• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.155-180
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• 2010

The three means of listening, reflection and meditation (${\acute{s}}raava{\d{n}}a$, manana and $nididhy{\bar{a}}sana$) which are central devices of practice in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ philosophy should be understood not as a continuative step but as a methodological extension on condition of having one and the same purpose. In other words, the three means should be interpreted in a listening-oriented manner, in which the process has to be methodologically extended to reflection and meditation only when the direct knowledge on the reality is not gained in listening. This kind of interpretation can be more justified by displaying significant characteristics of Indian philosophy implied in the three means. It can be easily said that $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ belonging to the liberation-centric tradition is a project of 'regaining essential self' through which the self becomes essential self by knowing that self. In this case the listening-oriented interpretation coincides with the basic teachings of $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$, since listening alone can be a sufficient means for obtaining knowledge of the original self. Further, as the project of 'regaining essential self' is carried out by the three means, these can be called a sort of 'event' that is carried out according to the scenario of $Ved{\bar{a}}ntic$ metaphysics. In this case listening is a course of comprehending the scenario of event participated by oneself, and that participant can accomplish the project by way of listening the scenario alone judged as somewhat more effective for liberation. However, in the later $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ there arises a meditation-oriented interpretation of which three means are regarded not as a methodological extension but as a continuative step, because of the emphasis on meditation under the lasting influence of other philosophical systems. This is a result of epistemic desire that tries to convert what is heard to what is specially perceived or what is given to what is accepted. It may be said that this interpretation emphasizing the phased transition from the indirect to the direct of knowledge is an attempt to rationalize the repetitive delay of event as the actual failure of project. Furthermore, an assertion of the later $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ which refers the fourth means called $sam{\bar{a}}dhi$ is based on the logic that the self-realization is possible apart from and outside the text, and accordingly it is incompatible with an assertion of the early $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ that the self-realization is a reproduction as it is of the scenario guided by the absolute text. After all, the standard interpretation on the three means in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ have to be the listening-oriented, but not be the meditation-oriented or the $sam{\bar{a}}dhi$-oriented.

• Cross-Cultural Studies
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• v.47
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• pp.191-216
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• 2017

Among 20th century Western ideologies (Western civilization), existentialism is a spirit of the times to restore humanity as rationality and advanced technology have driven mankind to impoverishment and death, experiencing the First and Second World War, Great Depression, Fascism and the Spanish Civil War. In his literature, $Andr{\acute{e}}$ Malraux records his existential agony of how mankind lives and faces death by questioning the fateful life and death of characters. For Malraux's characters, the absurdity of existence related to the human identity means self-examination. Malraux explores existential consciousness and actions of characters in the presence of a concept known as death relative to terror, revolution, and adventure. Malraux deftly addresses the concept of death in his literary works, and it has being emphasized as a central subject for philosophical speculation. In Les $Conqu{\acute{e}}rants$(1928), La Voie Royale(1930), La Condition Humaine (1933), L'Espoir(1937), Malraux suggested a philosophical thesis of the meaning of life through characters in tragic situations, and sought out the consciousness of being and the existential meaning through how the characters control their fate. Malraux, in such a tragic perspective of the world, portrays humanity, affirmation of life, and characters' consciousness and actions in denying death. The agony of death triggers escapist behavior such as having unpredictable instinctual desires such as gambling or smoking opium, but these are desperate struggles to flee from frustration and related to the question of one's existence. What is always emphasized with respect to Malraux's existentialism is the tragic metaphysics of the inevitable destiny of the human condition eventually leading to the question of how humans ultimately confront death. But as characters unite in times of war, revolution and adventure in the novel, such cooperative actions symbolizes a keen sense of solidarity reflecting a camaraderie that transcends individualism. Fellowship among people who voluntarily gather for the common cause of philanthropy and restoring humanity is possible because of the underlying human greatness to sacrifice for such a noble cause. Therefore, Malraux's camaraderie includes the victory of existentialism in creating a world of humanism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.130
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• pp.219-246
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• 2014

