• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• 제10권2호
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• pp.5-15
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player's own payoff, the player's perception of others' payoffs, and others' perceptions of the player's payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.

• 정보처리학회논문지C
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• 제17C권4호
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• pp.385-390
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• 2010

공리적 접근 방법을 이용한 제휴 (Coalition) 게임 이론과 협상 (Bargaining) 게임 이론을 이용하여 다수의 노드가 대역폭을 공유하는 환경에서 각 노드의 트래픽 입력율에 따라 공정하고 효율적으로 대역폭을 할당하는 방안들이 제시되어 왔다. 이들 기법들은 게임 이론이 제공하는 수학적 근거에 따라 공리적 공정성을 만족한다. 그러나 이들 게임들의 공리는 서로 다르기 때문에 동일 통신 환경에서도 각 송신 노드에게 할당되는 대역폭은 달라진다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 이들 게임 이론들을 이용하여 대역폭 할당 문제를 모델링하고 다양한 통신 환경에서 각 게임 기법들에 의해 송신 노드에 할당되는 대역폭과 이로 인한 손실율을 정량적으로 비교 분석하였다. 분석 결과 협상 게임은 입력율이 낮은 노드보다 입력율이 높은 노드에게 상대적으로 대역폭을 적게 할당하고 제휴 게임은 송신 노드들의 입력율에 비례하여 대역폭을 할당한다는 것을 보였다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권9호
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• pp.4220-4241
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• 2017

For the downlink energy-harvesting small cell network, this paper proposes an interference management algorithm based on distributed coalitional game. The cooperative interference management problem of the energy-harvesting small cells is modeled as a coalitional game with transfer utility. Based on the energy harvesting strategy of the small cells, the time sharing mode of the small cells in the same coalition is determined, and an optimization model is constructed to maximize the total system rate of the energy-harvesting small cells. Using the distributed algorithm for coalition formation proposed in this paper, the stable coalition structure, optimal time sharing strategy and optimal power distribution are found to maximize the total utility of the small cell system. The performance of the proposed algorithm is discussed and analyzed finally, and it is proved that this algorithm can converge to a stable coalition structure with reasonable complexity. The simulations show that the total system rate of the proposed algorithm is superior to that of the non-cooperative algorithm in the case of dense deployment of small cells, and the proposed algorithm can converge quickly.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권9호
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• pp.3312-3334
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• 2015

In this paper, a mechanism for spectrum allocation in overlay cognitive radio networks is proposed. In overlay cognitive radio networks, the secondary users (SUs) must first sense the activity of primary users (PUs) to identify unoccupied spectrum bands. Based on their different contributions for the spectrum sensing, the SUs get payoffs that are computed by the fusion center (FC). The unoccupied bands will be auctioned and SUs are asked to bid using payoffs they earned or saved. Coalitions are allowed to form among SUs because each SU may only need a portion of the bands. We formulate the coalition forming process as a coalition forming game and analyze it by game theory. In the coalition formation game, debtor-creditor relationship may occur among the SUs because of their limited payoff storage. A debtor asks a creditor for payoff help, and in return provides the creditor with a portion of transmission time to relay data for the creditor. The negotiations between debtors and creditors can be modeled as a Bayesian game because they lack complete information of each other, and the equilibria of the game is investigated. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed auction yields data rate improvement and certain fairness among all SUs.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권7호
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• pp.3413-3430
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• 2017

With the fast increasing popularity of mobile services, ubiquitous mobile devices with enhanced sensing capabilities collect and share local information towards a common goal. The recent Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) paradigm enables a broad range of mobile applications and undoubtedly revolutionizes many sectors of our life. A critical challenge for the MCS paradigm is to induce mobile devices to be workers providing sensing services. In this study, we examine the problem of sensing task assignment to maximize the overall performance in MCS system while ensuring reciprocal advantages among mobile devices. Based on the overlapping coalition game model, we propose a novel workload determination scheme for each individual device. The proposed scheme can effectively decompose the complex optimization problem and obtains an effective solution using the interactive learning process. Finally, we have conducted extensive simulations, and the results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves a fair tradeoff solution between the MCS performance and the profit of individual devices.

