• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.19
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• pp.295-327
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• 2002

Deliberative democracy places its great importance on the theory that the citizens should fill the role of conducting the principles of democratic society. This is divided into two main theoretical trends in modern political theories, a liberal theory advocated by J. Rawls and a critical one emphasized by J. Habermas. Mutual understanding between two scholars focuses on the responsibility of citizens; citizens should be the reflective persons who can accept the terms of just communication going beyond the preference of individual belief. It is not denied that the discussions of deliberative democracy guided by both Rawls and Habermas do not place emphasis upon mass media. Even though they seldom regard the argument how the current media can be a essential factor in encouraging deliberative democracy, they never close the eyes to the significance of communication. Rawls stresses the political freedom of speech as the very condition which leads to the citizens' autonomous participation in politics, while Habermas places his hope on the role of mass media that would amplify the citizens' will gushed out in public sphere.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.476-496
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• 2005

This paper considers some significances and limitations in application of Rawls' liberal theory of justice to conceptualization of environmental and ecological justice. It first reviews Rawls' liberal theory of justice, then examines how his theory of justice considers natural resources and can be applied to develop distributive theory of environmental justice, and finally explores what kinds of problems would be generated when Rawls' theory of justice is to be extended to animals and other natural components. In Rawls' theory of justice the status of natural resources is described as a objective condition for justice, but it is argued that natural resources should be seen as a substantial component of just production and distribution. It also can be stressed that his theory of justice does not secure a just result of resource distribution, even though it has a great significance for just procedure of distribution. Finally, it seems hardly possible to extend Rawls' theory of justice to animals and other natural components to develop a Rawlsian theory of ecological justice, because liberalism and Western tradition of science on the basis of which Rawls' theory of justice has developed presuppose an ontological dualism of human beings and other natural components, and hence cannot recognize the inherent value of nature.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.247-265
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• 2014

In this paper I will undertake three tasks: first, to identify the difference between John Rawls's liberal conception of liberty and Will Kymlicka's; second, to briefly examine the problems with liberal conception of liberty; finally, to propose a certain alternative that will be able to make liberal conception of liberty more meaningful In Kymlicka's view, Rawls seems to fail to make the best defence of freedom of choice because he wants to explain of individual freedom on the basis of Kant's moral theory about liberty. Kymlicka thinks that it is not a desirable way of defending liberal conception of liberty. According to his liberal theory, Rawls's defence of freedom of choice might make us think that we should have our freedom of choice for its own sake because freedom is the most valuable in the world. So Kymlicka wants to provide stronger argument to defend freedom of choice in liberalism. He insists that it is our projects and tasks that are most important things in our lives. Furthermore, he argues that we should conceive our freedom of choice as a precondition for pursuing those projects and practices that are valued for our good lives. Now I want to look at two concepts of liberty in liberalism with Rawls's theory and Kymlicaka's. In this paper, I shall look at criticisms of the liberal account of freedom of choice. These would give us a certain chance for understanding true freedom.

• 한국노년학
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.1045-1058
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• 2010

Based on Rawl's Justice Theory, the author examines the rationales for educating older adults and advocates for their needs for just distributions of educational resources and opportunities. The author also seeks policy implications for establishing just educational systems for older citizens. On the basis of Rawl's Justice Theory, the essential principles for realizing social justice are presented. The author points out the Veil of Ignorance and Rational Indifference. As the practical methods for achieving social justice, the author presents Exclusion of Coincidence, Difference Principle, Democratic Equality, and Common Asset. Implications for establishing just education systems for older adults include: 1) The least advantaged groups such as older adults, females, and the disabled should not be discriminated in the distribution of educational resources; 2) People with higher capacities are obliged to serve less capable people; and 3) Older adults should mobilize all resources to empower themselves and to develop their potentials. The author concludes that Rawl's Justice Theory can be tapped into as a useful ideological framework in order to expand educational resources and opportunities for older adults.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.33 no.spc
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• pp.709-719
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• 1998

오늘날 세계는 물질적으로 풍요롭게 되었지만, 생태위기의 발생과 더불어 환경문데를 둘러싼 불평등이 감소하기 보다는 오히려 증대하고 있다. 21세기를 위한 새로운 패러다임으로서 생태학은 이러한 불평등을 극복하기 위한 지식 및 실천으로서 '환경정의'의 개념 또는 이론을 필요로 한다. 진정한 환경정의론은 한편으로 생태학의 규범적 측면들을 발전시키면서 다른 한편으로 이의 이데올로기의 동원을 막을 수 있는 이론적 및 실천적 토대가 될 것으로 기대된다. 환경정의에 관한 개념적 연구는 주로 사회정의에 관한 철학적 전통, 특히 자유론, 공리주의, 계약론을 포괄하는 자유주의적 정의론, 맑스주의적 정의론 및 포스트모던 정의론 등에서 도출된 주요 개념들을 자연환경에 확대시키고자 한다. 환경정의에 관한 몇몇 학자들, 대표적으로 벤쯔(Wenz), 하비(Harvey), 로와 그리슨 (Low and Gleeson) 등은 다양한 전통을 위에서 제시한 (환경)정의론들을 면밀히 고찰하여, 이들 각각의 한계를 제시하거나 문제점들을 지적하고, 나아가 이들을 종합하고자 했다. 이들의 연구는 환경정의에 관한 다양한 이론들의 특성을 이해하는데 많은 도움을 주지만, 그 자체로 일관성 있는 이론으로 발전하지는 못했다. 이 글에서 제시되는 환경정의론은 인간들 간의 관계, 자연과 인간들 간의 물질적 관계, 그리고 상징적 관계 등에 상응하도록 정의를 3가지 차원, 즉 분배적 정의, 생산적 정의, 승인적 정의로 구분하고자 한다. 이들은 각각 필요의 원칙, 노동의 원칙, 그리고 의사소통의 원칙에 기초하며, 또한 각각 자유주의적, 특히 롤즈의 정의론, 맑스주의 정의론, 그리고 비판이론이나 포스트모던 정의론에서 많은 시사점들을 얻을 수 있다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.165-188
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• 2017

According to Braybrooke(1976) and Sobel(1976), the traditional problem of the social contract is insoluble as long as it assume the 'agents with the rational egoistic motivations' in the 'circumstances such as the state of nature'. The problem of social contract is so called because it defies solution and it runs in the family of social contract theory. Then, do contemporary social contract theories have a solution? I argue that contemporary social contractarians fail to supply a solution due to a previous question or a circulation problem in their theories. And then, I show how conventionalism helps social contractarianism escape the problem.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.29-58
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• 2018

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy of right is a dialectic critique of liberalism. The dialectical criticism in this article does not mean the formal logical denial, but a return to self by self-negation. Thus, if Hegel's philosophy of right is a dialectical critique of liberalism, Hegel's philosophy of right will be critical of liberalism and at the same time, it will not reject liberalism, but rather have aspects of liberalism. The criticism of liberalism implies that individual freedoms and rights can not be realized subjectively through individual free acts, but are realized intersubjectively through social mediums. And this is also found in controversies among modern liberalists because modern liberalism requires the government's role and institutional arrangements for the realization of individual freedoms and rights. We can find the aspects of liberalism in Hegel's philosophy of right since Hegel's ethical life entails ultimately the concrete realization and extension of individual freedom and rights.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.23-51
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• 2014

Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.