• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.12
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• pp.685-688
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• 2004

In competitive electricity markets, the System Operator (SO) coordinates the overall maintenance schedules whenever the collective maintenance schedule reported to SO by Gencos in the pool does not satisfy the specified operating criteria, such as system reliability or supply adequacy. The SO's coordination usually involves sorts of financial conflict among Genco's. This paper proposes a coordination algorithm which minimizes the total financial loss of Genco's while satisfying the required operating criteria.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.8
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• pp.1172-1180
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• 2017

This study analyzed competition in peak load plants between CCGT and GT instead of competition between base and peak load plants like in previous studies. In common overseas power markets, CCGT and GT claim certain market shares as peak load plants with the latter boasting a high utilization rate as reserve plants. In South Korea, however, there has been no introduction of GT in the market that opened in 2001 with no analysis cases of GT's economy as a peak load plant. The current power market of South Korea is run on the cost-based pool, which allows for no price spikes. Since the capacity payment criteria for compensations for missing money are set based on GT generators, the power market uses GT generators as marginal plants. The purposes of this study were to analyze the competitive edge of GT generators as peak load plants in the domestic power market of South Korea and identify the causes of GT's failure in market entry, thus assessing the adequacy of market signals in the domestic power market.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.158-163
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• 2005

Competitive electricity markets necessitate equitable methods for allocating transmission usage in order to set transmission usage charges and congestion charges in an unbiased and an open-accessed basis. So in competitive markets it is usually necessary to trace the contribution of each participant to line usage, congestion charges and transmission losses, and then to calculate charges based on these contributions. A UPFC offers flexible power system control, and has the powerful advantage of providing, simultaneously and independently, real-time control of voltage, impedance and phase angle, which are the basic power system parameters on which sys-tem performance depends. Therefore, UPFC can be used efficiently and flexibly to optimize line utilization and increase system capability and to enhance transmission stability and dampen system oscillations. In this paper, a mathematical approach to allocate the contributions of system users and UPFCs to transmission system usage is presented. The paper uses a dc-based load flow modeling of UPFC-inserted transmission lines in which the injection model of the UPFC is used. The relationships presented in the paper showed modified distribution factors that modeled impact of utilizing UPFCs on line flows and system usage. The derived relationships show how bus voltage angles are attributed to each of changes in generation, injections of UPFC, and changes in admittance matrix caused by inserting UPFCs in lines. The relationships derived are applied to two test systems. The results illustrate how transmission usage would be affected when UPFC is utilized. The relationships derived can be adopted for the purpose of allocating usage and payments to users of transmission network and owners of UPFCs used in the network. The relationships can be modified or extended for other control devices.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.7
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• pp.352-357
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• 2005

In competitive electricity markets, the System Operator (SO) coordinates the overall maintenance schedules when the collective maintenance schedule reported to 50 by Gencos not satisfy the specified operating criteria, such as system reliability or supply adequacy. This paper presented a method that divides generator maintenance scheduling of the 50 into a master-problem and a sub-problem. Master-problem is schedule coordination and sub-problem is DC-optimal power flow. If sub-problem is infeasible, we use the algorithm of modifying operating criteria of master-problem. And, the 50 should use the open information only, because the information such as cost function of a generator and bidding Price is highly crucial for the strategies of profit maximization.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.728-730
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• 2004

Transmission congestion is one of the Key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Other players' strategy is also considered. This paper presents an alternative methodology in market power under transmission congestion and other players' strategy. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF). Case study is fulfilled by GAMS simulation.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.183-187
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• 2002

The efficient and rational transmission tariff structure is one of the crucial factors in creation of fair and competitive electricity markets. Transmission charge can be largely categorized into the line usage charge, system reliability charge, access charge and others. Any transmission tariff should be able to reflect these cost components reasonably. This paper suggests an approach amenable to allocating the transmission reliability costs reasonably with reflection of line sensitivity and line outage rate.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2004.11b
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• pp.104-106
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• 2004

In competitive electricity markets, the System Operator (SO) coordinates the overall maintenance schedules whenever the collective maintenance schedule reported to SO by Gencos in the pool does not satisfy the specified operating criteria, such as system reliability or supply adequacy. In this paper, we divide maintenance schedule problem into master-problem and sub-problem. Master-problem is schedule coordination and sub-problem is DC-optimal power flow. If sub-problem is infeasible, we use the algorithm of modifying operating criteria of master-problem.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2004.11b
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• pp.101-103
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• 2004

Transmission congestion is one of the Key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Withholding is a one of the methods exercise the market power. This paper presents an alternative methodology in market power under transmission congestion and withholding. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF). Case study is fulfilled by GAMS simulation.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.449-470
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the effects of nuclear power generation on industrial growth in using the data of 22 manufacturing sectors in 14 nuclear power countries. The hypothesis that the change in the proportion of nuclear power generation in total electricity generation affects industrial value-added and industrial output through industrial electricity price reduction was tested using the dynamic panel data model. First, it was estimated that the increase in nuclear power generation by a 1% leads to a 0.8% reduction in electricity price. The results indicate that when nuclear power generation increased by a 1% point, industrial value-added and output increased by 0.16% and 0.23%,respectively, in the short-run and by 0.51% and 0.85%, respectively, in the long-run. It was also inferred that the effect of nuclear generation on industrial competitiveness working through electricity price reduction rely on institutional settings in the electricity markets. That is, the competitive effect is greater in the countries such as U.K and Japan where electricity price is high and price volatility is large. Meanwhile, in Germany which has pursued phasing out nuclear power, industrial competitiveness is promoted through stable electricity supply.