• Proceedings of the Korean Radioactive Waste Society Conference
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.457-463
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• 2005

KHNP(Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Ltd., Co.) is developing a HIC transport package which is satisfying domestic and IAEA regulations and NETEC(Nuclear Environment Technology Institute) is conducting a conceptual design. In this study, the shielding thickness was calculated using the data from radionuclide assay program which is currently using in nuclear sites and Micro Shield code. Considering the structural safety, carbon steel was chosen as shielding material and the shielding thickness was calculated for 500 R/hr and 100 R/hr at HIC surface, respectively. Through the shielding analysis, it was evaluated that the regulation limit is satisfied when the shielding thickness is 22 cm for 500 R/hr and 17 cm for 100/hr.

• Proceedings of the Korean Radioactive Waste Society Conference
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.523-530
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• 2005

In this study, maximum exposure rate at DAW(Dry Active Waste) drum surface which is satisfying regulation limit was calculated for conceptual design of IP(Industrial Package). DAW can be classified as combustible and non-combustible waste and the calculation was conducted for single and mixed radionuclide for each type of waste. In case of combustible waste that mixed radionuclide is uniformly distributed, the maximum exposure rates at drum surface were 3.60E-01, 8.85E-01 and 1.27E+01 mSv/hr for IP Type 1, 2-a and 2-b, respectively. and 3.60E-01, 8.85E-01, 1.27E+01 mSv/hr for single radionuclide(Co-60). In case of non-combustible waste that mixed radionuclide is uniformly distributed, the maximum exposure rates at drum surface were 7.14E-01, 1.83E+00, 2.69E+01 mSv/hr for IP Type 1, 2-a and 2-b, respectively. and 7.13E-01, 1.81E-01, 2.62E+01 mSv/hr for single radionuclide(Co-60). Through this study, the maximum amount of DAW can be transported by IP was suggested as maximum exposure rate at drum surface and the calculation for the other types of waste will be conducted.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.381-390
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• 2017

In Korea, commercial nuclear power plants and research reactors have on-site storage systems for the spent nuclear fuel, but it is difficult to expand the facilities used for the storage systems. If decommissioning of nuclear power plants starts, an amount of high level radioactive waste will be generated. In this study, a radiological impact assessment of the railroad transport of high level radioactive waste was carried out considering radiation workers and the public, using the developed transport container as the transport package. The dose rates for workers and the public during the transport period were estimated, considering anticipated transport scenarios, and the results compared with the regulatory limit. A sensitivity analysis was also carried out by considering the different release ratios of the radioactive materials in the high level radioactive waste, and different distances between the transport container and workers during loading and unloading phases and while attaching another freight car. For all the anticipated transport scenarios, the radiological impacts for workers and the public met the regulatory limits.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.199-212
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• 2007

If a type IP-2 transport package were to be subjected to a free drop test and a penetration test under the normal conditions of transport, it should prevent a loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents and a more than 20% increase in the maximum radiation level at any external surface of the package. In this paper, we suggested the analytic method to evaluate the structural safety of a type IP-2 transport package using a thick steel plate for a structure part and a bolt for tying a bolt. Using an analysis a loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents and a loss of shielding integrity were confirmed for two kinds of type IP-2 transport packages to transport radioactive waste drums from a waste facility to a temporary storage site in a nuclear power plant. Under the free drop condition the maximum average stress at the bolts and the maximum opening displacement of a lid were compared with the tensile stress of a bolt and the steps in a lid, which were made to avoid a streaming radiation in the shielding path, to evaluate a loss or dispersal of radioactive waste contents. Also a loss of shielding integrity was evaluated using the maximum decrease in a shielding thickness. To verify the impact dynamic analysis for free drop test condition and evaluate experimentally the safety of two kinds of type IP-2 transport packages, free drop tests were conducted with various drop directions. For the tests we examined the failure of bolts and the deformation of flange to evaluate a loss or dispersal of radioactive material and measured the shielding thickness using a ultrasonic thickness gauge to assess a loss of shielding integrity. The strains and accelerations acquired from tests were compared with those by analyses to verify the impact dynamic analysis. The analytic results were larger than the those of test so that the analysis showed the conservative results. Finally, we evaluated the safety of the type IP-2 transport package under the stacking test condition using a finite element analysis. Under the stacking test condition, the maximum Tresca stress of the shielding material was 1/3 of the yielding stress. Two kinds of a type IP-2 transport package were safe for the free drop test condition and the stacking test condition.

