water pollutant. The marginal net benefit function results from the relationship between the emission and the benefit, and then the equilibrium price of permit comes from constructing the excess demand function of the permit by using the total allowable permit of the local government entity. The equilibrium price of the permit would be estimated to be $1,409.3won/kg{\cdot}BOD$. This is within reasonable boundary compared for the permit price compared to foreign example. This permit price would be applied to calculate for the economic value of the water quality pollutants, and also be expected to use directly for the B/C analysis of the business involved with water quality change.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.47 no.1
• /
• pp.115-130
• /
• 2022

In this study, I focus on analyzing how the effects of implementing ETS are different depending on whether Korean ETS linking with carbon markets in other countries. The global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model built in this study analyzes the chages in the production and trade of industrial sectors according to the international linkage of ETS compared to the reference scenario of emissions reduction targets and implementation of ETS. From the analysis of internatioanl linkage of carbon markets scenarios, Annex B countries-South Korea carbon market linkage with individual ETS in China worse the economic outcomes in South Korea the most. This means South Korea lose the international competitiveness compared to China in this scenario. On the other hand, Annex B-China carbon market linkage with Korean individual ETS implementation reduce the decreases in production and trading. The most effective way is to join a global emissions trading market with China. The results are consistent in most industries of South Korea. These results are caused by that the supply of emission allowance is increased and the price of emissions allowances is dropped by China's participation to the carbon market, which can be understood to reduce the carbon reduction cost for industrial sectors. In addition, it can be also concluded that the determinant of the negative impact of ETS on changes in production and trade is more sensitive to the price of emissions allowances than to the characteristics of production and trade structure.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.15 no.5
• /
• pp.827-858
• /
• 2006

The paper presents game theoretic models for self-enforcing coalition formation in order to sustain effective international environmental agreements(IEAs). The model analyzes how the intrinsically strategic nature of a government's environmental policies(the emission allowance standard) calls for rules to sustain an IEA. Focusing on the recent theoretical developments in the infinitely repeated game, the paper introduces some mechanisms to show how self-interested sovereign countries are cooperatively able to maintain an IEA rather than defect to initially profit at the expense of a pollution heaven later on. For a more realistic case needed to sustain an IEA, an optimal international environmental policy with both signatories and non-signatories under imperfect monitoring is also explored. In this extension of the model, the derivation process for a critical discount factor, a trigger price level and the length of punishment period is briefly discussed.