• IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing
• /
• v.1 no.1
• /
• pp.50-64
• /
• 2012

Quality of Service (QoS) and fairness considerations are undoubtedly essential parameters that need to be considered in the design of next generation scheduling algorithms. This work presents a novel game theoretic cross-layer design that offers optimal allocation of wireless resources to heterogeneous services in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) networks. The method is based on the Axioms of the Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (S-NBS) concept used in cooperative game theory that provides Pareto optimality and symmetrically fair resource distribution. The proposed strategies are determined via convex optimization based on a new solution methodology and by the transformation of the subcarrier indexes by means of time-sharing. Simulation comparisons to relevant schemes in the literature show that the proposed design can be successfully employed to typify ideal resource allocation for next-generation broadband wireless systems by providing enhanced performance in terms of queuing delay, fairness provisions, QoS support, and power consumption, as well as a comparable total throughput.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2000.07a
• /
• pp.403-405
• /
• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2000.11a
• /
• pp.3-5
• /
• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.51 no.7
• /
• pp.311-316
• /
• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.4A no.4
• /
• pp.243-253
• /
• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
• /
• v.19 no.8
• /
• pp.1415-1423
• /
• 2016

Interference in device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular network needs to be elaborately investigated because of channel sharing. The objective is to improve the quality of D2D communications while maintaining high performance for cellular users. In this paper, we solve the above problem by jointly considering channel allocation and power control using coalition formation game. Our cooperative game theoric approach allows to enhance network-wide performance. We design a merge-and-split algorithm to deal with the complexity of the combinatorial structure in coalition formation problem. The analytical and numerical results show that our algorithm converges to a stable point which achieves high network performance.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
• /
• v.97 no.6
• /
• pp.669-679
• /
• 2008

Jirisan National Park was designated on December 29, 1967 as the first national park in Korea and that caused continuous conflicts between the violation of the right to hold property in this area due to several regulations following the designation and the nature preservation for the value of heritage for descendants. Thus, the objective of this study is to find a proposal for making decision based on the rationality that is able to solve these conflicts. To achieve the objective of this study, this study applies a game theory that supports a reasonable decision making process for solving these conflicts between interest groups around Jirisan National Park in which the component of this game consists of Jirisan National Park, residents, and interest groups. The Nash equilibrium obtained by the analysis of the strategy of interest groups for the use and preservation of forests and its rewards from the strategy as an nonecooperative game showed a behavior that chases their own benefits and causes lots of troubles. However, in the case of the results obtained from a cooperative game based on the strategy that includes some public interests accepted by interest groups and its rewards, it represented an aspect that solves conflicts through achieving a strategical set, which shows a win-win outcome even though the results of this cooperative game may present less rewards than that of the Nash equilibrium. Whereas, if there exists the public interests accepted by interest groups and truth for protecting such public interests, it is considered that it becomes a way that solves present structural troubles in the National Parks in Korea due to the fact that there exist uncertainties caused by the human rationality.

• ETRI Journal
• /
• v.36 no.1
• /
• pp.31-41
• /
• 2014

The heterogeneous network (HetNet) has been discussed in detail in the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and LTE Advanced standards. However, the standardization of High-Speed Packet Access HetNet (HSPA HetNet) launched by 3GPP is pushing at full steam. Interference coordination (IC), which is responsible for dealing with the interference in the system, remains a subject worthy of investigation in regard to HSPA HetNet. In this paper, considering the network framework of HSPA HetNet, we propose a quasi-distributed IC (QDIC) scheme to lower the interference level in the co-channel HSPA HetNet. Our QDIC scheme is constructed as slightly different energy-efficient non-cooperative games in the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) scenarios, respectively. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for these games are first revealed. Then, we derive the closed-form best responses of these games. A feasible implementation is finally developed to achieve our QDIC scheme in the practical DL and UL. Simulation results show the notable benefits of our scheme, which can indeed control the interference level and enhance the system performance.

• Journal of Korea Trade
• /
• v.25 no.6
• /
• pp.1-19
• /
• 2021

Purpose - This paper aims at analyzing the functions and effectiveness of the cooperation agenda in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), focusing on the cases of Asian countries. This paper estimates the contribution of this agenda to the sustainable development in Asia by providing the 'side payment' of the economic integration that encourages foreign investment and change in global value chains (GVC). Design/methodology - This study analyzes the functions of the cooperation chapter in FTAs by applying the cooperative game theory and reviewing the structures of the related FTAs. Also, as an empirical study, the existing FTA provisions and related development assistant programs in Asia are reviewed in this paper, especially focusing on the FTAs signed by Korea. Findings - Our main findings can be summarized as follows: The drawback of the economic integration, which would be the imbalanced economic benefit, can be redressed by the cooperation chapter in FTAs functioning as a 'side payment'. Indeed, as the examples of Korean FTAs show, more foreign investment and the GVC expansion in Asian countries have been encouraged thanks to the implementation of the cooperation chapters. Originality/value - This paper attempts to find how a legally binding agreement would influence the cooperation agenda in Asia which has never been analyzed despite the increasing number of so-called 'cooperation' chapters in the FTAs.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.23 no.4 s.82
• /
• pp.37-45
• /
• 2005

This paper presents a relationship between Nash bargaining game and Wardrop user equilibrium, which has been widely used in transportation modeling for route choice problem. Wardrop user equilibrium assumes that drivers in road network have perfect information on the traffic conditions and they choose their optimal paths without cooperation each other. In this regards, if the bargaining game process is introduced in route choice modeling, we may avoid the strong assumptions to some extent. For such purpose, this paper derives a theorem that Nash bargaining solution is equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium as the barging process continues and prove it with some numerical examples. The model is formulated based on two-person bargaining game. and n-person game is remained for next work.