• Title/Summary/Keyword: 도덕적 형이상학

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Mou's 'Intellectual Intuition' and Kant's The Aesthetic (모종삼의 '지적 직관'과 칸트의 심미성)

  • Kim, young-kun
    • (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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    • no.34
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    • pp.363-385
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    • 2009
  • I criticize Mou's moral metaphysics and propose the alternative depending on Kant's analysis on the sublime. (1) Mou's moral metaphysics conflicts with the scientific world view. (2) Kant's 'aesthetic space' does not conflict with the scientific world view. Futhermore, Kant's 'aesthetic space' satisfies the conditions which Mou's moral metaphysics requires. (3) Mencius's autonomous morality is not sufficient for justifying the moral law or categorical imperative. (4) At this point, the sublime plays the important role in bridging between nature and morality. (5) In Kant's context, the possibility of the autonomous moral action is achieved on the basis of the educated feeling of the sublime.

A study on the "Affect" of Nietzsche's - Focus on the criticism of Metaphysic, Religion and Moral - (니체 개념연구: 정동 - 형이상학, 종교, 도덕에 대한 그의 비판을 중심으로 -)

  • Lee, Sang-bum
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.148
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    • pp.291-326
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    • 2018
  • The present lecture aims to discuss Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, religion and morality through the affect. Nietzsche's philosophical attempt for the existential health of man made possible by the affirmation of the earth as a world of realistic life. The affirmation about the nascent Earth means that one feels the world as a world of pleasure. But metaphysics and religion have imagined the earthly world of this world as a place against lust. That is, metaphysics and religion suppress the actual affect of man. From the aspect of metaphysics, religion and morality, the human affect is dangerous. But according to Nietzsche, affect is the basic condition revealed by man's nature. The present lecture aims to discuss Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, religion, and morality in the guide to his concept of affect.

과학과 형이상학 -포퍼와 폴라니의 경우-

  • 강영안
    • Journal of Life Science
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    • v.4 no.1
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    • pp.2-10
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    • 1994
  • 과학과 형이상학은 포퍼에게서는 분명히 구별된다. 그럼에도 불구하고 전형적인 형이상학적 이론인 실재론, 비결정론, 출현이론은 과학 활동의 전제 조건으로 수용된다 하지만 폴라니에게서는 과학과 형이상학이 서로 다른 차원으로 분리되지 않는다. 형이상학적 믿음은 과학 자체의 구조를 이루고 있다. 과학은 형이상학적 개념이라 할 수 있는 진리, 선, 미, 정의 등의 본질적 가치에 따라 현실의 드러냄을 목적으로 삼는 인간의 통합적 행위이다. 다라서 폴라니에게 형이상학은 두 가지의 차원을 갖는다. 한편으로 형이상학에는 주관적인 차원이 있다. 도덕적 태도, 지적 열정, 이론의 미적 차원에 대한 감각, 종교적 관점 등 주체로서의 인간의 자기 이해와 관련된 차원이 있다. 진리에 대한 열정과 현실의 의미 추구를 자신의 과학적 활동의 본질적 부분으로 볼 수 있는 과학자는 바로 그 자체는 하나의 훌륭한 형이상학자가 되는 것이다.

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Kant's Categorical Imperative and Chu Hsi's Moral Philosophy (칸트의 정언명법과 주자(朱子)의 도덕철학)

  • Lim, Heon-gyu
    • (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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    • no.35
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    • pp.297-327
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    • 2009
  • Kant proposed three principles of moral philosophy(Categorical Imperative) and Supreme moral principle in The Fundamental principles of Metaphysics of Ethics : Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ${\cdots}$ etc. Kant's three principles of moral philosophy(Categorical Imperatives) imply that the idea of universality, freedom, and the kingdom of ends. We contrast Chu Hsi's Moral Philosophy with Kant's three principles of Categorical Imperatives. In conclusion Chu Hsi's moral rules be equal to kantian categorical imperative. These rules implicate principle of universalization, impartiality, and the kingdom of ends. But Chu Hsi believe in reality of the human mind and it's nature. Human mind and it's nature is comprised of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom(四德) is the origin of morality. Chu Hsi's philosophy of LI(理) is metaphysics of Tao-Te(道德) or ontological-metaphysical Ethics. Everyone has created with LI. LI is potentiality of Human beings and the good. Chu Hsi's moral philosophy is distinguished from the traditional theory of the substance and modern scientism(phenomenalism)

