• Journal of the Korean Association of Geographic Information Studies
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.41-50
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• 2008

Intense competition for resources has forced many countries pay attention to their eyes to the ocean. Therefore, the disputes and the conflict over the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf will be sharpened. Since 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Korea has opened the talks with Japan and China to discuss the boundary issues as the adjacent water zone is less than 400 miles between Korea and Japan and Korea and China. This study is to review the important rules and techniques for the delimitation of the maritime boundary which have defined in the Law of the Sea Convention and IHO-51 technical guide and to figure out how to build the maritime delimitation GIS DB to negotiate effectively with the neighboring countries. Definition of the base point and baseline will be the utmost important concept to delimit the ocean boundary. The policy makers and the specialists who prepare for the international negotiation meeting between the countries have to be ready to draw the maritime boundary for our best interest under the Law of the Sea Convention. The negotiation strategies and the principles can be made with the concrete and reliable database relevant to maritime boundary issues. So effective and fast strategic decision for negotiation can only be made based on maritime boundary delimitation GIS DB.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.19-38
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• 2019

The Seosan-Daesan Port is closest to the major ports of China; hence, it is recognized as the ideal port for trade with China. Well-developed industrial infrastructure in its hinterland, including petrochemical, automotive, and electronic component complexes and recent developments of port facilities that aim to strengthen its function as a commercial port clearly highlight the necessity to develop it as a comprehensive port by building a marine industrial cluster. In this study, prerequisites for marine industrial cluster development in Seosan-Daesan Port are identified; they include the following. First, the conditions to be met for being designated a marine industrial cluster should be amended; Second, the central government should delegate authority to local governments to ensure the development of marine industries; Third, changes related to marine industrial cluster development in the governance structure of local governments (Seosan City and Chungnam Province) are required; and Last, a consultative body should be established to facilitate discussions on developing a marine industrial cluster in Seosan-Daesan Port and build public consensus.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.3
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• pp.99-135
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• 1999

남해안의 해양관광벨트 조성사업은 양 지역의 세계화와 지방화의 기틀을 동시에 마련할 수 있다는 측면에서 그 의미를 찾을 수 있다. 남해안의 관광유람선사업은 연안 해양지향적 국토개발정책 비중이 증대되는 과정에서 중앙정부도 남해안국제관광벨트 조성사업계획을 금년말까지 수립할 계획이며, 민선자치시대를 맞아 지역의 자립의식 및 지역간 경쟁분위기가 고조되면서 지역의 비교우위성 자원을 활용한 지역발전전략을 추진하는 분위기가 성숙되는 등, 국가 지역적인 여건과 합치하고 있으며, 그 위에 남해안의 관광유람선사업은 동서협력 차원에서도 유익한 사업으로 기대된다. 실질적인 동서화합은 상호 인 물적 교류를 통해 과실을 함께 얻을 수 있는 기반이 마련될 때 이루어진다는 측면에서 관광유람선사업은 동서협력의 대표사업이다. 관광유람선이 운항되면 양지역주민들의 상호 방문이나 자치단체간 상호 친선방문 등이 이루어짐으로써 인적 교류가 활성화되는 계기가 될 것이며, 관광유람선이 운항되면 남해안에 풍부하게 부존되어 있는 수산자원과 특산물 등 물적자원의 교류가 이루어짐으로써 남해안지역의 수산물과 특산물 관련산업 진흥에 기여할 것이며, 관광유람선 운항을 위해서는 사전 준비단계에서부터 운항에 이르기까지의 과정에서 부산, 경남, 전남 등 자치단체의 협력이 전제되어야 하는데, 이러한 협력체제가 동서협력으로 성숙될 가능성이 높고, 또한 관광유람선의 운항범역이 단계적으로 중국, 일본에까지 확대되면 남해안지역의 세계화에도 기여할 것이다.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.71-123
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• 2021

Seoul is under increasing pressure to choose between the US-led IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Accordingly, this paper undertakes a detailed appraisal of the IPS and the BRI in the context of Korea's national policy imperatives. Based on a study of network structure by Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright (2007), the present study seeks to identify a particular network structure within the IPS and the BRI. Through this analysis, the relationship between the core and the participant states will be addressed. Awareness of specific configurations of the IPS and the BRI is important as these reveal what participant states can expect from each network. According to Nexon and Wright, there are four types of network structure: unipolar anarchy, hegemonic order, constitutional order, and imperial order. Based on this, we argue that the IPS has a constitutional order and the BRI has an imperial order. Therefore, we suggest to Seoul that participating in the IPS may make more room for an independent foreign policy than would a BRI partnership with China. South Korea would benefit by participating in the IPS in terms of its national security, striking a favourable regional balance of power.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Marine Environment & Energy
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.337-348
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• 2012

