• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.2
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• pp.91-118
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• 1998

라이프니츠는 일반적으로 현대논리학의 선각자라고 부른다. 그래서 라이프니츠 논리학에서는 현대 논리학을 이해함에 있어서 중요한 단초들을 발견할 수 있다. 라이프니츠의 논리학을 대표하는 개념으로는 흔히 보편수학, 보편기호학 그리고 논리연산학을 들곤한다. 라이프니츠의 보편수학의 이념은 연대 논리학이 논리학과 수학의 통일에서 출발할 수 있는 결정적인 근거를 제공했다. 이러한 현대 논리학의 출발에 있어서는 상이한 두 입장을 발견할 수 있는데, 부울, 슈레더의 논리대수학과 프레게의 논리학주의가 바로 그것이다. 이 두 입장은 "논리학과 수학의 통일"에 있어서는 공통적인 관심을 보이지만, 논리학의 본질을 라이프니츠의 보편기호학에서 찾느냐 또는 라이프니츠의 논리연산학에서 찾느냐에 따라 상이한 입장을 취한다. 이외에도 보편과학이나 조합술을 이해하지 않고는 라이프니츠 논리학에 대한 총체적인 시각을 갖기 힘들다. 이 두 개념은 특히 타과학이나 과학적 방법론과 관련지어 논리학이란 과연 무엇인가라는 논리철학적인 조명에 있어서 중요한 실마리를 제공한다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.2
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• pp.35-61
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• 1998

개최들의 개별화를 위한 대표적인 법칙으로 간주되고 있는 라이프니츠의 법칙은 철학에서만 아니라 수학이나 논리학과 같은 순수과학에서도 중요한 법칙으로 사용되고 있다. 그러나 최근에 들어서 라이프니츠의 법칙은 그 논리적 위상과 관련하여 심각한 논란의 대상이 되고 있다. 이러한 논란의 근본적 원인은 칸트나 블랙과 같은 철학자들에 의해 라이프니츠의 법칙이 적용되지 않을 기능성을 보이는 반례가 제시되었고, 많은 철학자들이 이에 동조한 데에서 찾을 수 있다. 라이프니츠의 법칙의 논리적 위상과 관계된 철학자들의 입장은 크게 두 가지로 구분된다. 첫 번째 입장은 블랙 등에 의해 제시된 예들을 라이프니츠의 법칙에 대한 정당한 반례로 간주하는 입장이고, 두 번째 입장은 이러한 예들은 리이프니츠의 법칙에 대한 반례로 간주될 수 없다는 입장이다. 두 번째 입장을 쥐이는 대표적 철학자는 헷킹이다. 헷킹은 시공간에 대한 인습주의에 입각하여 블랙 등에 의해 제시된 예는 완전한 가능성을 나타내는 것이 아니고 라이프니츠의 법칙은 가능세계에 대한 메타 원칙으로 간주되어야 한다고 주장하고 있다. 본고에서 필자는 리이프니츠의 법칙을 옹호하려는 헷킹의 시도는 성공적이지 못하고, 또한 블랙 등에 의해 제시된 예들은 라이프니츠의 법칙에 대안 정당한 반례로 간주되어야 한다는 입장을 개진하고 있다. 필자가 이러한 입장을 취하게 된 것은 헷킹의 입장은 논리적 기능성과 물리적 기능성 사이의 구별을 어렵게 한다는 문제점 이외에도 가능세계 의미론과 관련된 중요한 문제점들을 야기하고 있기 때문이다. 가능세계 의미론과 관련된 문제점은 이러한 시도는 가능세계 의미론에 입각한 양상명제들의 해석의 범위를 제한하게 만들고 De-Re 양상명제에 대한 해석을 위해 필수적인 헤세이티즘의 수용을 불가능하게 한다는 것이다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.94
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• pp.53-87
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• 2011

Leibniz regards a corporeal substance, which is composed of monads, as 'one substance' and tries to prove that it has a true unity. This position seems to be contradictionary to his Monadology. Therefore, many scholars have ignored Leibniz's stand that corporeal substance is 'one substance', or consider this only as a stand from his theory of substance in his early works, which has been discarded afterwards. This Research will show that Leibniz adheres to this position throughout his lifetime; that although Leibniz uses the concepts such as substantial form and substantial bond to explain his stand, but the concept of substancial bond doesn't fit in with his philosophical system; that to explain the unity of the corporeal substance, the concept of substancial form and the theory of preestablished harmony are sufficient; and that nevertheless the stand that the corporeal substance is 'one substance' inconsistent with the position that the monad is 'one substance'; and that if Leibniz abandons that stand, the theory of the corporeal substance is a good foundation of his panorganism.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.81-96
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• 2006

