• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.61-93
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• 2014

This paper analyzes Onbid car auction data by employing various methods, including structural estimation, to identify main factors which decides auction prices and figure out what effects those factors are making on the auction price. I then discuss on how to maximize sellers' revenue in OnBid car auctions. The government and public institutes sell their assets through the OnBid auction, hence the optimal design of the OnBid auction is important. The paper's main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) The independent private value model explains OnBid car auction data better than the correlated private value model or the interdependent value model; (ⅱ) Both the number of bidders and the ratios of the auction price to the evaluation value were lower in the auctions posted by the Kamco than auctions by institutes other than the Kamco; (ⅲ) Some auctions require that at least two bidders should submit a bid no less than the reserve price for sale. In those auctions, both the number of bidders and each bidder's valuation on the auctioned object were lower than in auctions without that requirement; (ⅳ) The sum of sellers' revenue would be decreased in the simulation with the reserve price higher by 5%, 10%, and 20% across auctions by institutes other than Kamco.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.8 no.6
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• pp.155-160
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• 2008

The BTL project, 4 years since its operation. has benchmarked the PFI Project in Japan and has been introduced. Given the evaluation step to select a preferred bidder, in a technological factor, the basic plans are corrected and complemented, whereas in a price factor, the low price bidding system is being enforced. There is concern that how to select preferred bidders and how to operate project costs during operation and management period may be problematic. Thus, in this study, using the Analytic Hierarchy Process, the method of deciding the priority to select preferred bidders in an early stage of the project and the evaluation model to evaluate the validity of BTL project expenses in process of project enforcement are established. Targeting the group composed of experts who have experiences in the BTL project. Then, the levelling of evaluation factors and grouping have been carried out as following : LCC analysis and disbursement for government including two more detailed factors.

• The Journal of Information Systems
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.63-85
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• 2016

Purpose While the popularity of C2C auction platforms such as eBay is gradually decreased, this domain is still undermined to explain online bidding behaviors. Online bidders sometimes engage in impulsive bidding due to some of the online auction characteristics. Therefore, this study develops and tests a model of the impulsive bidding exhibited by online bidders in C2C auction platforms. Based on S-O-R framework, our model posits that both perceived time-pressure and competition intensity affect cognitive absorption which ultimately influences the impulsive bidding. Design/methodology/approach This study collected survey data from 214 C2C auction participants, who have prior experience on impulsive bidding and tested both measurement model and structural model by using CB-SEM (covariate-based structural equation modelling) technique. In this study, by using AMOS 20.0, we tested the measurement model for its overall fit, item reliability, and validity and further conducted the structural model to test our proposed hypotheses. Findings Based on our results, we found that perceived tim-pressure and competition intensity were positively related to cognitive absorption. We also found that the cognitive absorption was positively associated with impulsive bidding behavior. In this study, by developing our research model in S-O-R framework, we provide an alternative theoretical mechanism to describe online impulsive bidding behavior.

• Proceeding of Spring/Autumn Annual Conference of KHA
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• 2009.04a
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• pp.211-216
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• 2009

Bidding systems in the domestic public construction work have been amended many times since the lowest-bidding system was implemented in 1951. However, this hasn't had much success. Competition in technical development among companies has declined as the contracts for buildings are given to company which submits the lowest price without considering traits of projects. In addition, as the construction market turns to the limitless competition system due to FTA(Free Trade Agreement), advanced techniques are needed to promote the national competitive power. Considering the needs of the times, Korean government announced that "Best Value Contract (Design-Bid-Build)" and "Bridging Contracts (Design-Build)" are included to 4 existing bidding systems in October 2007. Thus this study aims to suggest devised the evaluation criteria including major items for evaluating bidders, in order to establish and revitalize the best-value bid system successfully.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2006.05a
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• pp.119-124
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• 2006