Do the particular good and the common good stand in relation of opposition or superiority each other? With regard to this question, some argue that the relevant Thomas texts reveal the superiority of the common good over the particular good, while others argue for the superiority of the particular good. The argument of this articles is, however, that closer examination of texts shows that Thomas Aquinas seeks to the unity of the common good and the particular good instead of seeing the conflict between them. It is true that Thomist moral and political theory emphasizes the value of the individual, but it should be noted that for Thomas the individual as individual does not exist, but shares specific formal determination with other members of the same species and, therefore, is the individualized, concrete universal. Good, meanwhile, means perfection which each being pursues and a thing is called good in the absolute sense when it actualizes its potentialities as a whole. An individual person is said to pursue only partial good, if it only seeks its perfection as an individual. The nature of individual person should be fully realized only in and through the community pursuing the common good. But the aim of living together which is rooted in the nature of human being as a rational being is for its members to live virtuously. The political community is said to try to bring its individual members to perfection, since the virtues are what renders human beings and their acts good. In this sense the particular good of the individual person is achieved through the pursuit of the common good and the common good is realized through the pursuit of the particular good so that they coincide each other. But this unity remains imperfect, when it would not be rightly ordered to its due end which is non other than the highest good, that is God. Accordingly the goodness of the human being in an absolute sense lies in the unity of the particular good and the common good rightly oriented towards the highest good, which is also called common good which every being pursues.

• 기호학연구
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• no.56
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• pp.45-70
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• 2018

Criticism of the postmodern philosophy of the system of representation, which has continued since the Renaissance, is based on a critique of the dichotomy that separates the subjects and objects and the environment from the human being. Interactivity, highlighted in a series of works emerging as postmodern trends in the 1960s, was transmitted to an interactive aspect of digital art in the late 1990s. The key feature of digital art is the possibility of infinite variations reflecting unpredictable changes based on public participation on the spot. In this process, the importance of computer programs is highlighted. Instead of using the existing program as it is, more and more artists are creating and programming their own algorithms or creating unique algorithms through collaborations with programmers. We live in an era of paradigm shift in which programming itself must be considered as a creative act. Simulation technology and VR technology draw attention as a technique to represent the meaning of reality. Simulation technology helps artists create experimental works. In fact, Baudrillard's concept of Simulation defines the other reality that has nothing to do with our reality, rather than a reality that is extremely representative of our reality. His book Simulacra and Simulation refers to the existence of a reality entirely different from the traditional concept of reality. His argument does not concern the problems of right and wrong. There is no metaphysical meaning. Applying the concept of simulation to algorithmic art, the artist models the complex attributes of reality in the digital system. And it aims to build and integrate internal laws that structure and activate the world (specific or individual), that is to say, simulate the world. If the images of the traditional order correspond to the reproduction of the real world, the synthesized images of algorithmic art and simulated space-time are the forms of art that facilitate the experience. The moment of seeing and listening to the work of Ian Cheng presented in this article is a moment of personal experience and the perception is made at that time. It is not a complete and closed process, but a continuous and changing process. It is this active and situational awareness that is required to the audience for the comprehension of post-representation's forms.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.109-132
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• 2013