The Yellow Sea Ecoregion Conservation Project is a joint international project which is carried out under the purposes of conserving the habitats in the Yellow Sea Ecoregion and biodiversity from various threats that damage ecosystems, informing the importance and value of the Yellow Sea Ecoregion, and promoting the understanding and interests of Korea, China and Japan. Subsequent to the Yellow Sea Ecoregion Planning Programme which had been performed during the period from 2002 to 2006, the Yellow Sea Ecoregion Support Project has been performed over 7 years in total from 2007 to 2014. Panasonic is sponsoring the financing of the project, and the organizations in charge of the project by country are Korea Institute of Ocean Science & Technology for Korea and World Wide Fund for Nature branches for China and Japan. While the Yellow Sea Ecoregion Planning Programme was focused on the biological assessment and the selection of potential priority area by scientific review, the Yellow Sea Ecoregion Support Project is oriented toward practical activities targeting more diversified stakeholder. Especially, this project plans to support direct conservation activities in the region and participation and cooperation from local residents. The project plan is comprised of 3 phases. During the first period from 2008 to 2009, small grant projects were operated targeting 16 institutions of Korea and China, and for the second period from 2010 to 2012, one place each was selected as demonstration site for habitat conservation in Korea and China respectively and supported for three years to introduce the conservation method based on international standards such as the management of marine protected areas, ecosystem-based management and community-based management and simultaneously to develop habitat conservation activities suitable for national and regional characteristics. During the period from 2013 to 2014 which is the last phase, the project plans to distribute the performance of small grant projects and demonstration site activities through a series of forums among stakeholder. Through the activities described above, the recognition of general public on the conservation of the Yellow Sea Ecoregion was changed positively, and community-based management began to be reflected in the policies for the marine protected areas of central and local government.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.1-20
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• 2019

This study aims to establish a method for activating Korean ship finance through an analysis on the development of Chinese ship finance market, which has grown rapidly in recent years. It focuses on its main institutions, laws and policies, strengths and weaknesses, market share, and development status. Because 80.7% of South Korea's economy depends upon foreign trade and 99.7% of the South Korea's traded volume is transported by ships, shipping has assumed an important role in Korean economy. However, since the global financial crisis, Korean shipping and shipbuilding industry has been facing difficulties and Hanjin, the biggest Korean shipping company, went bankrupt in 2017. One of the key aspects of the competitiveness of the shipping and shipbuilding industry is acquiring competitive shipping assets; therefore, stable and smooth supply of ship finance is crucial for the development of the shipping and shipbuilding industry. Given this background, the study analyzed how the Chinese ship finance market has grown rapidly in the past 30 years and identified the problems, strengths, and weaknesses of the Chinese ship finance. The analysis on the status of the Chinese ship finance market is expected to suggest a direction for establishing methods for activating the Korean ship finance market, which is facing scarcity of finance, even as the global ship finance market has remained depressed since the global financial crisis. Although this study focused exclusively on the Chinese market, future research can draw conclusions from a comparative analysis that includes the Japanese ship finance market; the conclusions obtained would contribute to the establishment of long-term policies and plans for Korean ship finance.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.189-217
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• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.1-16
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• 2017

China has achieved rapid economic growth in the late 1970s with economic reform and open-door policy. China's economic growth began initially in the eastern coastal areas and from the 2000s expanded to the western and northeastern regions where the economy was relatively underdeveloped. In particular, in 2013 'One-Belt One Road' initiative proposed by Xi Jinping, the current General Secretary of the Communist Party of China is not only a key strategy for China's advancement into the world and also provides important opportunities for the development of these backward regions. Inland Port is the inland logistics hub and plays a crucial role in enhancing access to maritime ports as well as access to adjacent inland countries. Therefore, a number of inland ports have been developed and operated in order to enter into overseas markets and secure resources in the northeastern and western regions of China. This study aims to examine the role and development of inland port in 'One-Belt One Road' scheme. In conclusion, 'One-Belt One Road' will further increase the role of inland port, and in response, the development of inland port will play a pivotal role in one belt one road initiative. In this respect, Korean companies need to consider plans to participate in the development and operation of inland ports in China, which would provide opportunities to spread Northern markets including China, Russia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.