• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.36-44
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• 2023

The aim of this study is to predict the potential for bid-rigging among public construction bidders and develop preventive and responsive measures. By employing the Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT), which considers the factors of opportunity, pressure, and rationalization, we analyze and explore the bid-rigging potential among construction industry professionals. A survey is conducted among General and specialized construction firms to validate the FTT research model and predict individual bid-rigging tendencies. The results indicate that higher levels of pressure, greater opportunities, and stronger rationalization increase the likelihood of individual bid-rigging. Moreover, more opportunities and stronger rationalization also raise the potential for bid-rigging by others. Understanding these dynamics enhances our knowledge and contributes to the development of policies aimed at preventing bid-rigging.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2015.05a
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• pp.111-112
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• 2015

Garak Market Modernization Project Phase 1, which is the public projects worth 1,75 billion won, was delivered by adopting modifiable bid of BOQ on the lowest price award system. The modifiable bid of BOQ system allows bidders to modify quantities based on their own drawings and construction specifications and requirements. It was initiated by the government for minimizing design error and for inducing technical competition between tenders by checking errors. At that time the bidding, it allowed modifying the BOQ all the works. In the construction phase, the responsibility for the design changes, due to mistakes and omissions on design documents and BOQ were disputed between the owner and the contractors. This study analyzed the problem of the system and addressed a need of improvement.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.12-20
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• 2020

To estimate collusion effects on bid award in Public Construction works, this paper uses Logit Model, which is a choice variable model. Price, design, competition, and other factors are included, with a special focus on collusion, as independent variables in the model. The empirical results are as follows. First, collusion has little effects on bid award, but great impacts on bidding behavior. Secondly, the score of design is the most important and significant factors among all variables. Thirdly, competition has also significant effects on bid award. Finally it is analyzed that institutional framework and characteristics of public work have some effects on bidding award.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.213-230
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• 2022

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to find out any potential factors for explanatory variables when calculating the virtual successful bid rate in case of no collusion. Design/methodology/approach - An empirical analysis was conducted in this study with a regression analysis that included 725 bid samples under the public construction technical type bidding. Findings - The result of the basic analysis showed that there are several factors affecting the successful bid rate. First, collusion variable; second, government variable; third, successful bidder design score variable and the number of bidder variable among bidding features; fourth, turnkey variable based on the alternative method; fifth, civil works variable and plant works variable based on building work; sixth, asset variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable. However, the technical proposal method variable among bidding features was found to be statistically insignificant in column(4). Research implications or Originality - The significance of this research is that new variable such as the government variable and the fourth-quarter performance difference variable were added in the regression model, which showed statistically significant research results.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.52-60
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• 2018

Korea's public construction projects are under construction through bidding, however, due to the nature of the bidding, collusion between participants can occur. The collusion of bids accordingly damages the client. So, it is necessary to calculate the appropriate fictitious competition price to compensate for this. In this regard, econometrics methods are generally used, but there are limitations and issues arising from the nature of construction, especially design-build bid. Therefore, this study proposes a method to estimate reasonable competitive bid-price in design-build bid. It derives the lowest bid-price from the design submitted by the proponent and estimates the competitive bid-price by examining the factors according to the penetration rate according to the technical level of the tester, the skill level of the competitor, and the type of tester. Based on the method proposed in this study, a reasonable price can be derived that reflects the characteristics of the design and construction bidding bidder selection method and also it can be used as a reference material in the actual bidding process as well as calculating the damage due to the answer.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.1053-1061
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• 2017

The study is concerned with providing the improvement method on making a reasonable and scientific decision on the damages accrued from the bid rigging in the construction work. According to the review on the precedent studies and decision cases on the damages caused by bid rigging, the representative problems include the insufficiency of the classification system on the damage calculation method and the omission of the necessary stage in the damage determination process. First, the improved classification system on calculating the damages caused by bid rigging is presented with the application to the bid rigging in the construction work by adding the ratio factor in addition to the damage calculation parameters such as price and cost. Second, the standard procedures organized with six stages is presented as the process required for determining the damages if the indemnification for bid rigging is claimed. The study becomes the foundation for resolving the problem with the undue burden on a party and for preventing the opportunity loss by resolving a dispute early through the improvement classification system and standard procedures presented in the study.

• Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.165-175
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• 2013

Purpose: This study was done to examine not only the relationships between body mass index (BMI), self-esteem, body image dissatisfaction (BID) and mental health, according to gender, but the mediating role of BID on mental health in relation to BMI and self-esteem among early adolescents. Methods: Data from 576 (296 boys and 280 girls) elementary school students in grades 5 to 6 were collected. A multiple-group path analysis was utilized to examine the relationships between BMI, self-esteem, BID and mental health by gender. Results: In the path analysis for all students, poor mental health was related directly to BID, while it was indirectly related to BMI and self-esteem. In the multiple-group path analysis of both genders, BID was found to have a significant direct and indirect effect on mental health for girls alone. Conclusion: The findings suggested that BID should be examined early to prevent poor mental health in early adolescent girls. This study helps to elucidate the role of early adolescent BID on mental health and provides insight for further prevention and intervention programs in school and community mental health settings.

• Survey Research
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.47-76
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• 2002

Starting point bias arises in the iterative bidding framework when the initial bid influences respondent's final bids. The bidding game has become the most commonly used method of asking the valuation question in contingent valuation studies. A bidding game is typically conducted by either personal or telephone interview. Bidding begins with an interviewer positing an initial bid (starting bid) to a respondent. If the respondent is willing to pay the initial bid, the interviewer revises the bid upward until a negative respondent is obtained. A negative response to the initial bid downward until an acceptable amount is found. The final bid is a measure of the respondent's Hicksian compensating or equivalent surplus for the item being valued. This paper explicity tested for starting point bias in bidding games. That is, it was asked whether final bids are influenced by the magnitude of the starting bids in the process of valuating the WTP when to improve the quality of running water in Seoul and its vicinity. The result shows staring point bias exists in the present data and its magnitude is ${\delta}$=-0.265237.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.61-93
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• 2014

This paper analyzes Onbid car auction data by employing various methods, including structural estimation, to identify main factors which decides auction prices and figure out what effects those factors are making on the auction price. I then discuss on how to maximize sellers' revenue in OnBid car auctions. The government and public institutes sell their assets through the OnBid auction, hence the optimal design of the OnBid auction is important. The paper's main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) The independent private value model explains OnBid car auction data better than the correlated private value model or the interdependent value model; (ⅱ) Both the number of bidders and the ratios of the auction price to the evaluation value were lower in the auctions posted by the Kamco than auctions by institutes other than the Kamco; (ⅲ) Some auctions require that at least two bidders should submit a bid no less than the reserve price for sale. In those auctions, both the number of bidders and each bidder's valuation on the auctioned object were lower than in auctions without that requirement; (ⅳ) The sum of sellers' revenue would be decreased in the simulation with the reserve price higher by 5%, 10%, and 20% across auctions by institutes other than Kamco.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.11
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• pp.255-266
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• 2021

Investment demand for factory facilities has increased due to the balloon effect caused by housing price regulation. This study investigated the impact of the real estate market and macroeconomic factors on the bid price ratio of apartment auctions and factory auctions, focusing on the metropolitan area. To this end, we reviewed theories and previous studies on real estate auctions, and examined how macroeconomic variables affect bid price ratio of apartments and factories using the panel vector autoregressive model. It was found that the increase in the apartment bid price ratio increases as the participation in apartment auctions increases. However, as the factory bid price ratio increases, the factory bid price ratio does not increase, it was confirmed that the positive (+) relationship between the successful bid price ratio and the bid price ratioe does not exist, unlike previous studies. Based on the analysis results, it is suggested that the real estate market and macroeconomic factors should be considered for the stable operation of the related relevant auction system. This study has limitations in that it is limited to the metropolitan area. In the future, research that expands the scope of research to the whole country and provinces should be conducted.