• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.2
• /
• pp.1-21
• /
• 2004

Clausewitz’s theory of war can be divided between the theory of conduct of war and the theory of preparations for war, and the theory of war that Clausewitz means, is the theory of conduct of war. But before Clausewitz, men regarded a theory of preparations for war as the theory of war. The theory of preparations for war concerns generally about the material side of war, but not its spiritual aspect. The activity of war is basically a human spiritual and psychological action. And because the war is dangerous, the anxiety occurs and diverse human feelings, for example courage, have been required. Also the informations in war is normally very uncertain, so an insight of the commander is in war very needed. The Theory of war has to consider this spiritual aspect. To end the war and to acquire the peace, an excellent talent of commander is necessary. And it is a genius. Men who are difficult to move but have strong feelings, these are the men who are best able to be a genius.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.8
• /
• pp.271-309
• /
• 2010

The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.

• Convergence Security Journal
• /
• v.18 no.2
• /
• pp.41-47
• /
• 2018

Theorists of war have often used Clausewitz's trinity theory as a framework for analyzing war strategies and histories. Heretofore, studies on cyber warfare have focused primarily on laws, policies, structuring organizations, manpower, and training pertaining to preparing the cyberspace for war. Currently, studies highlighting the comparative characteristics of war in cyberspace, how it differs from conventional warfare, and analytical frameworks for understanding war in cyberspace are rare. Using Clausewitz's trinity theory, this paper interprets the essence of war from the perspectives of (1) Intellect, (2) Bravery, and (3) Passion, to propose an analytical model for understanding war in cyberspace, one that factors in the intrinsic qualities and characteristics of cyberspace under spatial and temporal constraints. Furthermore, this paper applies the aforementioned analytical model to the Iraq War and concludes with a theoretical illustration that cyber warfare played a significant role in winning the war.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.1
• /
• pp.1-34
• /
• 2003

Clausewitz's On War is a very difficult classic. Because its manuscript was not completed by him, and the Korean translations are hard to understand. Seven Korean translations of the twelve, all of the Korean translations of On War, are the plagiarisms or very alike to the former translations. It remains only five translations, to that is worth reading. Even the five are composed of Korean, difficult to understand. Because they are full of japanese and chinese terms, the sentence structures too long and complex, and many of terms too 'military'. Now is the time to translate the book new, that is understandable with easy and simple terms and short sentences.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.7
• /
• pp.305-331
• /
• 2009

This year I published a Korean translation of On War in three volumes, written by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz. I believe it is the first unabridged Korean translation from the original German text, Vom Kriege. It is true that the work has been translated into Korean several times, but some translations have been done from English or Japanese versions, while others are abridged ones. It is not easy to make a good translation of On War, partly because the book is actually an unfinished work, and partly because it contains almost all academic subjects in social sciences. Moreover, two aspects of the dialectical logic in the book make it more difficult to understand. One is inductive reasoning, the other is deductive explanation. The former is to 'ascend' to draw principles and generalizations from empirical experience, the latter is to 'descend' to describe and explain given principles, often by concrete examples. Considering these difficulties, if we want to have better translations than existing ones, there should be substantial commentaries which contain not only history of wars, but also biographies and geographies concerned. I hope that On War can be taught and studied in many universities, for it will make it easier to produce reliable commentaries.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.22 no.2
• /
• pp.1-17
• /
• 1996

Sun Tzu once clarified that "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements, " while Clausewitz explained that "A victory will be guaranteed for one who can overcome 'fog and friction' at a battlefield." Now the U.S. is striving hard to develop an American version of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)/MTR (Military Technical Revolution) by utilizing its rapidly emerging information technology in the information age. The U.S. firmly believes that its RMA/MTR with less defense expenditure can provide all combat players in the battlespace with "dominant battle awareness, " by which no nation will be able to challenge U.S. military superiority. In this paper, the recent efforts of the U.S. Armed Forces on RMA/MTR will be briefly introduced, some lessons and expertises from the U.S. RMA/MTR are extracted, and, in this regard, several suggestions are provided for the progress of the ROK Armed Forces.gress of the ROK Armed Forces.

