• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.189-195
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• 2020

Smart contract, one of the applications of blockchain, is expected to be used in various industries. However, there is risks of damages caused by attacks on vulnerabilities in smart contract codes. Tool support is essential to detect vulnerabilities, and as new vulnerabilities emerge and smart contract implementation languages increase, the tools must have extensibility for them. We propose a design model for extensible architecture of smart contract vulnerability detection tools that detect vulnerabilities in smart contract source codes. The proposed model is composed of design pattern-based structures that provides extensibility to easily support extension of detecting modules for new vulnerabilities and other implementation languages of smart contract. In the model, detecting modules are composed of independent module, so modifying or adding of module do not affect other modules and the system structure.

• Ocean Systems Engineering
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.79-95
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• 2019

The material analysis of an offshore structure is generally conducted in the contract design phase for the price quotation of a new offshore project. This analysis is conducted manually by an engineer, which is time-consuming and can lead to inaccurate results, because the data size from previous projects is too large, and there are so many materials to consider. In this study, the piping materials in an offshore structure are analyzed for contract design using a big data framework. The big data technologies used include HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System) for data saving, Hive and HBase for the database to handle the saved data, Spark and Kylin for data processing, and Zeppelin for user interface and visualization. The analyzed results show that the proposed big data framework can reduce the efforts put toward contract design in the estimation of the piping material cost.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.365-368
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• 2004

소프트웨어 신뢰성을 보장하기 위한 Eiffel의 Design by Contract[1,2] 기법은 프로그램 코드 안에 코드가 뜻하는 바를 함께 기술하는 것으로 소프트웨어가 명세의 주어진 조건에 따라 정확히 동작하도록 하고 있다. 그것은 재사용성이 높은 콤포넌트를 기반으로 하는 콤포넌트 기반 소프트웨어 개발방법에 있어서 중요한 특징이다. 본 논문에서는 C++언어의 타입 상속에서 올바른 의미적 타입 계층구조를 유지할 수 있도록 Design by Contract 기법을 적용하고, 기능을 활용할 수 있는 방안을 제시하였다. 또한, 객체지향 프로그래밍에 있어서 올바른 타입 구조를 형성할 수 있도록 하여, 견고한 소프트웨어 콤포넌트를 제작할 수 있도록 유도하였다.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.1-11
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• 2013

An interesting puzzle in business practices is that although many researchers emphasize the benefits of a revenue-sharing contract, a wholesale contract has remained to be the most common contractual form. By introducing the concept of unobservable efforts, we examine the contractual efficiency of a wholesale contract and a revenue-sharing contract. The multi-task agency model and experimental design approach are used to analyze the relationship between the contractual efficiency and parameters. A major finding of our study is that a wholesale contract coordinates unobservable efforts, while it fails to coordinate the order quantity decision. Because unobservable efforts have mixed effects on the contractual efficiency, the superiority of contract type depends on parameters. This finding implies that a wholesale contract can be a competitive contract, especially when unobservable efforts are heavily involved. Our conclusion is that the current popularity of a wholesale contract is manager's rational response to complex supply chain environments rather than irrational behaviors.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.1-12
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• 2022

Purpose: The revenue sharing contract has been widely used in industries, and its ability to coordinate the supply chain system has been studied by numerous researchers. By reviewing the representative studies on the revenue sharing contract, this study intends to analyze the key features of this coordinating contract and identify its potential to be a more advanced coordination program than the original contract. Research design, data, and methodology: This study reviews past studies on the revenue sharing contract. The selected studies are investigated with a focus on how this contract is described to realize the supply chain coordination and the key issues that they address. Results: The literature review reveals that the revenue sharing contract requires standardized details about what and how to share. This study also finds additional issues that need to be addressed by researchers to improve this coordinating contract. Conclusions: Future researchers are advised to unify the detailed contents of the revenue sharing contract to confirm that it successfully coordinates the supply chain system. In addition, this study proposes key research issues that would enhance the role of revenue sharing contract as a supply chain coordination program.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.18
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• pp.189-218
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• 2002