Design-Build, one contractor is responsible for both the design and construction, has become more popular since the government framed the policy on how to activate the design-build projects in 1996. The reality is, however, there are many problems encounted on Contractor Selection Method for Public Design-Build Projects. The purpose of this paper is to improve the problems, no way to meet the goal(value) the owners expect from the design-build projects, for instance, not fully reflecting the characteristics of projects and owners intention, not systematical enough to judge if bidders could carry out the contract. This study will insist we introduce Best Value Procurement, which is being commonly used in some advanced countries recently, so that we would properly select the contractor suitable for Best Value concept which totally depends on the owners, types of work and specified conditions. Furthermore, by passing through the Two-Step Procedures following Pre-qualification in Best Value Procurement, we expect it lighten the bidders' burden for proposal and the owners' complicate bid administration.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.95-121
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• 2007

There are recently several studies of online auctions which have focused on exploring a bidder's bidding behavior in IS area. Those studies, however, have been limited to account for bidders' bidding behavior in the view of TAM and trust, not considering perceived price fairness and competition intensity. Although this view point seems reasonable in the online auction sites, few previous studies employing this perspective are found in the relevant literatures. Based on it, this study developed a comprehensive model based on trust and TAM in terms of perceived price fairness to explain competition intensity in the online auction sites. This study collected 269 survey responses from online bidders who have prior experiences with online auction sites. The survey data are used to empirically verify 11 research hypothesis by using LISREL. The results indicate that trust in websites, trust in sellers and perceived usefulness have significant impacts on perceived price fairness. Finally, perceived price fairness is strongly related to competition intensity in the online auction. This study ends with theoretical and managerial implications, as well as limitations and future research.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.33-43
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• 2021

Purpose: This study aims to verify sellers' economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing negative information in online markets and provide practical guidelines to online sellers in terms of whether, when, and how sharing low quality to buyers increase sales. Research design, data and methodology: Our model examines the number of bidders in Internet auctions to measure potential demand and uses count data analysis following previous studies that have also analyzed the number of bidders in auctions. After checking over-dispersion and zero-inflation in our data, we have run a Poisson regression to analyze the effect of sharing negative information on sales. Results: This study presents a counterintuitive result that low-quality sellers can increase their demand by fully disclosing negative information in an online market, if appropriate risk-reducing methods are employed. Our finding thus shows that there exists economic incentive for online sellers to voluntarily disclose negative information about their products, and that the context of transactions may affect this incentive structure as the incentive varies across product categories. Conclusions: As the positive impact of disclosing negative information has rarely been studied so far, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a unique empirical analysis on the impact of sellers' honesty on sales. By verifying economic incentives of disclosing low quality with actual online sales data, this study suggests practical implications on information disclosure strategy to many online sellers dealing with negative information.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

Auction is widely used in allocation and procurement of resources due to its desirable properties: efficiency and revenue maximization. It is well-known, however, that auction may fail to achieve efficiency when allocative externalities exist. Such a result may happen in the auction of the resources that are very scarce, for example, radio spectrum. This is because allocation of the resources has effects on competition of the firms in the aftermarket, and thus a firm that utilizes the resources less efficiently may make a higher bid to lessen competition. This paper shows first that efficient allocation may not be achieved by auction even when the number of bidders is 2, while it is shown in the literature that auction may result in inefficient allocation when the number of bidders is greater than or equal to 3. There exist 2 firms, who make a bid to win the scarce resources that increase the value or decrease the production cost of their own product. After the auction ends, the firms engage in Bertrand competition on the Hotelling line. Inefficient allocation may happen even under the second-price auction rule, and it happens only when the firms are different in the initial value or the initial cost of their products as well as in the value of the auctioned resources. The firm who has been the leader loses a large portion of the market if it fails to win the auction, and thus makes a high bid even when the other firm can use the resources more efficiently. Allocative efficiency Pareto improves when the smaller firm's bid counts more than the leader's bid. This paper suggests a modified rule that the smaller firm wins the auction when its bid multiplied by some constant is greater than the leader's bid. The multiplier can be calculated from the market shares. It is equal to 1 when the two firms are the same, and is increasing in the leader's market share. Allocation is efficient in a strictly larger set of parameters under the modified rule than under the standard second-price auction rule.