• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.131-154
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• 2013

Michael Williams, in his paper, rejects the wide-accepted view that Donald Davidson's radical interpretation is a truth conditional account of meaning, and suggests a claim that robust truth in fact does not play any role in Davidson's interpretation and thus interpretation can be in accord with the deflationary theory of truth. In this paper, I will first research the right understanding on the explanatory relations in radical interpretation between truth and meaning, and on that ground, will evaluate the adequacy of Williams' suggestion. My diagnosis is that the acceptability of Williams' idea depends on how we regard the several factors which are crucial for interpretation. Especially I will argue that whether truth condition is regarded as deflationary or inflationary makes difference to the way of understanding radical interpretation, hence the room for taking radical interpretation as deflationary can be in two different ways. Furthermore I will show the same argument can be applied to Williams' another claim that Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning is similar to Davidson's account.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.207-231
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• 2018

The identity theory of truth insists that a truth bearer is identical with a fact. First, I will consider how we can make the thesis intelligible. For this, I classify the identity relation which the identity theory discusses into two kind; trivial and non-trivial relation. And I show that the trivial one is not adequate to be qualified to be applied to the identity theory. The non-trivial relation can be adopted in robust or modest way. I argue that the robust kind of identity theory is incoherent itself. Then, I explain why we should compare the modest identity theory with the deflationism. From this comparing, I will draw the consequence that two choices are left to the modest theory. If they choose one way, there is no reason for us to prefer the identity theory to deflationism. On the other hand, in case that they choose the other way, I argue what kinds of interesting problem is left to be solved by the modest theorists. Finally, I will evaluate the limit and prospect of the result of the problem in case that the identity theorists achieve their goal.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.125-150
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• 2019

A coherence theory is adequate as a theory of justification only when justification as conceived by the theory is truth-conducive. But it is not clear how coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This is the alleged truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism. In my 2017 paper, I argued that a certain version of the coherence theory, namely a Sellarsian coherence theory combined with the deflationary conception of truth, can cope with this problem. Against this claim, Kiyong Suk argues in his recent paper that my proposed solution fails on the grounds that there is no practical way of distinguishing between intersubjective justification and objective justification. The purpose of this paper is to clarify my view by way of explaining why Suk's criticism is not correct. In particular, I argue that his criticism is based on a wrong assumption, namely that for one to be objectively justified in believing something, one's justification must be qualitatively transformed into the status of having objective justification from the status of having intersubjective justification.