• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.19-32
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• 2002

This paper examines the effect of the producer-supplier quality contract parameters and the magnitude of the quality related variables on the quality of the final products. Our analysis focuses on the parties' equilibrium behavior In a quality game environment where the supplier should choose among the two production technologies, one requiring high cost but producing high quality Parts and the other requiring low cost but producing low quality parts and where the producer should decide whether to do the inspection of the parts. The game framework is employed to depict the potential conflicts existing between the Producer and the supplier because the Producer can not observe the supplier's choice and each party wants the other to bear the cost of producing high quality products. In our model, we specifically consider the competitive situation where the producer competes with a firm producing the same product. We employ the market share attraction model to Incorporate the competitive situation and completely characterize the equilibrium by using the Nash equilibrium concept for the game solution. Our results show that the equilibrium depends on the contract terms and the magnitude of the quality related variables. Compared to the non-competitive situation, the probability of producer's Inspection and the probability of supplier's choosing the high quality technology increases in a competitive situation. This is true even when the competitor's quality is lower than the producer's lowest. As a result, the quality of the final product increases In a competitive situation. And as the failure cost borne by the supplier increases, the probability of choosing the high quality technology Increases and the probability of inspection decreases. The net effect of this results in the decrease of the final product quality.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.131-142
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• 2018

As the gaming industry grows, the need to understand and study on game Addiction and overindulgence have also grown. For this object, in this study, the author first studied how game elements and game mechanisms were categorized by using previous studies. As a result, game elements are divided into three elements that compose visual, competitive, and probability elements. And the game mechanisms that establish three elements were grouped into subcategories. Risk of competitive and visual element that effect on overindulgence is depended on what mechanism has used. But, in the probability element, Gambling mechanism must be viewed in terms of addiction, not overindulgence.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.532-541
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• 2004

Computer game has become the core part of multimedia area in our knowledge and information based society Recently, computer game has been evolving into on-line 3D games which give players more realism from the existing on-line 2D games. We are competitive in developing on-line 2D games. However, we have difficulties in maintaining the competitive edge in the area of 3D game technologies owing to the limited technologies. In this paper, we design and develop Aria Online, an on-line 3D prototype game using Dream3D. The on-line game supports simultaneous connections of multi -users on each game server and full flexibility on user's view.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.107-125
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• 2006

We introduce a two-stage game theoretic model to support decision making processes for product Positioning and pricing in competitive environment. In the first stage, firms decide on entry and product position, in the second stage, firms compete with price. 'Alpha rule' is used as a choice model. Demand parameters of the choice model are estimated by conjoint analysis. We investigate conditions for the existence of Nash price equilibria in the pricing game. Nash equilibria in the entry and positioning game are produced using a concept of stable sets. An example of the online game industry in Korea is examined.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.3-12
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• 2020

The introduction of 5G greatly reduced service traffic speed and capacity problems. In this communication environment, the market demand for cloud games is increasing, and cloud games are considered as a replacement for mobile games in the future. This study explains the changes in the game industry, and the characteristics and market status of cloud games. Next, this study suggests competitive advantage elements for cloud games market. We expect that this study could help make decisions related to policy support for the cloud game market and industry.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.60 no.3
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• pp.509-516
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• 2011

This paper studies a novel method to find the profit-maximizing Nash Equilibriums in allocating generation quantities with consideration of ramp-rates under competitive market environment. Each GenCo in a market participates in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies. In order to find the Nash equilibriums it is necessary to search the feasible combinations of GenCos' strategies which satisfy every participant's profit and no one wants various constraints. During the procedure to find Nash equilibriums, the payoff matrix can be simplified as eliminating the dominated strategies. in each time interval. Because of the ramp-rate, generator's physically or technically limits to increase or decrease outputs in its range, it can restrict the number of bidding strategies of each generator at the next stage. So in this paper, we found the Nash Equilibriums for multi-stage generation allocation game considering the ramp-rate limits of generators. In the case studies, we analyzed the generation allocation game for a 12-hour multi-stage and compared it with the results of dynamic economic dispatch. Both of the two cases were considered generator's ramp-rate effects.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.24-30
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• 2001

This paper is to consider on Engine-Technology & Engine-Design of the On-line Game for game production. This study will act as practical skill of the task for homemade game engine development which has competitive power internationally.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.40 no.2
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• pp.43-61
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• 2015

The valuation of patents is very important, since technology competitiveness is crucial for firms to maintain global competitiveness. But, the patent valuation is difficult and challenging because of the uncertainty affecting their returns. Hence, we propose a patent valuation method by incorporating game theory into the real option model, which can not only potentially recognizes the effect of uncertainty on patent value, but also consider investment decision in a competitive market, as a game between firms. With the model, we can consider dynamic strategy involving an option of patent leveraging strategies enabling the firm to switch among compete, cooperate, or wait modes under different demand or competitive advantage condition.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.87-98
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• 2002

A competitive coevolutionary algorithm is a probabilistic search method that imitates coevolution process through evolutionary arms race. The algorithm has been used to solve adversarial problems. In the algorithms, the selection of competitors is needed to evaluate the fitness of an individual. The goal of this study is to compare and analyze several competition strategies in terms of solution quality, convergence speed, balance between competitive coevolving species, population diversity, etc. With two types of test-bed problems, game problems and solution-test problems, extensive experiments are carried out. In the game problems, sampling strategies based on fitness have a risk of providing bad solutions due to evolutionary unbalance between species. On the other hand, in the solution-test problems, evolutionary unbalance does not appear in any strategies and the strategies using information about competition results are efficient in solution quality. The experimental results indicate that the tournament competition can progress an evolutionary arms race and then is successful from the viewpoint of evolutionary computation.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.07a
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• pp.507-508
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• 2001

Power transactions are considered as noncooperative game in that participants compete each other to win the bidding game, and as cooperative game in that they have to cooperate to apply the result of bidding game to the physically interconnected power system. This paper applies both noncooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire process of power transaction.