• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.1
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• pp.71-111
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• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.113-120
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• 2006

C4I system is the centerpiece of the military force. The system is an information based system which facilitates information grid, collection of data and dissemination of the information. The C4I system seeks to assure information dominance by linking warfighting elements in the battlespace to information network which enables sharing of battlespace information and awareness; thereby shifting concept of warfare from platform-centric paradigm to Network Centric Warfare. Although, it is evident that C4I system is a constant target from the adversaries, the issues of vulnerability via cyberspace from attack still remains. Therefore, the protection of C4I system is critical. The roadmap I have constructed in this paper will guide through the direction to protect the system during peace and war time. Moreover, it will propose vision, objectives and necessary supporting framework to secure the system from the threat. In order to fulfill these tasks, enhanced investments and plans from the Joint chief of Staff and Defense of Acquisition and Program Administration (DAPA) is critical; thereby enabling the establishment of rapid and efficient security system.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.50-60
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• 2006

This work describes a basic concept of network based battle management system in AMD(Air & Missile Defense). The AMD operation inherently is joint concept that each single service do not satisfy the requirements of AMD theater operation. It is integrated system of joint forces that is operated simultaneously. The analysis of the future battlespace and air & missile threat is shown. From this analysis the prospective scheme of network based battle management system in building Korean future AMD is presented.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.1-17
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• 1996

Sun Tzu once clarified that "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements, " while Clausewitz explained that "A victory will be guaranteed for one who can overcome 'fog and friction' at a battlefield." Now the U.S. is striving hard to develop an American version of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)/MTR (Military Technical Revolution) by utilizing its rapidly emerging information technology in the information age. The U.S. firmly believes that its RMA/MTR with less defense expenditure can provide all combat players in the battlespace with "dominant battle awareness, " by which no nation will be able to challenge U.S. military superiority. In this paper, the recent efforts of the U.S. Armed Forces on RMA/MTR will be briefly introduced, some lessons and expertises from the U.S. RMA/MTR are extracted, and, in this regard, several suggestions are provided for the progress of the ROK Armed Forces.gress of the ROK Armed Forces.

• Proceedings of the Korea Committee for Ocean Resources and Engineering Conference
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• 2002.10a
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• pp.61-67
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• 2002

The joint warfighting environment, arranged by the net work-centrics, consists, with the situational awareness, the battlespace deconfliction, the joint force ID/location/allocation, and the ordnance on targets, considered by the concepts evolving In meet the future scenarios and threats. And then, the next generation warships have the operational requirements, such as the major offensive capability, the low operating cost, the ability to operate in net. centric forces, the revolutionary stealth, the in-stride mine avoidance, and the revolutionary manning. Therefore, the proposal discussed at this paper will be accepted in order to resolve only the portion of the afore-mentioned problems.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.799-821
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• 2016

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are essential systems for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations in current battlespace. And its importance will be getting extended because of complexity and uncertainty of battlespace. In this study, we forecast the advancement of 96 UAVs during the period of 32 years from 1982 to 2014 using TFDEA. TFDEA is a quantitative technology forecasting method which is characterized as non-parametric and non-statistical mathematical programming. Inman et al. (2006) showed that TFDEA is more accurate in forecasting compared with classical econometrics (e.g. regression). This study got 4.06% point of annual technological rate of change (RoC) for UAVs by applying TFDEA. And most UAVs in the period are inefficient according to the global SOA frontiers. That is because the countries which develop UAVs are in the middle class of technological level, so more than 60% of world UAVs markets are shared by North America and Europe which are advanced countries in terms of technological maturity level. This study could give some insights for UAVs development and its advancement. And also can be used for evaluating the adequacy of Required Operational Capability (ROC) of suggested future systems and managing the progress of Research and Development (R&D).

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.3
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• pp.73-120
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• 2005

Today's world is generation of Transformation. The Term "Transformation" is widely used in many nations and international organizations such as U.S. and NATO to describe the course of change undertaken by militaries to respond to the new and emerging security environment. Transformation involves all elements of the defense enterprise including Operational Environment, Operational Concepts, Doctrine, Structure and Technologies, within a supportive Cultures context. An Operational Environment is defined as "a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander." The context for developing future military concept and capability lies essentially within the anticipated boundaries of the operational environment in a collective sense. The joint operational environment is essential to the nation's defense. It describes volatile, complex, and dangerous environment in which the military personnel. organizations, and material will operate. Implications coming forth from joint Operational Environment are but a starting point - many others exist. More and better Implications will come forth as people think about massages of Operational Environment, experiment its characteristics, learn to deal with its threats and scenarios, apply their experience and judgement, and then consider what is required of Korean military doctrine, organizations, training and education, material development, and leadership for operations in the joint Operational Environment.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.421-430
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• 2010

This work describes a derivation process of JIC(Joint Integrating Concept) based JFC(Joint Functional Concept) analysis of an Aegis BMD(Ballistic Missile Defense). JIC is developed through JOC(Joint Operating Concept) and JFC based on capstone strategy and concept. Aegis BMD is a sea-based ballistic missile defense to detect ballistic missile threat, increase engagement battlespace and enable multiple engagement based on Aegis ships. Aegis BMD is a good case of JIC due to performing an Joint operations based on System of Systems under highly complicated NCW environment. This work analyses JFC using QFD(Quality Function Deployment) and UJTL(Universal Joint Task List). From this analysis the JIC of Aegis Korean BMD is derived using a CASE tool.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.221-230
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• 2020

The effects-based operation, which would reduce unnecessary efforts and meaningless sacrifices incurred during a war and simultaneously reach the will of the enemy leadership by strategic attacks, was discarded for the reason that it was difficult to apply it to military power except for airpower. However, cyberspace, which can be thoroughly logical and calculated, can be suitable for conducting effects-based operations. This study examined a way to carry out effects-based operations in such cyberspaces. It laid the foundation for overcoming the limitations of effects-based operations revealed in previous battle cases and executing the operations in cyber battlespace where the boundary between physical and cyberspaces gradually disappeared. Futhermore, it demonstrated that effects-based operations could be carried out in cyberspace by establishing a military strategy, which could conduct the operations through an analysis of previous cyber-attack cases.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.17-29
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• 2007

This work describes a basic process of OMS/MP in guided weapons on board ship. The OMS/MP which provided basic data of ROC & RAM analysis must be prepared by user But data acquisition Quantified by specific operational environment of ship and related preparing instructions which are not established are now insufficient of reliable weapon systems acquisition. The OMS/MP is an important area that become measures of Acceptance Test and doctrine considering future battlespace environment From a development of the OMS/MP template that describe systematically and as quantitative of shipped guided weapons, combat developer oriented product development & reliable weapon system acquisition are ta be accomplished. This research developed OMS/MP preparation templete that presented quantified OMS/MP derivation and RAM target value calculation process which provide optimum weapon systems design concept to research developers