• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.177-192
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• 2015

The Chinese government portrays the One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) and South Korea President Park Geun-hae's Eurasia Initiative as a win-win opportunity which will hurt nobody's interests, but some South Korean commentators have interpreted it as much more than just a trade and development deal: they focus on the geopolitical implications and the possibility that the balance of power in Asia will be disturbed. South Korea depends upon its maritime-oriented Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in focusing on its alliance with the US to deter North Korean threats and explore its export-based economic growth and development, and yet cannot afford to be left out of these initiatives which could transform the economic and logistical linkage between South Korea and Europe. Given its negative reception by the some pundits, however, South Korea should be more precautious for expressing only full-fledged supports for the BRI and Eurasia Initiative. Opponents of these two initiatives doubt that its putative benefits can be realized, at least in the short term, arguing that creating the necessary rail interconnections may be too costly.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.59-83
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• 2019

The Chinese Belt Road initiatives in the Southeast Asian countries marked a new chapter in the development of China political influence on this region. This article looks at the initiative from the cultural dimension and aims to place its narrative as the entry point to understand the use of identity politics in Asian countries that target the Chinese diaspora. This topic relates to the primordial sentiments of Southeast Asian nations amid massive Chinese investment in the region. The issue of Chinese investments under the Belt Road Initiative corridor has a relationship with the formation of anti-Chinese discourse and anti-communist in some Southeast Asian countries. We took the cases of Indonesian and Malaysian elections to observe the use of identity politics and anti-Chinese political discourse in Southeast Asia. In both cases, a common issue emerged, that of the strengthening both Islamic and indigenous sensibilities. The establishment of ASEAN during the Cold War may be seen then as an anti-thesis to emerging Chinese power. However, anti-Chinese and anti-communism sentiments were not enough to unite the forces of the nations of Southeast Asia. We have concluded that brotherhood, mutual prosperity, and anti-neo-colonialism are yet to be fostered completely to make a distinct ASEAN identity.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.243-258
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• 2021

By using the trade in value-added(TiVA) database and employing social network analysis, this paper analyzes changes in global trade to be triggered by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the US-China trade war. The main results are summarized as follows. First, the BRI will help maintain China's core position as the world's manufacturing hub, and will strengthen Europe's service industry capabilities within the global value chain(GVC) network. Second, the US R&D industry, US wholesale and retail industries, and Germany's automobile industry were considered the most influential industries in the GVC network during the 1995-2011 period, and will retain their status until 2049, when the US-China trade war and the BRI are reflected. Third, the increase of the number of communities shows that the BRI might spur fragmentation of the production process. Finally, community structures of inter-industry trade relations, including China's electronics industry, Germany's automobile industry, and US R&D, show important features that are related to the competiveness of each country's service industries.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.19-30
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• 2021

The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is an important part of Belt and Road Initiative(BRI). As an economic and trade corridor for dozens of countries in Asia, Europe and Africa, and the port as an important link node, the efficiency of port operation directly affects the implementation of BRI's strategy. On the basis of combining BRI and related evaluation methods of port efficiency, this paper uses DEA-BCC model to select port production berth number and production berth length as input index container throughput and cargo throughput as output index to analyze the port efficiency of 14 ports in China. The results show that: (1) The overall efficiency level of the ports along the MSR is relatively low. Most of the ports have not reached the DEA efficiency and there are different degrees of problems in scale investment and technological improvement. However, this situation is accompanied by the implementation of China's maritime cooperation strategy and becoming better year by year. (2) The low operating efficiency of ports along China's MSR is mainly due to the lack of coordination between scale efficiency and technical efficiency, which is caused by insufficient scale investment in the port itself, weak economic linkage between the hinterland and the port, (3) Whether a port has a strong comprehensive strength does not entirely depend on the cargo throughput or scale but also includes the port's operating efficiency.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.57-90
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• 2023

China launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015 as part of the existing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its influence in digital and technological development across Asia, Europe, and Africa. Southeast Asia is one of the key targets of the Digital Silk Road due to its geographical proximity to China and the rapid growth of the digital sphere. Although the DSR opens several potential opportunities for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states to foster the digitalization process in the region, how each country reacts to projects under the DSR is varied. Secondly, Vietnam is the only ASEAN member state that has not signed any official agreement under the BRI framework, and thirdly, Vietnam opted out of Huawei technology. This paper aims to understand the perspective of Vietnam and how Vietnam has responded to the growing technological presence of China in Southeast Asia until 2021. By using qualitative methods, the author argues that the DSR has allowed Beijing to overcome the limitations of the original strategy, BRI, and strengthen its influence in the field of information and communication technologies, particularly fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications. Furthermore, the paper examines Vietnam's digital development and digital diplomacy and how the Vietnamese government has responded to DSR projects. In light of both the potential threats and economic benefits that the DSR has brought to Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries, in the last section, the policy implications for cooperation are discussed.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.103-115
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• 2018

