• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.113-120
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• 1994

A duopoly model is developed in order to examine the effect of imperfect competition on the price-setting behavior of competing providers in a congested market. Multiple Nash price equilibria are found and the implications of such multiple price equilibria are discussed.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.65-75
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• 2016

We study limit pricing in a price-based duopoly market under asymmetric information on the demand state. An incumbent, who is a monopolist in the initial period, has complete information on the size of a market, while a potential entrant only knows it partially. After observing the sales price of the incumbent in the first period, the entrant decides whether to enter a duopoly market and the sales price if she chooses to. We present a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which indicates that limit pricing can deter the entry of a potential entrant under price competition when there is information asymmetry about the demand state.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.79-90
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• 2019

As an increasing number of cloud service providers begin to provide cloud computing services, they form a competitive market to compete for users. Due to different resource configurations and service workloads, users may observe different response times for their service requests and experience different levels of service quality. To compete for cloud users, it is crucial for each cloud service provider to determine an optimal price that best corresponds to their service qualities while also guaranteeing maximum profit. To achieve this goal, the underlying rationale and characteristics in this competitive market must be clarified. In this paper, we analyze price competition in the multimedia cloud service market with two service providers. We characterize the nature of non-cooperative games in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market with the goal of capturing how each cloud service provider determines its optimal price to compete with the other and maximize its own profit. To do this, we introduce a queueing model to characterize the service process in a multimedia cloud data center. Based on performance measures of the proposed queueing model, we suggest a price competition problem in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market. By solving this problem, we can obtain the optimal equilibrium prices.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.545-557
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• 1997

This paper deals with dynamic optimal pricing for new products by a firm which maximizes the discounted profit stream of it's own in a duopoly. The problem is constructed as differential games and dynamic optimization theory. Cost is assumed to decline as time goes on. A modified customer's choice model is formulated as a diffusion model and we solve a dynamic optimization problem by adopting the diffusion model. Since this paper focus on deriving real prices not showing a time trend, we formulate recursive form equations of costate variables(shadow price) and a simultaneous equation of price. Hence we derive a dynamic optimal pricing model for using in real market. In particular, we construct a dynamic optimal pricing model in the case that there are benefits from not only new subscribers but also previous subscribers. We analyze instant camera market in U.S.A(1976-1985) by utilizing the above model.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 1999.06a
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• pp.203-225
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• 1999

In this paper, I tried to analyze the relationship between the market structure of teleommunicatin industry and market performance using Economides and Lehr's results considering composite goods methods. And I took three policy scenarios into account. First, government tires to implement the policy which divides the integrated monopoly into network operator and service provider, then invite competition to service part. Second, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to service part only. Third, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to integrated duopoly. I gained the best result in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel vertical integration is the best market structure. I also specially checked the relationship between the market structure and service quality. I gained the best service quality in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel Vertical Integration is also the best market structure with regard to the service quality.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.90-97
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• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.81-96
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• 2016

This study analyzes how breach fee under long-term contract and/or cap regulation on the breach fee can affect the impacts of "Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act" on handset bundle price, average revenue per unit (ARPU), and social welfare. We conduct comparative analysis with an economic model of duopoly competition in price when users are under long-term contract and the breach fee can be regulated. The results show that the Act lowers the equilibrium prices, lower than incumbent price without the Act. Price of non-dominant Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can be lower than poaching price without the Act if significant portion of switching cost is breach fee or the market is significantly asymmetric. Under the significant circumstances, the Act can raise ARPU even though it improves social welfare. By contrast, the Act increases consumer surplus without affecting social welfare if breach fee is the only source of user's switching cost and is capped by the regulation, and more symmetric market and the stronger cap leads to higher consumer surplus.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.83-100
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• 2015

We analyze a duopoly competition when two firms face input cost increases. The objective of this study is to determine the firms' optimal strategy between a price increase and downsizing under conditions of a spatially differentiated market and consumers' diminishing utility on the product size. We develop a theoretical model of two competing firms offering homogenous products using the standard Hotelling model to determine how firms' optimal strategies change when facing input cost increases. In this paper, there are two types of duopoly competitions: symmetric and asymmetric. In the symmetric case, the two firms have the same marginal cost and are producing and selling identical products. In the asymmetric case, the two firms have different marginal costs. The results show that the optimal strategy decision depends on the size of the input cost increase and the cost differences between the two firms. We find that when two firms are asymmetric (i.e., they have different marginal costs), the two firms might choose asymmetric pairs of strategies in equilibrium under certain conditions. When the cost differences between the two firms are sufficiently large and the cost increase is sufficiently small, the cost leader chooses price increase, and the cost-disadvantaged firm chooses downsizing in equilibrium. This asymmetric strategy reduces price competition between two firms, and consumers are better off. When the cost differences between the two firms are sufficiently large, downsizing is the dominant strategy for the cost-disadvantaged firm. The cost-disadvantaged firm finds it more profitable to reduce the product size than to increase its price to reduce price competition, because consumers prefer downsizing to price increases. This paper might be a good starting point for further analytical research in this area.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.2
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• pp.1-8
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• 2019

Network externalities are essentially dynamic in that the value consumers feel about a product is affected by the size of the existing customer base that uses that product. However, existing studies on network externalities analyzed the effects of network externalities in a static way, not dynamic. In this study, unlike previous studies, the impact of network externalities on price competition in a vertically differentiated market is dynamically analyzed. To this end, a two-period duopoly game model was used to reflect the dynamic aspects of network externalities. Based on the game model, the Nash equilibria for price, sales volume, and revenue were derived and numerically analyzed. The results can be summarized as follows. First, if high-end product has strong market power, the high-end product vendor takes almost all benefits of the network externality. Second, when high-end product has strong market power, the low-end product will take over most of the initial sales volume increase. Third, when market power of high-end product is not strong, it can be seen that the effects of network externalities on the high and low-end products are generally proportional to the difference in quality. Lastly, if there exists a strong network externality, it is shown that the presence of low-end product can be more profitable for high-end product vendor. In other words, high-end product vendor has incentive to disclose some technologies for the market entrance of low-end product, even if it has exclusive rights to the technologies. In that case, however, it is shown that the difference in quality should be maintained significantly.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.1-19
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• 2013

The market for commercial open source software (OSS) has been rapidly growing with the proliferation of OSS. One way to commercialize OSS is the support model, which has been adopted by leading OSS firms such as Red Hat and JBoss. Despite the growing interest in OSS commercialization, little research has provided OSS support providers with a pricing guideline. In this paper, we examine the optimal pricing strategies for OSS support providers. Our benchmark is a monopoly case in which we investigate a startup software vendor's incentive to choose the OSS support regime over the proprietary one. Then we extend the model to a duopoly case in which OSS under the support regime competes against proprietary software. We characterize the conditions under which the OSS support model is viable under competition. We believe that our results offer insights to the OSS vendors who consider commercializing their OSS with a support model.