This paper aims to review Leibniz's analytic ideas in his philosophy, logics, and mathematics. History of analysis in mathematics ascend its origin to Greek period. Analysis was used to prove geometrical theorems since Pythagoras. Pappus took foundation in analysis more systematically. Descartes tried to find the value of analysis as a heuristics and found analytic geometry. And Descartes and Leibniz thought that analysis was played most important role in investigating studies and inventing new truths including mathematics. Among these discussions about analysis, this paper investigate Leibniz's analysis focusing to his ideas over the whole of his studies.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.49-60
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• 2008

When a man is called a person crossing borders(PCB), he is a man who pursues communication, coexistence and combination beyond visible and/or invisible borders of nations and disciplinaries. This paper examines Leibniz as a PCB in his life and learning, and how his metaphysics, the pre-established harmony, enabled him to be a PCB.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.67-78
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• 2005

In this paper we deals with Leibniz's definition of infinite and infinitely small quantities, infinite quantities and theory of quantified indivisibles in comparison with Galileo's concept of indivisibles. Leibniz developed 'method of indivisible' in order to introduce the integrability of continuous functions. also we deals with this demonstration, with Leibniz's rules of arithmetic of infinitely small and infinite quantities.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.235-256
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• 2017

This essay considers Leibniz-Clark correspondence on the nature of space and hole argument. The ontology of space had been debated under the name of substantivalism-relationism controversy. The debates between the two parties are concerned with the nature of existence of parts of space-time. Substantivalism claims that the point of space-time has existence analogous to that of material substance. Relationism argues that space-time should be understood as the framework of possible spatio-temporal relations between bodies. Although these two approaches attempt to respect theoretical context, it seems that the problems of these two interpretive schemes stems from the lack of understanding of the structure of space-time theories, especially how space-time is connected with the laws of motion. In order to appreciate the substance-relation controversy without deviating from the context of space-time theories, it is necessary then to capture how space-time theories are constituted. This essay offers the clear connection of ontology of space-time with present practices of theoretical physicists.

• Journal of Ginseng Culture
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• v.1
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• pp.28-42
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• 2019

What is unknown about Leibniz (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1646~1716), a great philosopher and mathematician, is that he inquired about ginseng. Why Leibniz, one of the leading figures of the Enlightenment, became interested in ginseng? This paper excavates Leibniz's references on ginseng in his vast amount of correspondences and traces the path of his personal life and cultural context where the question about ginseng arose. From the sixteenth century, Europe saw a notable growth of medical botany, due to the rediscovery of such Greek-texts as Materia Medica and the introduction of a variety of new plants from the New World. In the same context, ginseng, the renowned panacea of the Old World began to appear in a number of European travelogues. As an important part of mercantilistic projects, major scientific academies in Europe embarked on the researches of valuable foreign plants including ginseng. Leibniz visited such scientific academies as the Royal Society in London and $Acad{\acute{e}}mie$ royale des sciences in Paris, and envisioned to establish such scientific society in Germany. When Leibniz visited Rome, he began to form a close relationship with Jesuit missionaries. That opportunity amplified his intellectual curiosity about China and China's famous medicine, ginseng. He inquired about the properties of ginseng to Grimaldi and Bouvet who were the main figures in Jesuit China mission. This article demonstrates ginseng, the unnoticed subject in the Enlightenment, could be an important clue that interweaves the academic landscape, the interactions among the intellectuals, and the mercantilistic expansion of Europe in the late 17th century.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.273-301
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• 2014

This study aims to reconstruct Leibniz's theodicy. Theodicy is to defense of the highest wisdom of the creator against the charge which reason brings against it for whatever is the evil in the world. For this defense, Leibniz created his own new kind of concepts: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of perfection, the best of all possible worlds, moral necessity. Leibniz's theodicy is developed as following. Most good and wisest God created this world freely by moral necessity. God's will was to choose the goods antecedently. But God's will could not create goods only. For God's final purpose is to create the best. For this reason, it happens that the evils may come about by concomitance, and as a result of other greater goods. Therefore the evils are necessary in the world. And evil consists in imperfection. Man has free will as God. Freedom, according to Leibniz, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation. Man has freedom, but man's freedom is imperfect. Evil is originated in man's imperfect freedom.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.177-212
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• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.