• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.30 no.6 s.112
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• pp.509-515
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• 2006

As international trade has been increased, the competition of major ports is getting hard. The objective of this competition is that to get more cargoes, so port managements and operators are struggling to obtain cargoes. In addition the competition structure has classified several forms bemuse of specialization, integration and subdivision of port players. In this paper, therefore, we analyze the change of competition structure by port players' development characteristics. In the result of this study, competition structure is divided into five groups as among nations, among ports, among container terminal operation companies, among global container terminal operation companies and among container terminal operation companies operated by shipping companies. And they have showed not only competition but also co-operation partly in order to get strategic position.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.143-169
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• 2017

This paper empirically examines how capital structure inertia varies across industries and there is different in industries, and whether this fact is explained by product market competition using non-financial firms listed in KOSP market over periods of 1981 to 2015. In empirical test, I find that firms with more competition environment tend to have inertia behavior in making decision of capital structure. This implies that it is explained by debt discipline effect and it is substitution for product market competitions. Also I find that manager tends to take action actively making decision of capital structure when product market competition is low. Also I show that they use debt to constraint the free cash flow. As a result, I conclude that Korean non-financial firms do not have more strong inertia behavior in capital structure rather than U.S. firms. Second, using OLS estimation, inertia effect disappears while there is strong inertia effect in relationship between inertia and product market competition. This result suggests that transaction cost is not key factor in explaining inertia behavior of capital structure.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.85-100
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• 2009

An online marketplace, such as eBay, is an example of two-sided markets. In online marketplaces, there are transactions between sellers and buyers and direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. Previous research on two-sided market has not handle these competition effects and mostly focused on indirect network externalities between sellers and buyers. We analyze the fee structure of an online marketplace considering direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. We find that when fees for sellers and buyers can be imposed, an auction or fixed-pricing rule can be chosen according to the characteristics of a product traded. But when only fees for sellers can be imposed, an auction can be taken as a trading mechanism solely.

• Proceedings of the Korea Association of Information Systems Conference
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• 2001.12a
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• pp.271-282
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• 2001

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.99-108
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• 2020

Purpose: This paper investigated the relationship between market competition and firm valuation error. Furthermore, Additional analyses were made according to the quality of financial reports and the listed market. Through the process we confirm to the impact of competition on the capital market. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of competition on valuation errors. The preceding studies did not provide a consistent results of the effects of competing functions on the capital market. One view is that the competition could mitigate the information asymmetry, and the other is that monopolistic lessens the manager's involvement in financial reporting. This study is intended to expand the prior study by analyzing the impact of competition on the capital market and on the valuation of investors. Research design, data, and methodology: The analysis was conducted on 12,031 samples over 11 years from 2008 to 2018 using data from market in Korea. Here the valuation error was measured by the research methodology of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005), and competition measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by (-1), and Concentration Ratio by (-1). Results: We confirm that the positive relationship between competition and the valuation error. In addition, we also found that the positive relation between competition and valuation error was in cases of low discretionary accruals and the KOSDAQ market. This means that the net function of competition does not mitigate valuation errors. Conclusions. This study has the following contributions when compared to prior research. First, the relevance between the level of competition and the valuation of the entity was confirmed. The study by Haw, Hu and Lee (2015) suggested that monopolistic industry of analysts' forecast is more accurate due to lower the variability in earnings. This study magnified it to confirm that monopolistic lessen information uncertainty in valuation. Second, the study on valuation errors was expanded. While the study on the effect of valuation errors on the capital market is generally relatively active, it is different that competition degree has analyzed the effect on valuation errors amid the lack of research on the effect on valuation errors.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.37-59
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• 2018

This study investigates the effects of the distribution channel structure on quality decisions under duopoly competition. I considers a set-up in which two retailers compete on product quality and retail price. In the set-up, the integrated retailer has the power to determine the quality of its exclusive product, while the decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized retailer, the supplier determines product quality. I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized channel by one retailer and an integrated channel by the other retailer can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-channel-choice model. The two retailers select different levels of quality, and this quality competition benefits retailers by softening price competition. In a sequential-channel-choice model, I find that the leader can obtain a first-mover advantage. From the perspective of the supplier, which can decide the distribution channel structure and level of quality, both suppliers choose the decentralized channel in equilibrium.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.97 no.5
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• pp.501-507
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• 2008

The data of crown width with 4 directions, DBH, tree height, and coordinate for sample trees were collected from 30 permanent sample plots in secondary fore st of the Maoershan Experimental Forestry Farm, Northeast China. In this paper, the competition of individual trees in stand were discussed for secondary forest by using iterative Hegyi competition index and crown overlap index that represented the competitive and cooperative interactions among neighboring trees. Active competitors of subject tree in the competition zone were selected to calculate the iterative competition index. Using the results of crown classification based on the equal crown projection area, a new distance dependent competition index called crown overlap index (COI) was developed for secondary forest. The COI performed well in describing the crown competition rather than crown competition factor (CCF). The individual-based competition index discussed in this paper will provide more precise for developing individual tree growth models for secondary forest and it can also use to adjust the stand structure for spatial optimal management.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 1999.06a
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• pp.203-225
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• 1999

In this paper, I tried to analyze the relationship between the market structure of teleommunicatin industry and market performance using Economides and Lehr's results considering composite goods methods. And I took three policy scenarios into account. First, government tires to implement the policy which divides the integrated monopoly into network operator and service provider, then invite competition to service part. Second, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to service part only. Third, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to integrated duopoly. I gained the best result in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel vertical integration is the best market structure. I also specially checked the relationship between the market structure and service quality. I gained the best service quality in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel Vertical Integration is also the best market structure with regard to the service quality.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.593-600
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• 2021

In this paper, we present the FlappyBird Competition System (FCS) implementation, a competition-based automated assessment system used in an entry-level artificial intelligence (AI) course at a university. The proposed system provides an evaluation method suitable for AI courses while taking advantage of automated assessment methods. Students are to design a neural network structure, train the weights, and tune hyperparameters using the given reinforcement learning code to improve the overall performance of game AI. Students participate using the resulting trained model during the competition, and the system automatically calculates the final score based on the ranking. The user evaluation conducted after the semester ends shows that our competition-based automated assessment system promotes active participation and inspires students to be interested and motivated to learn AI. Using FCS, the instructor significantly reduces the amount of time required for assessment.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.105-117
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• 2019

Purpose - Underdog positioning is often used to evoke a positive attitude when interacting with consumers. However, little research has been conducted on the market competition structure and innovation contexts in which underdog positioning produces the most impact. This research aims to investigate unexplored boundary conditions of underdog positioning and addresses two issues: market structures (oligopoly vs monopolistic competition) and perceived firm innovativeness (PFI). Design/methodology - Two one-way ANOVA designs (market structures: monopolistic competitions vs. oligopoly; perceived frim innovativeness: strong vs. weak) were randomly assigned to 297 graduate and undergraduate students (52 % female) majoring in business. Study 1 examined the effect of underdog positioning on consumer attitudes in the different market structures. Study 2 investigated the relationship between underdog effect and consumer attitudes through viewing conditions that varied in PFI. Findings - Drawing on the results of the study, the authors conclude that underdog positioning is effective to generate more positive consumer attitudes when employed in the market structure of monopolistic competition rather than oligopoly. Moreover, both underdog and top dog positioning are likely to generate more positive consumer attitudes when accompanied with strong PFI than weak PFI. Originality/value -This is the first study to distinguish between monopolistic competition and oligopoly market structures with underdog positioning as well as to demonstrate a positive effect of PFI, regardless of the type of brand narratives.