The most important vocabulary in Advaita $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$, which is anthropology and soteriology on the self, is of course '${\bar{a}}tman$' or 'the self', to which '$an{\bar{a}}tman$' or 'the other' is in opposition. As $Ved{\bar{a}}ntic$ system revolves around the concept ${\bar{a}}tman$, it can be compared favorably with 'final vocabulary' of Richard Rorty. Moreover, $Ved{\bar{a}}ntic$ system can be termed as 'a return of self-identity', in which a process of returning is from a deceived self to the true and original self. After all, story of '$an{\bar{a}}tman$' or 'the other' in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ seems to have no significance at all. However, discourse about the other can also lead a something fruitful. There are such doctrines in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ that support a procedure of self-realization not according to the Hegelian dialectic but to the transposition and continuous antagonism between the self and the other, as a special meaning of viveka (discrimination) that fixes a boundary between the self and the other, a destruction of falsehood that is more important than establishment of truthfulness, a transposition of the true and the false before and after self-realization. Thus the other is not disappeared but only hidden, even after accomplishing its own methodological role, and the same is with discourse about the other. To revive forgotten vocabulary in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ is an attempt to reconstruct devaluated story by means of shifting the pivot of discourse from the self to the other. The essential thing in this attempt may be to revive the conceptions of 'effort' that is intently concealed and of 'self-inquiry' that has lost its true meaning. Out of these, a systematic and continuous self-inquiry, consists in having a scenario on the question 'Who am I?' and utilizing that scenario by experience without interruption. A work of reconstructing the lost narratives in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ can be feasible only when the history of self-inquiry is redescribed in the system itself, provided that object of inquiry is not 'a self as the self' but 'a self as the other'.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.1-25
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• 2017

Kant's doctrine of virtue shows how an actor should behave morally in an individual situation with moral law defines the limits of human action. There is latitude for action in the course of formulating the maxims of action by an actor. And moral judgement, as Aristotle's Pronesis, is very important in the latitude for action. In the doctrine of virtue, Kant suggests two kinds of duty of virtue: one's own perfeciton as an obligatory end, and the happiness to others as an obligatory end-and raises the question of casuistics for each. However, this was the practice and training for the human moral life by application of the moral law. In particular, Kant saw that ethics does not give laws for action, but only give laws for the maxims of action, and further intended to realize the practice in a proper way of seeking truth through casuistical questions. Thus, Kant points out that the casuistic is related only to ethics in a fragmentary way and is added to ethics only as a comment on the system. According to Kant, virtue and judgment are inevitable to apply categorical imperative in the empirical and realistic world. In other words, virtue and judgment are necessary to enable people who are likely to act in accordance to inclination to live a moral life in accordance with the command of reason. Thus Kant saw that in order to take wide duty into narrow ones, human beings must not only have to cultivate virtues as a strong power of will, but also to exercise judgment. In addition, the distinction between duty of law(narrow obligation) and duty of virtue(wide obligation) is dependent on whether there is a latitude for action in the application of both duties. So the role of virtue and training of judgement is very important in the latitude for action that occurs in the process of formalizing actor's maxims. In detail, as the duty is wider, so man's obligation to action is more imperfect, but the closer to narrow duty(Law) he brings the maxim of observing this duty(in his attitude of will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. Thus, it was an effort to show how Kant's best moral principles, that is categorical imperative could be applied to the real world at the time of criticism. Of course, even if it is difficult to assess Kant's efforts as successful, criticizing Kant's ethics as 'formal', 'abstract', or 'monologous' is not persuasive because of critics did not understand his ethics as a whole.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.177-212
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• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.190-217
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• 2012

This research has studied the building awareness of Nu-Jeong that a view of nature and aesthetic consciousness to unite the nature are inherent by considering Nu-Jeong of scholars who left fame and wealth behind and retired to hermitage in the backwoods in the 16~18 Century. This is to clarify correlation with leaving nature as it is, namely, an ideal state that scholars at the time would enjoy, through landscape awareness accepted into Nu-Jeong literature. In addition, this research has tracked the ideologic flow that acts on space formation by clarifying Korean unique meanings inherent to Nu-Jeong's cultural landscape. As a suggestion for this, the interpretation through 'Pungsu location Nu-Jeong name's analysis Nu-Jeong literature analysis', etc. was tried, so its integrated conclusion is as follows. It is not a chance that scholars of Joseon have left numerous literature works singing the nature. They already had huge interest and knowledge on the nature, and achieved active poetic exchange by sublimating the praise of nature as literature. Nu-Jeong, which was a place of exchange like this, had cleanliness of the nature and ideological purity as an oppositional space on turbid political realities. The Nu-Jeong literature drew the nature into a literature space as it is, without doing abstraction or ideation on the nature. The owner of Nu-Jeong exclusively possessed such natural landscape in grim and independent postures, so it provided a clue of Nu-Jeong cultural landscape that this research aimed to discuss. Scholars who aimed to raise wide and large vigor filled in between the sky and earth got to convince that people are born from the nature, grow in the nature and finally return to the nature. What people are born from the nature and finally return to the nature is just consistent with Taoistic and Zhua-ngzi thoughts denying human work, and leaving nature as it is or nature itself remained intact which is an ideal state. The construction at the time is a vessel containing the spirit of the times of the era. This thesis has proved that the Nu-Jeong culture of scholars located on the central line of Korean landscape was the flower of Joseon's scholar culture by interpreting it semantically.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.48-63
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• 2013

