• 전기학회논문지
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• 제58권2호
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• pp.264-269
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• 2009

Marginal Loss Factor(MLF) is represented as the sensitivity of transmission loss, which is computed from the change of the generation at slack bus by the change of the load at the arbitrary bus. The MLF dependent on the selection of slack bus is one of the key factors affecting nodal pricing, Genco's profits, social welfare(SW) and Nash Equilibrium in a competitive electricity market. This paper addresses the methodology of slack bus selection by using Cournot model of Cost Based Pool market. Numerical results from sample cases show that the slack bus of MLF of the highest average is beneficial from the view points of SW.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권2호
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• pp.199-203
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• 2005

This paper proposes the level of price cap in the TWBP(Two- Way Bidding Pool) market in Korea for which the draft of market design has been prepared by KPX. Max - GMCP(Maximum Generation Market Clearing Price) and APC(Administered Price Cap) would be separately applied as individual price caps for a normal period and a Price Capping period in TWBP. The level of price cap is determined for inducing optimal investment in the Korean Electricity Market considering the 'electricity resource baseline plan' published by the Korean government in 2002 for maintaining government-leading resource planning in Korea. In this regard, Max - GMCP is calculated from the equilibrium condition of investment based on reliability standard and fixed cost of the peaking plant. For verifying the propriety of the proposed price cap, this paper compares the proposed value with the estimated VoLL(Value of Lost Load) based on Korea's GDP(Gross Domestic Product).

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권2호
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• pp.79-87
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• 2005

At present Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in oligopoly market. But there exist several problems to apply this model to electricity market. The representative one is to obtain the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to accomplish maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears on the long-term basis through the statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제41권4호
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• pp.67-99
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• 2019

This paper, focusing on the renewable portfolio standard (RPS), evaluates alternative renewable energy policies. We propose a tractable equilibrium model which provides a structural representation of Korea's electricity market, including its energy settlement system and renewable energy certificate (REC) transactions. Arbitrage conditions are used to define the core value of REC prices to identify relevant competitive equilibrium conditions. The model considers R&D investments and learning effects that may affect the development of renewable energy technologies. The model is parameterized to represent the baseline scenario under the currently scheduled RPS reinforcement for a 20% share of renewable generation, and then simulated for alternative scenarios. The result shows that the reinforcement of the RPS leads to higher welfare compared to weakening it as well as repealing it, though there remains room to enhance welfare. It turns out that subsidies are welfare-inferior to the RPS due to financial burdens and that reducing nuclear power generation from the baseline yields lower welfare by worsening environmental externalities.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.675-685
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• 2013

Generation capacities and transmission line constraints in a competitive electricity market make it troublesome to compute Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing participants' strategic generation quantities. The NE can cause a mixed strategy NE rather than a pure strategy NE resulting in a more complicated computation of NE, especially in a multiplayer game. A two-level hierarchical optimization problem is used to model competition among multiple participants. There are difficulties in using a mathematical programming approach to solve a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents heuristics applied to the mathematical programming method for dealing with the constraints on generation capacities and transmission line flows. A new formulation based on the heuristics is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the heuristics and the newly-formulated equations.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제51권8호
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• pp.403-408
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• 2002

As the electricity industry undergoes a process of fundamental restructuring, horizontal market power appears as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below competitive levels. In models for imperfect competition under the consideration of the transmission constraints, the Nash equilibrium has the form of a mixed strategy. In this paper, the models for analyzing imperfect competition are compared using the solution of pure and mixed equilibria. The relation between market power and the capacity of a transmission line is investigated by imperfect competition analysis methods: Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply Curve model.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권1호
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• pp.62-67
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• 2003

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.807-809
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권4호
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.