A study on a the poetic symbol and moral instruction (시적 상징과 도덕과수업)

  • Song, Young-min
    • The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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    • no.35
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    • pp.415-443
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    • 2012
  • The moral instruction expresses and conveys a abstract objects so called moral. And it pursues occurrence of moral meaning contained a emotion. In these respects, there is a resemblance between moral instruction and artistic symbolic language. Meanwhile, the poetry are a typical form of artistic symbolic language, and especially poetic symbolism is a representative and possible way that expresses accepting a meaning of abstract objects. Then a moral instruction needs to be poetic symbolism. The poetic symbolism that a moral instruction intends to resemble is a linguistic expression, but at the same time that is a expression beyond a linguistic limitation for conveying the metaphysical meaning. For this, the poetic symbolism reveals visible and concrete vehicles that imply invisible and metaphysical tenor. At this point, poetic symbolism is characterized with sameness, implicitness, polysemy, context, allness. The poetic symbolism having these characters appears personal symbol of poet as combined with creative imagination, and is experienced poetic meaning as combined with creative imagination of reader. The moral instruction as a poetic symbolism offers learning experience similar to poetic experience. The moral instruction as a poetic symbolism would be constructed not a logical or prosaic explain but symbolic form that can draw various moral meaning. For this construction, first, we might find a symbolic media for materialization of teaching contents. Second, moral teaching should be constructed to be searching moral meaning of symbolic media. Third, moral teaching should be constructed to be interpreting moral meaning of symbolic media. When teacher can construct moral instruction as possible as similar to poetic symbolism, student can learn moral meaning combined with emotion through their response and interpretation to the teaching. It is very similar to good poem that is sympathized and accommodated poet's theme by reader.

Three meanings implied by Thomas Aquinas' "intellectualism" (토마스 아퀴나스의 '지성주의(주지주의)'가 내포하는 3가지 의미 - 『진리론(이성, 양심과 의식)』을 중심으로 -)

  • Lee, Myung-gon
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.148
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    • pp.239-267
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    • 2018
  • In the matter of ethical and moral practice, Thomas Aquinas's thought is called "intellectualism". It does not mean only that intelligence is more important than will in moral practice, but that it has epistemological, metaphysical, and psycho-psychological implications significance. The first means affirming "the first principles of knowing" as the problem of certainty of knowing. In Thomism, there are surely above suspicion notions in the domain of practice as well as in the domain of reason, which are obviously self-evident, and because of that certainty, they become the basis of certainty of all other knowings that follow. The principle to know these knowings is the first principle of knowing, reason and Synderesis(conscience). Therefore, the "intellectualism" of Tomism is the basis for providing the ground of metaphysics. In the case of reason, it is classified into superior reason and inferior reason according to whether it is object. The object of higher reason is "metaphysical object" which human natural reason can not deal with. This affirmation of superior reason provides a basis for human "autonomy" in the moral and religious domain. This is because even in areas beyond the object of natural reason, it is possible to derive certain knowledge through self-reasoning, and thus to be able to carry out the act through their own choosing. Likewise, for Thomas Aquinas, "Synderesi" as the first principle of good and evil judgment can be applied to both the superior reason and the inferior reason, and thus, except for the truth by the direct divine revelation, precedes any authority of the world, scrupulous Act always guarantees truth and good. This means "subjectivity" that virtually in the act of moral practice, it can become the master of one's act. Furthermore, "consciousness(conscientia)", which means the ability to comprehend everything in a holistic and simultaneous manner, is based on conscience(synderesis). So, at least in principle, correct behavior or moral behavior in Tomism is given firstly in correct knowledge. Therefore, it can be said that true awareness (conscious awareness) in Thomas Aquinas's thought coincide with practical practice, or at least knowledge can be said to be a decisive 'driver' for practice. This will be the best explanation of the definition of "intellectualism" by Thomism.

