• Journal of Nutrition and Health
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• v.53 no.2
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• pp.215-229
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the attitude of South Korean adults toward food aid to North Korea and factors associated with it. Methods: An online survey involving 1,000 adults aged 19-69 years was conducted between September-October 2019. Throughout South Korea, the subjects were proportionally distributed with respect to gender, age, and region, to represent South Korean adults. Results: A total of 44.6% of the respondents agreed (Agreement group), 36.7% disagreed (Disagreement group), and 18.7% neither agreed nor disagreed to food aid to North Korea. Compared to the Disagreement group, the Agreement group had a higher concern of food aid to North Korea and a more positive perception on the effect of it. The Agreement group selected "direct assistance from the government" whereas the Disagreement group chose "support through international organizations" as the most appropriate channel for food aid to North Korea. Logistic regression analysis revealed that South Korean adults showing a more positive perception on the effect of food aid to North Korea were more likely to agree to the aid (odds ratio [OR], 19.32). Moreover, compared to the conservatives, the progressives were more likely to agree to food aid to North Korea (OR, 5.94). South Korean adults in their 40-50s were more likely to agree to food aid to North Korea than those in their 20-30s (OR, 2.81). South Korean adults with a higher concern of food aid to North Korea (OR, 3.93) and a greater positive perception on Korean unification (OR, 1.88) were more likely to agree to food aid to North Korea. Conclusion: The most important factor associated with the attitude of South Korean adults toward food aid to North Korea was their perception on the subsequent effect. As strategies to draw social consensus on food aid to North Korea, we recommend systematizing the monitoring process on the effect of providing food aid to North Korea and informing the public of the outcomes.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.405-421
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• 2019

International aid to North Korea remains far below the humanitarian needs of vulnerable people. This paper examines the trajectory of international humanitarian assistance to North Korea over the last two decades with the focus on its decline in the context of the country's nuclear standoff and corresponding stringent sanctions. In so doing, the paper addresses major problems associated with North Korea's reception of foreign aid and operational constraints placed on humanitarian activities in the country. It shows that humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been largely shaped by geopolitical dynamics. A survey of UN reports and statistics also suggests a shifting trend in recent international aid to North Korea. The decline of aid and multiple operational obstacles faced by humanitarian organizations, for instance, have led to a fall in agricultural support and a proportional rise in health and related services. While UN Security Council resolutions include an exemption provision, humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been constrained by stringent sanctions, which have led to adverse consequences for the civilian population. In this regard, the paper suggests some policy directions for international aid to North Korea amidst negotiations over denuclearization, while stressing an urgent need to address the negative impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups in the country.

• New & Renewable Energy
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• v.1 no.3 s.3
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• pp.24-34
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• 2005

Ministry of Commerce, Industry [MOCIE] has taken it into consideration to introduce a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) that is a purchase obligation program as an alternative plan to the FIT. We conducted a survey of renewable energy companies and experts to ask their opinions about renewable energy policy, the introduction of the RPS, and the scheme for aid of North Korea with renewable energy. Korean renewable energy companies show an impartial opinion about a FIT and a RPS system overall, although they tend to have distinctive opinions by technology each other. With respect to eligible resources for a RPS, the industries want to extend the scope of it as broad as possible. In addition, experts prefer the multi-tiered and energy production based RPS to the sing1e-tiered and installed capacity based RPS. We also conducted a surrey to find the best renewable energy sources. Wind, Geothermal, Solar-thermal, and Photovoltaic were selected to have the best potential capacities to support North Korea by renewable energy experts. However, these energy resources also have several problems to overcome in the aid of North Korea, and thus, the plans for solving them and for giving efficient support to North Korea in the area of Renewable Energy are discussed.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to start from the recognition of the problem of why the sanctions of the international community could not indicate a great effect. In order to find answers to this question, this study focuses on China's aid to North Korea and analyzes the determinants of support for North Korea. Despite a tough international community's sanctions against North Korea, China has taken a dual stance on sanctions and support for North Korea. As for this dual attitude of China, this study approaches the internal and external situation of the support to the North with the rationale for the Two-level game theory. China's sanction against North Korea could be divided into two categories: external factors and domestic factors. These factors include strengthening supremacy in China, checking the US, playing a responsible role in China, securing resources in North Korea, sustaining stable growth in China, maintaining the legitimacy of China's socialist political system, and spreading the Beijing consensus. Based on the analysis of these factors, it could be expected that China's aid for North Korea will be official, informal, or continuous, and it will be difficult for the North to stop supporting North Korea or deteriorating North Korea- China relations.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.52 no.3
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• pp.39-55
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• 2021

