• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.151-191
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• 2016

Kant and Lacan strongly criticized the epistemological premise of formal logic. However, Lacan was opposed to Kant in terms of subject, object, knowledge and truth. From the viewpoint of Kant's transcendental logic, formal logic does not have the ability to represent the nature of truth. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Lacan's psychoanalytic logic, Kant's transcendental logic misunderstands or only partially represents the state of things. But I would like to try to criticize the epistemological premise of the two forms of logic. Transcendental logic takes the evident and new function in that it has studied the necessary condition of content rather than the form of thinking which formal logic considers as his object of study. Transcendental logic evidently studies the categories which dominate our way of thinking. Can we say that the 12 categories which Kant provided are sufficient in explaining the necessity of thinking? Lacan's psychoanalytic logics tells us that Kant's categories are only a kind of metaphor related with hypothesis that tries to explain the possibility of synthetical judge a priori. Is Lacan's psychoanalytic logic sufficient in explaining the possibility of science? It is not sufficient in explaining the objectivity and strictness of science, for it depends on metaphor and metonymy which are useful to literature and unconsciousness. I would like to try to synthesize Kant's transcendental and Lacan's psychoanalytic logic in terms of structure-constructivism which combines both formal and dialectical logic, which is consistent with the ideal of human science, and not blinkered science. My conclusion is that Kant's ethical and esthetical theory should be modified though Lacan's psychoanalytic logic, and Lacan's theory of the unconsciousness revised by Kant's transcendental logic.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.35
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• pp.275-295
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• 2009

The aim of this paper is to reject Graham's interpretation of bi (必) and xianzhi (先知) of Later Mohists' Mojing ("墨經") as logical necessity and a priori knowledge respectively. Graham's interpretations of them are based on his beliefs that Mojing distinguishes lun (論), the art of description from bian (辯), the art of inference in the Mohist disciplines and that the latter art should be seen as such a rigorous proof as Euclidean geometry even though it is not a Western formal logic. His beliefs also start from his distinguishing 'knowledge of names' from 'knowledge of conjunction of names and objects' according to the objects of knowledge. In my reading, the art of description and the art of inference, however, can't be sharply distinguished each other in Mojing and bi and xianzhi should be taken as suggesting both a normative necessity and an empirical necessity. A normative necessity is derived from 'normative theory of definition' which comes form the theory of rectification of names in China. The normative theory of definition, unlike the descriptive theory of definition, defines terms normatively rather than descriptively. For example, although such a definition of father, 'father is beneficient', has the form of being descriptive, but it actually is prescriptive and therefore means 'father should be beneficient'. Through this normative theory of definition, empirical knowledge, as long as it is a knowledge, is seen as necessary and so can't be wrong. To conclude, for Mohists an empirical knowledge is always a basis of an inferential knowledge or a priori knowledge, so Mohists' a priori knowledge is not really a fundamental knowledge and its necessity therefore is nothing but both a normative necessity and an empirical necessity.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.99
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• pp.69-100
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• 2012

Die Gegenwart steht den Tatsachen der Gewalt gegenüber. Wesentlich destruktive Techniken können den kollektiven Tod des Menschen als Gattung produzieren. Die Destruktivität dieser Techniken ist durch Skeptizismus geistesgeschichtlich gerechtfertigt. Ebelings Fundamentalpragmatik ist Reflexionstheorie der widerstandsfähigen Vernunft, welche einer Sozialisierung derjenigen Gewalt widersteht, die in einer gegenwärtigen Aussicht auf universale Selbstdestruktion des Menschen Tod produziert. Selbstbewußtsein (Apperzeption) ist bei Kant Selbstbewußtsein in Gegenstandsbewußtsein. Mit kritischer Auslegung von Kant zeigt Heidegger endlich, daß der Tod der Selbstbeziehung des konkreten Daseins als des In-der-Welt-seins gehört. Aber seine existenziale Analytik berücksichtigt nur individuelles Dasein zum Tode und vernachlässigt die Allgemeinheit des menschlichen Todes bzw. die dem allgemeinen Untergang widerstehende Vernunft. Apel kritisiert ein solipsistisches Erbe von Kants Bewußtseinsphilosophie und präsentiert ein Argument der Letztbegründung zur Überwindung des Skeptizismus. Aber seine Transzendentalpragmatik vernachlässigt die Endlichkeit des menschen und zeigt ein Defizit der fundamentalpragmatischen Vereinigung der Vernunft und des Todes. Aufgrund des gegenwärtigen Todesbewußtseins, das Heideggers Todesdeutung transformiert, rekonstruiert Ebelings Existentialpragmatik Heideggers Dasein zu Existenzsubjekt. Seine Fundamentalpragmatik vollzieht diejenige Erstbegründung, die zwischen der existentialpragmatischen Endbegründung des Todes und der transzendentalpragmatischen Letztbegründung vermittelt, und damit bestimmt sie Vernunft als Widerstandsbewußtsein (das bewußte Sein) gegen den Tod. Also ist sie neue transzendentalphilosophische Bewußtseinsphilosophie, die mit der neuen Selbstbestimmung der Vernunft entwickelt wird.

