• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.147-152
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• 2020

The bidding program uses statistical analysis method of the collected bidding information and the accumulated bidding results from the public/private sector; however, it is not easy to predict the accurate bidding price by winning the bid method through multiple lottery. Therefore, this paper analyzes the accuracy of the current state data of the electric construction bid from January 2015 to August 2019 acquired from the electric net, which is an electronic bidding site, We use MLP and RNN method, and proposes a technique to predict the bidding amount necessary for the winning bid by predicting the amount between the first and the lowest bidder.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.25-47
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• 2005

This study wishes to analyze that affect in purchasing decision in Telecommunication operation company's international competitive bidding. When submit a tender laying stress on international competitive bidding of the Telecommunication operation companies among specially various international competitive bidding, I wish to investigate game theory enemy by bid method through access method about bid form affecting in buyer's purchasing decision.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.11
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.47-52
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• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.60-62
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• 2001

This paper shows the optimal bidding strategy determination method using Nash equilibrium concept by defining bidding strategy vector. This vector is 2-dimension vector whose components are generation amount and generation cost. Thereby we are able to make all possible strategies and their's payoff table. And then we erase dominated strategies one by one so that we obtain Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategy of generation bidding game.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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• v.48 no.4
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• pp.41-54
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• 2020

This study was conducted to provide basic data for a transparent and fair bidding system by identifying problems and suggesting improvement measures through an analysis of the bidding status for construction projects and service-related landscaping of multi-family housing. To this end, we used the data from the "Multi-Family Housing Management Information System (K-apt)" that provides the history of apartment maintenance, bidding information, and the electronic bidding system to examine the winning bid status and amount, along with the size and trends of the winning bids by year, and the results of the selection of operators by construction type. As a result, it was found that out of the total number of successful bids (36,831), 4.4% (16,631) were in the landscaping business, and the average winning bid value was found to be about 24 million won. According to the data, 73% of the landscaping cases were valued between 3 million won and 30 million won, and 58.6% of the cases were in the field of "pest prevention and maintenance". 36% of the total number of bids were awarded from February to April, with "general competitive bidding" accounting for 59.8% of the bidding methods. As for the method of selecting the winning bidder, 55% adopted the "lowest bid" and "electronic bidding method," and 45% adopted the "qualification screening system" and "direct bidding method." As an improvement to the problems derived from the bidding status data, the following are recommended: First, the exception clause to the current 'electronic bidding method' application regulations must be minimized to activate the electronic bidding method so that a fair bidding system can be operated. Second, landscaping management standards for green area environmental quality of multi-family housing must be prepared. Third, the provisions for preparing design books, such as detailed statements and drawings before the bidding announcement, and calculating the basic amount shall be prepared so that fair bidding can be made by specifying the details of the project concretely and objectively must be made. Fourth, for various bidding conditions in the 'business operator selection guidelines', detailed guidelines for each condition, not the selection, need to be prepared to maintain fairness and consistency. These measures are believed to beuseful in the fair selection of landscaping operators for multi-family housing projects and to prepare objective and reasonable standards for the maintenance of landscaping facilities and a green environment.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.3 no.2 s.10
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• pp.114-120
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• 2002

Traditional bidding process and activities in public construction area has many problems in terms of the transparency and fairness of administration. And, it causes many expenses to suppliers. As part of the efforts to solve these problems, some public institutions developed the electronic bidding systems. But these systems have still problems in diverse aspects. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze current bidding systems through literature survey, Questionnaire, contentment estimation and IDEF method to compare the result of the analysis with the developed electronic bidding systems and to suggest the improvement for the coming bidding systems. According to the survey, under present bidding system big problem is inconvenience of conducting process. Nearly all users of current electronic bidding systems were contented. When public institutions are planning new electronic bidding systems, standardization, security, law and bidding system consolidation must be applied. This study proposes an improved bidding system and described the effects through the improvements.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.213-230
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• 2022

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to find out any potential factors for explanatory variables when calculating the virtual successful bid rate in case of no collusion. Design/methodology/approach - An empirical analysis was conducted in this study with a regression analysis that included 725 bid samples under the public construction technical type bidding. Findings - The result of the basic analysis showed that there are several factors affecting the successful bid rate. First, collusion variable; second, government variable; third, successful bidder design score variable and the number of bidder variable among bidding features; fourth, turnkey variable based on the alternative method; fifth, civil works variable and plant works variable based on building work; sixth, asset variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable. However, the technical proposal method variable among bidding features was found to be statistically insignificant in column(4). Research implications or Originality - The significance of this research is that new variable such as the government variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable were added in the regression model, which showed statistically significant research results.

• Journal of Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.18-28
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• 2015

Bidding and contract systems are used for public construction projects to select contractors following fair competition principles and to execute national budgets effectively. Many challenges have arisen due to a lack of transparency and fairness and because bidding practices have been luck-based. Few comprehensive or comparative analyses have been conducted on the performance and limitations of bidding and contract systems, and empirical analyses designed to improve policies on and the practice of such systems are lacking. This study empirically analyzed current bidding and contract systems to seek ways of improving them. The study proposes several alternatives to resolve the problems with and irrationalities of the current system: 1) improving bidding and selection systems by changing them from a luck-based price competition into a technical merit- and value-based competition; 2) improving the assessment criteria to meet the current market level of bid and winning prices; 3) adjusting contractual responsibilities and sharing structures to meet the current trend; and 4) strengthening the competitiveness and expanding the social responsibility-based procurement systems of construction companies.