• 한국멀티미디어학회논문지
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• 제19권8호
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• pp.1415-1423
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• 2016

Interference in device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular network needs to be elaborately investigated because of channel sharing. The objective is to improve the quality of D2D communications while maintaining high performance for cellular users. In this paper, we solve the above problem by jointly considering channel allocation and power control using coalition formation game. Our cooperative game theoric approach allows to enhance network-wide performance. We design a merge-and-split algorithm to deal with the complexity of the combinatorial structure in coalition formation problem. The analytical and numerical results show that our algorithm converges to a stable point which achieves high network performance.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.611-627
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• 2017

For enhancing the coverage of wireless networks and increasing the spectrum efficiency, small cell networks (SCNs) are considered to be one of the most prospective schemes. Most of the existing literature on resource allocation among non-cooperative small cell base stations (SBSs) has widely drawn close attention and there are only a small number of the cooperative ideas in SCNs. Based on the motivation, we further investigate the cooperative approach, which is formulated as a coalition formation game with power control algorithm (CFG-PC). First, we formulate the downlink sub-channel resource allocation problem in an SCN as a coalition formation game. Pareto order and utilitarian order are applied to form coalitions respectively. Second, to achieve more availability and efficiency power assignment, we expand and solve the power control using particle swarm optimization (PSO). Finally, with our proposed algorithm, each SBS can cooperatively work and eventually converge to a stable SBS partition. As far as the transmit rate of per SBS and the system rate are concerned respectively, simulation results indicate that our proposed CFG-PC has a significant advantage, relative to a classical coalition formation algorithm and the non-cooperative case.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:소프트웨어및응용
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• 제31권2호
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• pp.101-110
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• 2004

사회시스템이나 경제시스템 같이 동적으로 변하는 시스템에서는 그 구성원들 간에 복잡한 상호작용(행동)이 나타나게 되는데 구성원들의 행동은 변화하는 환경에 따라 적응하는 경향을 보인다. 그리고 이들의 행동양상은 흔히 생물학 분야의 조건반사에 비유되기도 한다. 본 논문에서는 복잡한 사회 현상을 모델링하고 분석하기 위하여 반복적 죄수의 딜레마 게임 상에서 에이전트들의 전략적 연합을 통하여 변화하는 환경에 잘 적응하는 일반화 능력이 우수한 에이전트들을 자동 생성하는 방법을 제안한다. 또한 에이전트에 신뢰도를 부여하여 연하의 의사결정에 참가하게 함으로써 일반화 성능을 향상시키는 방법을 소개한다 실험결과, 전략적 연합을 이용하여 진화된 에이전트들은 테스트 에이전트들에 비하여 일반화 성능이 우수함을 확인할 수 있었다.

• 정보처리학회논문지:컴퓨터 및 통신 시스템
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• 제8권1호
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• pp.1-8
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• 2019

본 논문에서는 모바일 크라우드소싱 환경에서 게임이론의 인센티브 매커니즘 기법과 중복 연합 형성 게임(Overlapping Coalition Formation Game)을 적용하여 시스템의 진실성을 보장하고 모바일 노드의 이득을 극대화하는 효율적인 기법을 제안한다. 제안된 매커니즘 기법은 노드가 자신의 정보를 솔직하게 드러냈을 때 가장 높은 보상을 지급함으로써 노드가 진실된 정보를 보고하도록 한다. 또한 중복 연합 형성 게임을 적용함으로써 노드들은 자신 주변의 가장 높은 보상을 지급하는 연합을 선택하고 자신의 자원이 허락하는 한 다수의 연합에 참가하여 업무를 수행함으로써 효율성을 높일 수 있었다. 컴퓨터 시뮬레이션을 통해 기존에 제안된 다른 기법에 비해 제안된 기법은 모바일 노드들이 높은 보상을 얻기 위해 자신의 정보를 솔직하게 드러냈고 자신의 성능과 남은 자원에 따라 더 높은 보상을 받을 수 있음을 확인할 수 있었다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제41권4호
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• pp.220-227
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• 2018

The cooperative game theory consists of a set of players and utility function that has positive values for a subset of players, called coalition, in the game. The purpose of cost allocation method is to allocate the relevant cost among game players in a fair and rational way. Therefore, cost allocation method based on cooperative game theory has been applied in many areas for fair and reasonable cost allocation. On the other hand, the desirable characteristics of the cost allocation method are Pareto optimality, rationality, and marginality. Pareto optimality means that costs are entirely paid by participating players. Rationality means that by joining the grand coalition, players do not pay more than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of players. Marginality means that players are charged at least enough to cover their marginal costs. If these characteristics are all met, the solution of cost allocation method exists in the core. In this study, proportional method is applied to EOQ inventory game and EPQ inventory game with shortage. Proportional method is a method that allocates costs proportionally to a certain allocator. This method has been applied to a variety of problems because of its convenience and simple calculations. However, depending on what the allocator is used for, the proportional method has a weakness that its solution may not exist in the core. Three allocators such as demand, marginal cost, and cost are considered. We prove that the solution of the proportional method to demand and the proportional method to marginal cost for EOQ game and EPQ game with shortage is in the core. The counterexample also shows that the solution of the proportional method to cost does not exist in the core.