• Korean Institute of Interior Design Journal
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.3-15
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• 2016

Between various ideological experiences, such as spatial, artistic and religious experiences, a consistent and transcendental sense exists, which is difficult to systemize or establish, in all the senses human beings experience. It shows that the depth of essence may be much deeper than that of religion or science in limits of humans' thinking and experiences. On the premise that we need to rationally understand and systemize such a sublime experience, it is thought that we will be able to expand the system of our senses through a new approach breaking away from the previous concepts used to interpret a spatial experience. Rudolf Otto, a German philosopher and comparative religion scholar, explains such an essential sense through Numinose Theory. As his theoretical analysis and approach are used to explore the mechanism of such a transcendental emotion, which is impossible to express with such words as 'sanctity', 'sublimity' and 'reverence', from various perspectives, but intend to exclude dogmatic logic. Therefore, they seem to become new and useful tools in aesthetically understanding space design and objects of arts. Thus, this study aims to examine what value Numinose Theory has in the aspect of understanding space design, based on which this study intends to use the Numinose concept as a concept of interpreting 'Jongmyo Jeongjeon'.

• Journal of Elementary Mathematics Education in Korea
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2014

Instructions for the commutative property of multiplication at elementary schools tend to be based on checking the equality between the quantities of 'a times b 'and b' times a, ' for example, $3{\times}4=12$ and $4{\times}3=12$. This article critically examined the approaches to teach the commutative property of multiplication from Kant's perspective of mathematical knowledge. According to Kant, mathematical knowledge is a priori. Yet, the numeric exploration by checking the equality between the amounts of 'a groups of b' and 'b groups of a' does not reflect the nature of apriority of mathematical knowledge. I suggest we teach the commutative property of multiplication in a way that it helps reveal the operational schema that is necessarily and generally involved in the transformation from the structure of 'a times b' to the structure of 'b times a.' Distributive reasoning is the mental operation that enables children to perform the structural transformation for the commutative property of multiplication by distributing a unit of one quantity across the other quantity. For example, 3 times 4 is transformed into 4 times 3 by distributing each unit of the quantity 3, which results in $3{\times}4=(1+1+1){\times}4=(1{\times}4)+(1{\times}4)+(1{\times}4)+(1{\times}4)=4+4+4=4{\times}3$. It is argued that the distributive reasoning is also critical in learning the subsequent mathematics concepts, such as (a whole number)${\times}10$ or 100 and fraction concept and fraction multiplication.

• 한국HCI학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2006.02b
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• pp.557-562
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• 2006

휴대전화는 용도적인 측면에서 PC와 유사해 지고 있으며 네트워크 기술의 발달로 다 수의 파일들을 다룰 수 있을 것으로 전망되고 있다. 그러나 휴대전화는 PC와는 다른UI특징을 가지고 있으며 이러한 차이는 다 수 파일의 관리나 이와 관련된 복잡한 태스크 수행 시 문제점이 예상된다. 본 연구는 사용자의 선험적 지식을 바탕으로 휴대전화의 UI특징에 적합한 효용성 있는 파일관리 UI가 무엇인지 알아보는 것에 목적이 있다. 이에 따라 사용자의 선험적 지식이 있는 윈도우탐색기의 사용행태 조사를 통해 자주 수행하는 태스크와 메타포어를 분석하여 휴대전화와 비교, 문제점 과 해결방안을 도출하였다. 이를 바탕으로 프로토타입을 제작하여 사용자 평가를 통해 가로방향의 페이지 분할 방식과 * 또는 #키와의 중복을 활용한 단축키 제공, 일괄적인 옵션 메뉴의 제공은 사용자가 익숙해져 있는 4방향 네비게이션 키와 12 숫자 키패드를 입력장치로 사용하는 휴대전화에서 파일관리 시 효용성이 있음을 알 수 있었다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.441-465
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• 2012

In der Kritik der reinen Vernunft entfaltet sich die Lehre des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$, die in sich die verschiedene Auffassungen ${\ddot{u}}ber$ das transzendentale Ich $enth{\ddot{a}}lt$. $Demgem{\ddot{a}}{\ss}$ ist das transzendentale Ich einerseits das Ich als reine $Selbstt{\ddot{a}}tigkeit$. Die Vorstellung des Ich $dr{\ddot{u}}ckt$ insofern als die intellektuelle Vorstellung ${\ddot{u}}ber$ die spontane Handlung des denkenden Ich die numerische Einheit oder die Einfachheit der verschiedenen Handlungen desselben aus. Aber andererseits ist das transzendentale Ich im $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ das Ich als den Gegenstand ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. Das Ich als Gegenstand ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$ ist gerade das Ich als Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes oder das empirische Ich ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. In diesem Sinne $dr{\ddot{u}}ckt$ das $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ die unbestimmte Wahrnehmung ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$, oder apprehensio simplex aus. Auf diese Weise $enth{\ddot{a}}lt$ das transzendentale Ich im Selbstbewusstsein in sich die doppelseitigen Momente. Das Ich im $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ ist einerseits das Ich als das denkende Subjekt, $n{\ddot{a}}mlich$ das logische Ich, aber andererseits zugleich das Ich als das wharnehmende Subjekt, das psychologische Ich ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. Und diese doppelseitigen Momente des Ichs unterscheiden sich voneinander, aber zugleich auch $dr{\ddot{u}}cken$ in sich ein und dasselbe Ich aus. Dennoch ist das Problem der Einheit und Entzweiung des Ich im Selbstbewusstsein bleibt in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als ein $unerkl{\ddot{a}}rbares$, $unaufl{\ddot{o}}sbares$ $R{\ddot{a}}tzel$. Eben mit diesem Problem setzt Kant sich im Opus potumum ernsthaft auseinander und $l{\ddot{o}}st$ dieses Problem durch eine neue Lehre des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$ oder die Lehre der Selbstsezung auf.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.379-407
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• 2012

