• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.1117-1127
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• 2014

Differential Fault Analysis(DFA) is widely known for one of the most powerful method for analyzing block cipher. it is applicable to block cipher such as DES, AES, ARIA, SEED, and lightweight block cipher such as PRESENT, HIGHT. In this paper, we introduce a differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher LEA for the first time. we use 300 chosen fault injection ciphertexts to recover 128-bit master key. As a result of our attack, we found a full master key within an average of 40 minutes on a standard PC environment.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.568-573
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• 2013

In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on symmetry structured SPN block cipher proposed in 2008. The target algorithm has the SPN structure and a symmetric structure in encryption and decryption process. To recover the 128-bit secret key of the target algorithm, this attack requires only one random byte fault and an exhaustive search of $2^8$. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on the target algorithm.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.871-878
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• 2012

LBlock is a 64-bit ultra-light block cipher suitable for the constrained environments such as wireless sensor network environments. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on LBlock. Based on a random nibble fault model, our attack can recover the secret key of LBlock by using the exhaustive search of $2^{25}$ and five random nibble fault injection on average. It can be simulated on a general PC within a few seconds. This result is superior to known differential fault analytic result on LBlock.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.59-68
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• 2006

Although the cryptographic algorithms in IC chip such as smart card are secure against mathematical analysis attack, they are susceptible to side channel attacks in real implementation. In this paper, we analyze the security of smart card using a developed experimental tool which can perform power analysis attacks and fault insertion attacks. As a result, raw smart card implemented SEED and ARIA without any countermeasure is vulnerable against differential power analysis(DPA) attack. However, in fault attack about voltage and clock on RSA with CRT, the card is secure due to its physical countermeasures.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.33-41
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• 2012

A differential fault analysis(DFA) is one of the most important side channel attacks on block ciphers. Most block ciphers, such as DES, AES, ARIA, SEED and so on., have been analysed by this attack. PRESENT is a 64-bit block cipher with 80/128-bit secret keys and has a 31-round SP-network. So far, several DFAs on PRESENT have been proposed. These attacks recovered 80, 128-bit secret keys of PRESENT with 8~64 fault injections. respectively. In this paper, we propose an improved DFA on PRESENT-80/128. Our attack can reduce the complexity of exhaustive search of PRESENT-80(resp. 128) to on average 1.7(resp. $2^{22.3}$) with 2(resp. 3) fault injections, From these results, our attack results are superior to known DFAs on PRESENT.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.2 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2013

256-bit block cipher XSB(eXtended Spn Block cipher) was proposed in 2012 and has a symmetric strucrure in encryption and decryption process. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on XSB. Based on a random byte fault model, our attack can recover the secret key of XSB by using only two random byte fault injection. This result is the first known cryptanalytic result on the target algorithm.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.21 no.5
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• pp.15-25
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• 2011

A differential fault analysis(DFA) is one of the most important side channel attacks on block ciphers. Most block ciphers, such as DES, AES, ARIA, SEED and so on., have been analysed by this attack. In 2008, Wei et al. proposed the first DFA on ARIA-128. Their attack can recover the 128-bit secrey key by about 45 faulty ciphertexts. In this paper, we propose an improved DFA on ARIA-128. We can recover the 12S-bit secret key by only 4 faulty ciphertexts with the computational complexity of O($2^{32}$).

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.709-717
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• 2012

The round reduction on block cipher is a fault injection attack in which an attacker inserts temporary errors in cryptographic devices and extracts a secret key by reducing the number of operational round. In this paper, we proposed an improved round reduction method to retrieve master keys by injecting a fault during operation of loop statement in the Triple DES. Using laser fault injection experiment, we also verified that the proposed attack could be applied to a pure microprocessor ATmega 128 chip in which the Triple DES algorithm was implemented. Compared with previous attack method which is required 9 faulty-correct cipher text pairs and some exhaustive searches, the proposed one could extract three 56-bit secret keys with just 5 faulty cipher texts.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.105-108
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• 2015

In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on symmetric SPN block cipher with bitslice involution S-box in 2011. The target block cipher was designed using AES block cipher and has advantage about restricted hardware and software environment using the same structure in encryption and decryption. Therefore, the target block cipher must be secure for the side-channel attacks. However, to recover the 128-bit secret key of the targer block cipher, this attack requires only one random byte fault and an exhausted search of $2^8$. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on the target block cipher.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.70-75
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• 2012

LED-64 is a 64-bit block cipher proposed in CHES 2011 and suitable for the efficient implementation in constrained hardware environments such as WSN. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on LED-64. In order to recover the secret key of LED-64, this attack requires only one random nibble fault and an exhaustive search of $2^8$. This work is the first known cryptanalytic result on LED-64.