• Proceedings of the Korean Radioactive Waste Society Conference
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• 2007.05a
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• pp.213-214
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• 2007

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2001.05a
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• pp.419.2-419
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• 2001

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Pressure Vessels and Piping
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.110-116
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• 2020

As the management plan for domestic spent nuclear fuel is delayed, the storage of the operating nuclear power plant is approaching saturation, and the Kori 1 Unit that has reached its end of operation life is preparing for the dismantling plan. The first stage of dismantling is the transfer of spent nuclear fuel stored in storage at plants. The spent fuel management process leads to temporary storage, interim storage, reprocessing and permanent disposal. In this paper, the technical issues to be considered when transporting spent fuel in this process are summarized. The spent fuels are treated as high-level radioactive waste and strictly managed according to international regulations. A series of integrity tests are performed to demonstrate that spent fuel can be safely stored for decades in a dry environment before being transferred to an intermediate storage facility. The safety of spent fuel transport container must be demonstrated under normal transport conditions and virtual accident conditions. IAEA international standards are commonly applied to the design of transport containers, licensing regulations and transport regulations worldwide. In addition, each country operates a physical protection system to reduce and respond to the threat of radioactive terrorism.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.435-443
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• 2016

This paper describes the development of a dry operation process for PWR spent nuclear fuel, which is currently stored in the domestic NPP's storage pool, using a dual purpose metal cask. Domestic NNPs have had experience with wet type transportation of PWR spent nuclear fuel between neighboring NPPs since the early 1990s, but no experience with dry type operation. For this reason, we developed a specific operation process and also confirmed the safety of the major cask components and its spent nuclear fuel during the dual purpose metal cask operation process. We also describe the short term operation process that was established to be completed within 21 hours and propose the allowable working time for each step (15 hours for wet process, 3 hours for drain process and 3 hours for vacuum drying process).

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Pressure Vessels and Piping
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.43-49
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the radiation effect on damage when the external shield of the spent nuclear fuel transport cask is damaged due to impact as the cause of an unexpected accident. The neutron and gamma-ray intensities and spectra are calculated using the ORIGEN-Arp module in the SCALE 6.2.4 code package⁽¹⁾ and then using MCNP6.2⁽²⁾ code calculate the dose rate. In order to evaluate the radiation dose according to the size of damage caused by external impact, various sized holes of 0.3~13.7% are assumed in the outer shield of the cask to evaluate the sensitivity to the dose. In the case of radiation source leakage, damage to the nuclear fuel assembly is assumed to be up to 6% based on overseas test cases. When only the outer shield is damaged, the maximum surface dose is calculated as 3.12E+03 mSv/hr. However, if the radiation source is leaked due to damage to the nuclear fuel assembly, it becomes 7.00E+05 mSv/hr which is about 200 times greater than the former case.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Gas
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• v.7 no.2 s.19
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• pp.33-41
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• 2003

There exists high hazard when transporting LPG as well as using, storing, and producing. For small scale LPG consumer, retailers deliver LPG to customers via a truck loading many LPG cylinders. Suppose there occurred a accident during LPG cylinder transfer, this could result in serious damages to the life and properties in the near or neighbor of the accident spot. In this regard, we made a quantitative risk analysis to estimate the possible damages and the probability through the identification of accidents causes and the simulation of the possible scenario. In this study, we made the Excel & Visual Basic computer program to perform quantitative LPG accident analysis. The simulation showed the following results. In case of UVCE(Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion), the effect within l0m of the accident spot showed very severe structural damages and even the accident can break the window glasses of the area of 150 m apart from accident spot. In case of TNT corresponding probit analysis, after 10 minutes LPG leaking, $75\%$ window glasses of 40 m distance was expected to be broken. And $16\%$ frames of 20m distance, $10\%$ frames of 40m distance was expected to be collapsed.