The main purpose of this paper is to make a case for the availability of pragmatist ethics by showing the differences between utilitarianism and pragmatism. In this paper, drawing on Dewey's view, I show that Bentham and Mill were doomed to failure because they both regarded moral conduct not as a process but as a fixed act, the remarkable differences between their views notwithstanding. Besides, I also show that pragmatism distinguishes itself from utilitarianism by its focus on the aspect of the amendment of a conduct rather than its attainment. Pragmatist ethics works on the assumption that moral conduct arises only in conscious experience. What pragmatists mean by consciousness is not an ability just given to haman, but a function emerging from the human interaction with his environment. Therefore, morality is extended from and restricted by experience, because it is grounded in concrete experience, but not in the transcendental nor a priori realm. Since pragmatism suggests the possibility of "ethics without principles" in that it works through the way which successfully rejects the traditional absolutist ethics, while avoiding the downslide to a nihilistic form of skepticism. Thus, it may serve as a third view that overcomes a seriously divergent situation of the current ethical arguments. In other words, starting from the very nature of experience, pragmatist ethics offers a 'bottom-up' ethics, instead of a 'top-down' one. This reconstructive reading of pragmatism away from utilitarianism is expected to offer a more comprehensive account of our moral experience in the pluralistic world of diverged values.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.437-464
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• 2010

The article, focusing on the theory of Zhong-He, sheds a new light on the philosophy of Daizhen. The theory of Zhong-He, according to the philosophical system of Zhuxi, serves as the theoretical foundation in erecting the apriori moral nature and guiding mental cultivation of subjects. Daizhen, on the contrary, criticizes the doctrine of Zhonghe in Zhuxi's philosophy as it produces negative side-effects of moral dogmatism. Zhuxi's doctrine, according to Daizhen, as it reduce the origin of morality to apriori condition of consciousness and delimit the range of cultivation to psychological realm of subjects, restricts moral subjects in the fortress of their own subjectivity. In this vein of his criticism, Daizhen attempts new interpretation on Zhonghe. The character Zhong (中), according to him, does not refer to apriori moral state or metaphysical moral substance as it does in the doctrine of Zhuxi. On the contrary, it denotes the state in which diverse existent beings are placed in their own position by their own dispositions. Similarly, the other character He (和) does not refer to the condition where an individual's consciousness is in equilibrium, but to the process of achieving the harmony of entire society in which diverse existent beings are communicating to each other. With his novel interpretation of the theory of Zhong-He, Daizhen could dissolve the tradition of Weifa (未發) and moral subjectivism in Zhuxi's philosophy and provide a way of establishing reciprocal communication and harmony between various individuals. It is in his ethics of rational mutual understanding where the significance of Daizhen's philosophy should be found.

• 한국노년학
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.1047-1065
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• 2011

The main purpose of this study is to provide the sustainability and continuous development of Long-term care Insurance in projecting changes of the Long-term care Insurance beneficiary population and Cost. We conducted a transformed cohort-component projection method that are employed for the beneficiary population projection and applied the previous experiences in Japan and German. A transformed cohort-component method means that we also projected the increasing beneficiary of long-term care insurance for using the data of geriatric disease in NHIC and estimated the cost of insurance's financial resources. First of all, beneficiary increase and strategy of extending to level 4 are categorized 2 and the expense account projection are categorized 2. If it is thought experience of Japan and German, The Level 4 extend of insuree is projected 2012 or 2013. With the results of this study, we proposed that extended level 4 insuree include the 40%~90% of geriatric disease in elderly people. The number of beneficiaries in 2011 is expected to reach to about 342,896 and in 2015 is 415,905 on scenario 1. Scenario 2(40%of geriatric disease in elderly people), the number of beneficiaries in 2011 is 342,896 and in 2015 is 483,453. Scenario 3(90%of geriatric disease in elderly people), the number of beneficiaries in 2012 is 545,068 and in 2015 is 565,565. The cost of beneficiaries insurance benefit of scenario 1 are projected from 3,000billion in 2012 to 3,500billion won in 2015. Scenario 2 are projected from 3,100billion in 2012 to 4,000billion won 2015. Finally, The cost of Level 4 extending are need minimum 300billion to maximum 1,400billion won.