• Industry Promotion Research
• /
• v.5 no.2
• /
• pp.83-91
• /
• 2020

The purpose of this article is to analyse the military thought of Ferdinand Foch and to present its contemporary meanings. 1.Foch's life: Since 1871 to end of World War I, he acted as a military philosopher, battle field commander, and Supreme Commender of the Unified Forces so as to be judged as Clausewitz of the 20th century. 2. Historical Background of Foch's Activity Period : The series of the domestic revolutions after Napoleon's downfall were extended to Europe for independence, unification and overseas colonial wars. Thus Foch's growing and acting period was in totally imminent danger at all fields. 3. Foch's Military Thought : Through his three books, he argued cleary the absolute importance of the immaterial power including the technical esteem and the offensive fighting will for the victory. 4. The Contemporary Application of Foch's Thought : Though the operation plan based on Foch's strategic thought was defeated at the early stage of the World War I, its offensive-oriented immaterial spirit power should be remembered. 5. Conclusion : Foch's thought which develops the penetration through the war history and emphasizes the importance of the immaterial power should be highly appraised. Thus it should be also reinterpreted and redeveloped into a modern contemporary meaning.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.43
• /
• pp.225-247
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study is to find out a significant influence of continental strategy theories on the development of maritime strategy theories. For this purpose, I examined similar and different parts of each theories and their implications when applied to different environment. In details, Chapter 2 deals with how continental strategy and maritime strategy theories are similar and different in general. In Chapter 3, I look into how Karl Clausewitz's theory that has been quoted the most by military strategy theorists had influenced over the theory of Julian Corbett, one of the representative English maritime strategy theorists. In Chapter 4, I study how the theory of Alfred Mahan that has also been quoted the most among the theories of maritime strategy had been influenced by Antoine-Henri Jomini's theory. And in Chapter 5, their contemporary implications and conclusions are drawn. According to my findings, unbelievably, the theories of maritime strategy had been influenced by existing continental strategy theories very much. Many similarities are found between them. However, at the same time, a large part of them is found significantly different from original ones especially when used to reflect the maritime distinctiveness. This means that the past maritime strategy theories and stored experience also wield influence, in many ways, yielding out much better ones in terms of applicability to changing environment. Therefore, devising new strategies with creative attitude using knowledges and experiences from both other fields and past ones is the virtue required for maritime strategists.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.36
• /
• pp.101-133
• /
• 2013

In this paper, the writer investigated the thoughts on military art and science with a focus on the typical books on military art and science, which was published in the latter period of Joseon, and the discussion of literati in that time. Joseon had been happy to enjoy the piping times of peace for about 200 years ever since the establishment of the dynasty. However, having had to gone through two major wars, the Joseon Dynasty, revolving around scholarly people, had awakened the limits of military art and science of Joseon. It can be said that the countermeasure against Japanese pirates, which were reflected in the "Jingbirok" (懲毖錄 - Records of the 1592 Japanese Invasion) written by Yu Seong-ryong, and the experiences of war had formed the basis of the thoughts on military art and science in the latter period. Regrettably, there were no suggestions or proposals of preparing countermeasure against Japanese raiders in the books of military art and science in the early period of the Joseon Dynasty. Meanwhile, as the argument about the battle formation in the early period of Joseon, the process of establishing the military science had not gone smoothly in the latter period of Joseon. Right after the Japanese invasion of 1592, "Gihyo-Sinseo" (紀效新書 - New Text of Practical Tactics written by Cheok Gye-gwang) was brought into the country by the army of Ming (明) Dynasty. At first, this was used in the form of its original edition, or of abstract version in the military drill. But, later, it was published under the title of "Byeonghak-jinam" (兵學指南 - Military Training Manual about Action Rules by combat situation). This book, same as in Zhejian (浙江) province in China, had achieved a positive effect on counteracting the Japanese raiders in our country. However, these military tactics were conflicted with "Owi Jinbeop" - Rules of Deployment of the Five Military Commands, which had been handed down ever since the early period of the Joseon Dynasty, and, at the same time, it was pointed out that those tactics would not be able to apply to the situation uniformly, since Korea and China were geographically different. Furthermore, having gone through Manchu Invasion of 1636 (丙子胡亂, Byeongja horan) Joseon had used "Yeonbyeongsilgi" (練兵實記 - the Actual Records of Training Army), which was compiled in China on the basis of the experiences of wars against the nomad, including Mongolia and so on. And, this had become a typical training manual together with "Byeonghak-jinam". King Yeong Jo and King Jeong Jo of the Joseon Dynasty had tried to establish uniformity in military training by publishing the books of military science representing the latter period of Joseon such as "Sokbyeongjangdoseol" (續兵將圖說- Revision of the Illustrated Manual of Military Training and Tactics,) "Byeonghaktong" (兵學通 Book on Military Art and Science,) "Byeonghakjinamyeonui" (兵學指南演義 - Commentary on 'Byeonghak-jinam') and "Muyedobotongji"(武藝圖譜通志 - Comprehensive Illustrated Manual of Martial Arts,) and so on. King Jeong Jo had actively participated in the arguments in those days. So then the arguments that had been continued for about 200 years, ever since King Seon Jo, put to an end. To sum up the distinctive features of military art and science in both former and latter period of the Joseon Dynasty, in the former period of Joseon, the reasoning military science was proceeded with the initiative of civic official based on "Mugyeongchilseo"(武經七書- the Seven Military Classics). However, in the latter period of Joseon, "Gihyo-Sinseo"(紀效新書 - New Text of Practical Tactics written by Cheok Gye-gwang) had served as a momentum, and also comparatively a large numbers of military official had participated in arguments, so then such an occasion had made the military science turn into the Practical Theory. Meanwhile, King Sejo and King Jeong Jo had played a leading role in the process of establishing the theory of military science of Joseon, however, there are something in common that their succession to the throne was not smooth. This is the part that reminds us "War is an extension of politics," the thesis of Clausewitz