The Relation of the Cosmology and Xiangshuxue of Jang, Hyeon-Guang (장현광 우주론의 상수학적 성격에 대한 검토)

  • Kim, Moon-yong
    • (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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    • no.33
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    • pp.7-29
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    • 2008
  • Jang, Hyeon-Guang is one of the representative natural philosophers of Joseon Korea. This article aims to investigate the meaning of the factors of Xiangshuxue(象數學) contained in his cosmology. Xiangshuxue applies Image(Xiang), Numeral(Shu) and In-Yang to present the distinctions, inter-relations and time-series orders of things. Jang's cosmology, combined with Xiangshuxue, insisted that Li(Principle) is infinite in time and space, the cosmos is finite on the other side. This assures that the moral principle is absolute and eternal. Jang emphasized the book I-ching as the criterion and the model in understanding the nature. This restrained the objectivizm of Shaoyong and made his concept 'natural law' difficult to change itself as the experience and the knowledge expand. None the less, his cosmology is appraised in that it strengthened natural philosophical basis of neo-confucianism and preceded the cosmological investigations since mid-Joseon dynasty.

A study on the moral instruction by Spinoza's Ethics (스피노자 『윤리학』으로 본 도덕과수업)

  • Song, Young-min
    • The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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    • no.38
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    • pp.303-328
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    • 2013
  • The purpose of the present article is to understand moral instruction through Ethics written by Spinoza and enable the implications drawn from its understanding to give shape to lesson plans. In his representative book titled Ethics, Spinoza speculates ultimate substance from the metaphysical perspective and converges it into ethics. The ultimate substance, which is a cause of itself, refers to immanent cause of all things that have numerous attributes as essence. All things in nature develop the substance and exchange influence among individuals at the same time. A human in the influential relationship perceives things based on one's beneficialness and assigns moral words of good and evil. However, a human, who is a mode of substance, should escape from morals that are superficial, relative, and objective, in order to realize nature. Becoming a more complete human requires going through moral imagination in reality but going beyond the imagination ultimately. Moral instruction premises the moral imagination of a student who exists as a mode; meanwhile, it is a study to escape from the influence of moral imagination. Good and evil arise from the limitation that an existing human has, but if a life is to preserve the necessity of ultimate substance, moral instruction can be defined as the processes of alleviating the influence that hinders a human's nature from being realized. Giving shape to this processes with the basis on the Spinoza's epistemic argument, moral instructional texts can be composed of stages to form more adequate moral ideas about moral subjects gradually and cumulatively. The moral instruction like this expects moral awareness which is relatively perfect than the present moral imagination. Furthermore, with the teaching and learning like this sustained, it is expected that ultimately the limitation arising from sensible perception can be overcome to approach the realization of a human's nature.

Christine M. Korsgaard's Constructivism and Moral Realism (Christine M. Korsgaard의 구성주의와 도덕적 실재론)

  • Roh, Young-Ran
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.129
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    • pp.23-51
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    • 2014
  • Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.

Confucian Moral Principles and Kant's Categorical Imperative (유가의 도덕원리와 칸트)

  • Lim, Heon-gyu
    • The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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    • no.29
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    • pp.125-152
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    • 2010
  • The main purpose of this dissertation is a introductive proposal to reconstruct confucian moral principles. The most classical question in moral principles is : what is the good. In order to reconstruct confucian moral principles, this dissertation begin with question of what is the good in confucian moral principles. Confucianism believe in reality of the human good mind and good nature. Confucian the human good mind and good nature is comprised of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom(四德) is the origin of morality. Confucian's moral principles of human relationship is none other than conscientiousness and altruism. Conscientiousness is a principle of self-cultivation and self-revelation. As to altruism, confucious said, "the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself", or "do not impose on others what you do not desire others to impose upon you." Altruism is rectified as a principle of reciprocity methodology of the making of whole kingdom peaceful in The Great Learning. Confucian golden rule(conscientiousness and altruism is equal to Kantian categorical imperative in The Fundamental principles of Metaphysics of Ethics. : Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ... etc. Kant's three principles of moral philosophy(Categorical Imperatives) imply that the idea of universality, freedom, and the kingdom of ends. We contrast confucian moral principles with Kant's three principles of Categorical Imperatives. In conclusion, confucian moral principles implicate Kant's principle of universalizability and impartiality.