The purpose of this paper is to confirm the trend of inland water fish farming in North Korea and to suggest a plan for inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea's inland water fish farming laid the foundation for production in the 1950s and 1960s, and production facilities were expanded until 1980. In the midst of the severe economic crisis in the 1990s, North Korea paid attention to inland water fish farming as an alternative to food production. The military took the lead in expanding the aquaculture industry and catfish farming was encouraged. In the Kim Jong-un era, North Korea's inland fish farming continues the tradition of catfish farming and promotes a policy of expanding inland cage farming. This study comprehensively reviewed recent inter-Korean relations, North Korea's food crisis and acceptability, and UN sanctions. As a result, inland water fish farming is the most promising field for inter-Korean cooperation in the field of fisheries. In the initial stage of inter-Korean cooperation in the field of inland water fish farming, humanitarian aid projects such as feed and seed support can be promoted. In the stage of expanding inter-Korean cooperation, knowledge sharing program and materials and facilities support projects can be promoted. Development cooperation and direct private investment are possible at the full-scale stage.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.192-199
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• 2015

Under the economic banner of "self-reliance," North Korea has focused on hydro and thermal power as its main energy supply sources. However, in the face of extreme energy penury caused by machinery and material supply instability in the wake of the collapse of the former communist block as well as equipment aging and deterioration due to floods and other disasters, North Korea and international aid organizations are increasingly turning their attention toward energy source diversification. In particular, renewable energy is recognized as the best strategic energy source for North Korea and it is a decentralized energy option that is suitable in light of North Korea's power distribution networks and its pursuit of self-reliance. Biogas can contribute to improving the human rights situation of North Koreans in conjunction with an increase in food production. For this reason, renewable energy is the most promising option for an energy source that is likely to secure humanitarian aid from international organizations such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). However, the implementation of such humanitarian aid has been hampered by rising concerns about the diversion of provided energy materials for military purposes and the disguised introduction of dual use items strategic materials as well as UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions of the international community against North Korea's military provocation, including nuclear tests and missile launches. This paper explores the possibility of solving this dilemma and proceeding with the humanitarian aid to North Korea by evaluating the potential for sanction and the risk of diversion of the possible products for biogas-related aid on the basis of the list of UN-sanctioned items.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.169-238
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• 2010

The year 2010 is the 60th anniversary commemorating the Korean War. China intervened in the Korean War with the logics such as "To Resist the U.S.'s Aggression and Aid North Korea," "Save Endangered Home & defend Nation," and "If the Lips Are Gone, the Teeth Will Be Exposed to the Cold or If One of Them Falls, the Other is in Danger." However, China had a deep and long connection with North Korea through 1st Chinese Civil War, war against Japan imperialism, and 2nd Chinese Civil War. China has consulted with Kim Il-sung on his invasion of South Korea at the initial stage of development and played a casting vote role in the execution of the invasion plan. During the Korean War, the PLA supported the North Korea's regime by its action, and made the Korea Peninsula divide into two semi-permanently. Even after the war, China continues to maintain relations with North Korea by helping North Korea build the Kim Il-sung's Kingdom. Currently, whenever any issue related to North Korea rises in the international society, China definitely gets involved in those issues and exercises its power. Conditionally 'either armed aggression or, and wartime' in North Korea, China would follow the "Clause of Military Auto Intervention." In addition, China is very likely to establish refugee camps for North Koreans in the Northeastern-Three-Province and to provide rear bases or guerrilla camps for pro-Chinese sects. Furthermore, voluntarily playing a role as spokesman of North Korean Regime in the international society, China will exercise enormous influence on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Health Policy and Administration Conference
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• 2005.12a
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• pp.362-363
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• 2005

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.151-159
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• 2011

The aim of this paper is analyzing the economic outcome of development aid project on closed mine and submitting the policy alternatives to seek for substitute industries which lead independent growth of that area. Despite the aid project deployed from 2001 to 2010, the economic result appears to be fragile. It is obvious that the contents and magnitude of aid projects has its own limitation to build independent economic structure in closed mine area. Conclusively, to overcome the regional restrictions, it is important to establish the aid project scheme to make a strategic and systematic resource distribution under the regional circumstances.

• Korean Medical Education Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.95-101
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• 2012

As North Korea passed from the Devotion (Jeongseong) movement to the black market (Jangmadang) system, the medical service system in that country was effectively destroyed. North Korean physicians who have successfully defected to South Korea (North Korean defector physicians, NKDPs) have experienced socio-economic hardships on their way to becoming incorporated into the South Korean medical system due to different medico- social cultures, different (English-based) medical terminology, and the clinical knowledge gap between North and South Korea. Since 2009, we have operated programs at the Seoul Medical Center to help NKDPs prepare for the South Korean medical licensing examination. These programs consist of clinical education at the medical center, personal mentoring, arrangement of educational programs at the medical college, mock tests at the consortium, and administrative aid. Looking forward, we hope to achieve the following: 1) More systematic support plans are needed involving medical education experts, field physicians, and experts on reunification. 2) An evaluation of defector physicians' current medical knowledge may provide information about the areas where supplementary education is most needed and the standards for certificating licenses. 3) In the short term, a customized glossary should be developed to assist defector physicians prepare for the examination. 4) To secure internships and residencies is the most important issue for further sustained training of NKDP physicians to become good clinicians after certification. Hopefully, this short report on the current ongoing educational course will lead to more extensive discussion.