The results of the study on the space planning and landscape design of Unjoru(雲鳥樓) through the 'Jeolla Gurye Omidong Gado(全羅求禮五美洞家圖)' drawn using GyeHwa(界畵) technique are as follows. First, 'Omidong Gado' is believed to date back to the period when Unjoru(1776~1783) was established for the following reasons: (1) The founder, Yoo-IJu(柳爾?), sent the drawing for the house while he was serving as the governor of YongCheon county(龍川府史). (2) It shows the typical dwelling houses' space division and its location is in a good spot with mountain in the back and water in front(背山臨水) and there is every indication of scheme drawing. (3) Front gate was changed and remodeled to a lofty gate in 1804. Second, Nogodan & Hyeongjebong of Jiri Mountain sit at the back of Unjoru, and faces Obong mountain and Gyejok mountain. In addition, the Dongbang stream flowing to the east well illustrates the Pungsu theory of mountain in the back and water in the front. Third, the house is structured in the shape resembling the character 品, divided into 5 areas by hierarchical order in the cross line from all directions. The site, which includes the outdoor yard and the back garden, consists of 5 blocks, 6 yards and 2 gardens. Fourth, the outdoor yard with aesthetical value and anti-fire function, is an ecological garden influenced by Confucianism and Taoism with a pond (BangJiWonDo Type, 方池圓島形) at the center. Fifth, the Sarang yard(舍廊庭) is decorated with terrace garden and flower garden, and the landscaping components such as oddly shaped stone, crane, plum, pine tree, tamarisk tree and flowering plants were used to depict the ideal fairy land and centrally placed tree for metaphysical symbolism. The upper floor of Sarangchae commands distant and medium range view, as well as upwards and downwards. The natural landscape intrudes inside, and at the same time, connects with the outside. Sixth, pine forest over the northern wall and the intentionally developed low hill are one of the traditional landscaping techniques that promotes pleasant residential environment as well as the aesthetics of balanced fullness.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.43
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• pp.107-139
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• 2014

Tasan Chong Yak-yong has criticized Zhu Xi's metaphysical viewpoints of human being. Therefore he revealed his viewpoint of human being and the theory of moral practice through his thoughts about the Lord of Heaven and human nature with spiritual inclination toward goodness. He has drawn the Lord of Heaven into Confucianism again. Heaven as the Lord endows human being with a nature that enjoys virtues and detests vices. It watches human being's good and evil. Here we can say Heaven is a outer efficient cause of moral behavior. According to Tasan, human being has its own 'self directed weight'自主之權 so that he can make a judgment and decision about what to do. Therefore we have to do manifest this moral inclination which is a inner efficient cause of moral behavior. That is to say, we must follow the order of daoxin道心 inside our mind. If we did go against it, our mind would be uncomfortable. Now through the method of so-called shu恕 we need to put filial piety孝 fraternal respect弟 compassion慈 into practice. These three moral practices represent the spirit of reciprocity in Confucianism. These lead us to make an achievement of ren仁, representative virtue in the theory of moral practice. Our moral practice means the fulfillment of humanity. This is the way to serve Heaven. Tasan insists that theses are the core thoughts of Confucius and Mencius.