The potential competitiveness for new routes and resources has been theoretically discussed with regards to the Arctic route but is gradually becoming a reality as global warming increases. In June of 2017, China officially included the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and major countries' interests in the NSR are greatly expanding. This paper presents the general characteristics of the NSR, NSR development in China, the expected relationship between the NSR and the BRI, and this relationship's implications for Korea. The NSR has poor facilities and information infrastructure and is not economically viable for commercial navigation due to its high-cost conditions compared to competitive routes. In order to explore the Arctic and develop the NSR, large-scale projects must be funded over a long period of time; this has caused major difficulties in development. However, as the NSR is included in the BRI, there could be an opportunity to utilize BRI funds, such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Further, China's NSR development and the NSR development of partner countries, such as Korea, should be further stimulated. As Korea has strengths in terms of its shipbuilding technology and geographical location, which is located at the core of the NSR, Korea would have chances to expand the economic cooperation and business opportunities with China and Russia.

• Acta Via Serica
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.55-90
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• 2021

In the last several decades, and especially since the Chinese launching of the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative in 2013, the Chinese presence in Central Asia has intensified. Russia and Chinese leaders deny that there is any conflict of interests between them, while the standard narrative has been that the two states adhere to a functional division of tasks in which China concentrates on economic activity while Russia acts as the security guarantor for the region. This article argues that the professed equanimity between the Russian and Chinese leaderships masks the emergence of widening cracks in their relationship with regard to Central Asia. The convenient narrative of a functional division of tasks between the two states is called into question by China's increasingly active presence in the military and security sector in the region, but China's influence is growing throughout the Central Asian economic, political, and social order. China's movement into Central Asia challenges Russia's claim to act as an equal partner of China, as well as its pretensions to regional hegemony. This development reflects the widening disparity between the two states with respect to their power capabilities but it also exposes the interactions between Russia and China in Central Asia as the most vulnerable aspect of their relationship. In Central Asia, a defensive Russia encounters an ascendant China.

• Acta Via Serica
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.91-110
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• 2020

This paper traces the trajectory of a variety of complicated economic and political developments between China and India - the world's most ancient civilizations connected by rich history. These recent developments, which are heavily acrimonious and include military clashes involving loss of lives, have greatly damaged bilateral relations. The paper examines the reasons behind the bilateral relations dipping to new lows. Aside from specific bilateral disputes like outstanding border problems, China-India relations have been affected by global and regional developments. The paper identifies rising tensions between the U.S. and China, the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the growth of the Indo-Pacific construct, as the reasons that have expanded distance and mistrust between the two countries. Both China and India are now part of country coalitions aiming to marginalize each other's strategic influences. The paper argues that such efforts by them are going to impact countries in their neighbourhood - such as in Central Asia - by forcing them to make complex choices in the areas of trade engagement and technological development.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.63-87
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• 2020

This article not only theoretically explores the necessity and effect of constructive minilateralism and subregionalism in Northeast Asia, but also delves into a series of practical solutions from viewpoint of seeking common ground while reserving differences in this region. The main contents are as follows: First, the various obstacles that hinder the formation of regionalism, subregionalism and minilateralism in the Northeast Asia are discussed. That is to say, geopolitical realism, My Country First ideology, exclusive nationalism in the socio-historical context, and North Korea's latest provocations, etc. Second, this article explores the philosophy and basic principles of realizing Northeast Asia regionalism and minilateralism. Third, in the 21st century, Northeast Asia becomes the center of the world. It examines the core points, controversial focus and platform for building sub regionalism in the region. Finally, based on the institutional platform such as minilateralism and sub regionalism, the various ideas and practical plans of cross-border cooperation among major countries in Northeast Asia were discussed. Because there are a lot of obstacles, so first of all it is more appropriate to promote economic or functional minilateralism or sub regionalism than multilateral cooperation. In order to promote the formation of regionalism and minilateralism in Northeast Asia, the issues to be considered are as follows: First, for the sake of leading regional solidarity and minilateral economic cooperation, it is advisable for China, as a regional economic power, to implement a stable and responsible diplomacy. Secondly, regional solidarity based on credible politics and security should be promoted for a long time beyond the level of economic cooperation. Third, the primary prerequisite for the realization of Northeast Asian regionalism is that in the process of denuclearization of North Korea, the stability and peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula should be established. Fourth, with the continued hegemonic competition between the United States and China in Northeast Asia, under the circumstance that countries in the region are pushed into so-called "East Asian Paradox", it is profoundly important for them to consider transition from the hostile relationship as the "Thucydides trap" to the order of "coexistence" in which competition and cooperation run side by side, and the two countries should explore a conversion plan for the foreign policy line. This mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the US-China relationship will create a friendly atmosphere for the formation of regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the future, the cooperation of minilateralism in Northeast Asia will break the existing conflict between the maritime forces and the continental forces in order to promote peace. And along with the philosophy that "peace is economy", recent policies of common prosperity as the framework, such as China's "Belt and Road Initiative", North Korea's "Special Zone and Development Zone Policy", Russia's "New Eastern Policy", Japan's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and South Korea's The "Korean Peninsula New Economy Map" are organically linked and it should promote the so-called "networked regionalism".