• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.24
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• pp.25-49
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• 2004

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the duty of disclosure in insurance law. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the scope or extent of the duty of disclosure and the remedy for breach of the duty in English marine insurance law. The main purpose of this article is also to seek the alternative remedy for the breach. The results of analysis are as following : First, the scope of the duty of disclosure is closely related to the test of materiality and the concept of a hypothetical prudent insurer. The assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Secondly, an actual insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure of the assured. But this subjective test of actual inducement is somewhat meaningless in sense that English court takes the test of materiality as a starting point and assumes the presumption of inducement even in case of no clear proof on the inducement. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 18 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty of disclosure. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. The remedy of rescission is too draconian from the point of view of the assured, because he can be deprived of all cover despite he is innocent perfectly. An inadvertent breach from an innocent mistake is as fatal as wilful concealment. What is, therefore, needed in English marine insurance law with respect to remedy for the breach is to introduce a more sophisticated or proportionate remedy ascertaining degrees of fault.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.42
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• pp.275-305
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• 2009

Marine insurance contracts, which intended to provide indemnity against marine risks upon the payment of price, known as a premium, originated in Northern Italy in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. The law and practice were later introduced into England through the Continent. It is, therefore, quite exact that English and European marine insurance law have common roots. Nevertheless, significant divergences between English and European insurance systems occurred since the late 17th century, mainly due to different approaches adopted by English courts. The rule of warranty in English marine insurance was developed and clarified in the second part of the 18th century by Lord Mansfield, who laid the foundations of the modern English law of marine insurance, and developed different approaches, especially in the field of warranty in marine insurance law. Since the age of Lord Mansfield, English marine insurance law has a unique rule on warranty. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall rule of the rule of warranty in English marine insurance law. The result of analysis are as following. First, warranties are incorporated to serve a very significant function in the law of insurance, that is, confining or determining the scope of the cover agreed by the insurer. From the insurer's point of view, such the function of warranties is crucial, because his liability, agreed on the contract of insurance, largely depend on in, and the warranties, incorporated in the contract play an essential role in assessing the risk. If the warranty is breached, the risk initially agreed is altered and that serves the reason why the insurer is allowed to discharge automatically further liability from the date of breach. Secondly, the term 'warranty' is used to describe a term of the contract in general and insurance contract law, but the breach of which affords different remedies between general contract law and insurance contract law. Thirdly, a express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to warrant is to be inferred. An express warranty must be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must be contained in some document incorporated by reference into the policy. It does not matter how this is done. Fourthly, a warranty is a condition precedent to the insurer's liability on the contract, and, therefore, once broken, the insurer automatically ceases to be liable. If the breach pre-dates the attachment of risk, the insurer will never put on risk, whereas if the breach occurs after inception of risk, the insurer remains liable for any losses within the scope of the policy, but has no liability for any subsequent losses. Finally, the requirements on the warranty must be determined in according to the rule of strict construction. As results, it is irrelevant: the reason that a certain warranty is introduced into the contract, whether the warranty is material to the insurer's decision to accept the contract, whether or not the warranty is irrelevant to the risk or a loss, the extent of compliance, that is, whether the requirements on the warranty is complied exactly or substantially, the unreasonableness or hardship of the rule of strict construction, and whether a breach of warranty has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before loss.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.14
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• pp.103-152
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• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.43 no.5
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

The container shipping sector is an important international logistics operation that connects open economies. Freight rates rapidly change as the market fluctuates, and staff related to the shipping market are interested in factors that determine freight rates in the container market. This study uses the Vector Error Correction Model(VECM) to estimate the impact of factors affecting container freight rates. This study uses data published by Clarksons. The analysis results show a 4.2% increase in freight rates when world container traffic increases at 1.0%, a 4.0% decrease in freight rates when volume of container carriers increases by 1.0%, a 0.07% increase in freight rates when bunker price increases by 1.0%, and a 0.04% increase in freight rates accompanying 1.0% increase in libor interests rates. In addition, if the current freight rate is 1.0% higher than the long-term equilibrium rate, the freight rate will be reduced by 3.2% in the subsequent term. In addition, if the current freight rate is 1.0% lower than the long-term equilibrium rate, the freight rate will decrease by 0.12% in the following term. However, the adjusting power in a period of recession is not statistically significant which means that the pressure of freight rate increase in this case is neglectable. This research is expected to contribute to the utilization of scientific methods in forecasting container freight rates.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.111-130
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• 2014

The article 742(2) of the Korean Commercial Code allowed the third party to invoke a direct action against the insurer under a liability insurance. Meanwhile, the owners of the vessel enter into the P&I Insurance Contract with the P&I Club to indemnify all kinds of liability or expenses involved in the operation of its vessel. However, the Rule Book under the P&I Insurance mostly included the Pay to be Paid Clause which precludes the third party's direct action. Recently, the Seoul Central District Court passed a judgement on the validity of the Pay to be Paid Clause under the Korean law against the third party i.e. the cargo insurer having the right of subrogation. The court held that (1) the third party's right of direct action is not the right to claim insurance money but the right to claim damages against the P&I Club, (2) the insurer under a liability insurance is deemed to assume liability jointly and severally with the insured against the third party, (3) the Article 742(2) of the Korean Commercial Code is considered as a compulsory provision because it was invented to protect the innocent third party, the Paid to be Paid Clause is thus null and void. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the appropriateness of this court's judgments by comparative analysis of Korean and English law, and to suggest the relevant amendments of the Korean Commercial Code in order to prevent further legal disputes. The article criticizes the decision of the Seoul Central District Court, taking the attitude that, since the third party's right is the right to claim insurance money, the Paid to be Paid Clause is valid against the third party.