The EPC/Turnkey Contract goes to the extreme in allocating risks to the contractor and depending on the types of project, this may be regarded as unacceptable. It has also gone to the extreme in the extent to which the contractor is responsible for the specification and design of the Works. The employer is not responsible for correctness of any information provided by him nor for correctness of any specification or other matter included in the Employer's Requirements, except the definition of the intended purpose and criteria for testing and performance. With such conditions it is surprising that the employer is entitled to interfere in the contractors performance to an extent that is close to what is norm for a construction contract with employer design and with normal risk allocation. The combination of risk allocation and inappropriate administrative provisions makes the EPC/Turnkey Contract a document that will meet severe resistance from contractors. It is also likely that employers will see the risks and difficulties from their own perspective. It is a fiction that the EPC/Turnkey Contract will give the employer a contact with a certainty of final price and completion date. It is not a fiction that the EPC/Turnkey Contract carries many seeds for disputes between the parties. The Orange Book has become an accepted document even if it clearly contains some weaknesses. Some of these have been corrected in the Plant Contract. In my opinion FIDIC should let users become more familiar with the Plant Contract as a follow up to the Orange Book.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.1-16
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• 2001

This paper describes a preliminary investigation of contracts with a view towards automating the process of contract match-making. A novel approach based on exploiting Standard Form Contracts(SFC) is described. The approach is shown to be implementable with current technology. A second approach based on Standard Contract Clauses(SCC) which overcomes some of the limitations of Standard Form Contracts, is briefly outlined. The flexibility offered by this approach however, is accompanied by a considerable increase in the complexity of contract match-making. Both Standard Form Contracts and Standard Contract Clauses based match-making point towards an exciting area of future research.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.27-44
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• 2020

Purpose - This study examines the factors that influence the performance of contract farming by agricultural cooperatives from the agency theory and resource-based view of the firm. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected 1,090 data related to a sample of contract information between agricultural cooperatives and producers from national agricultural cooperatives federation. In order to examine the performance of contract farming, we use the multiple regression analysis. Findings - Incentives may reduce agency problems by increasing producers' motivation and discouraging their opportunistic behavior. Total asset size and education expenses function like resources that lessen the risks coming from environment uncertainty, and also facilitate the contract farming between producers and agricultural cooperatives. Research implications or Originality - By analyzing the factors that influence on the performance of contract farming between producers and agricultural cooperatives, we propose that incentives, and resources may improve the performance of contract farming between agricultural cooperatives and producers. Overall, the contract farming can co-create the economic efficiency and effectiveness while minimizing risks and uncertainty.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.125-135
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• 2022

Purpose: The revenue sharing contract has been used in various industries and it is expected to coordinate the individual companies' operations in a way to improve the whole supply chain performance. This study evaluates the performance of the revenue sharing contract to find out whether this contract achieves its original goal, the supply chain coordination. Research design, data, and methodology: The profit optimization models are developed to represent two stage supply chain system with a supplier and a buyer. By using the numerical examples of the proposed mathematical models, this study examines whether this supply chain contract coordinates the supply chain system. Results: The numerical examples show that the revenue sharing contract does not make the same supply chain profit as the centralized system does. With the proper combination of the wholesale price discount rate and revenue share ratio, both manufacturer and retailer can obtain increased profits from the revenue sharing contract. Conclusions: The outcomes of the numerical analysis imply that the revenue sharing certainly improves the supply chain performance but it does not fully coordinate the supply chain system. By controlling the wholesale price and revenue share ratio, every supply chain member can be beneficiaries of this supply chain contract.

• Journal of Computing Science and Engineering
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.251-262
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• 2013

Bad smells are usually related to program source code, arising from bad design and programming practices. Refactoring activities are often motivated by the detection of bad smells. With the increasing adoption of Design-by-Contract (DBC) methodologies in formal software development, evidence of bad design practices can similarly be found in programs that combine actual production code with interface contracts. These contracts can be written in languages, such as the Java Modeling Language (JML), an extension to the Java syntax. This paper presents a catalog of bad smells that appear during DBC practice, considering JML as the language for specifying contracts. These smells are described over JML constructs, although several can appear in other DBC languages. The catalog contains 6 DBC smells. We evaluate the recurrence of DBC smells in two ways: first by describing a small study with graduate student projects, and second by counting occurrences of smells in contracts from the JML models application programming interface (API). This API contains classes with more than 1,600 lines in contracts. Along with the documented smells, suggestions are provided for minimizing the impact or even removing a bad smell. It is believed that initiatives towards the cataloging of bad smells are useful for establishing good design practices in DBC.