• Sijohaknonchong
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• v.20
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• pp.5-27
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• 2004

This article aims to clarify the significance of nature's silence in sijo by comparing with the works taking misunderstanding and lie as poetic materials. Sijo poets praise the silence of nature with correlating the false of the mundane language. This is the natural consequence in which they arrive by denying both 'mundane' and 'language'. In mundane world people struggle for their interest and distinguish between right and wrong. Therefore the silence of nature is not the principle of life but counter-pair of mundane politics. Sadaebu[사대부], the sijo poets praise the silence of nature to realize needs to rise above the boundary of right and wrong. Then they don't recognize the nature as pure scenary. As Confucianist, they recognize the nature in connection with mundane world. Because they have two persona, the scholar [사] and politician[대부]. In Confucianism the naturalization of moral and moralization of nature is pursued simultaneously.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.449-472
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• 1999

본 논문은 맑스가 자본주의의 사회적 및 환경적 부정의를 비판하고 정의로운 사회 및 자연과의 관계를 위한 사회주의적 프로젝트를 제안했던 원칙들을 밝히고자 한다. 본 논문은 이러한 과정에서 비판적 생태학 일반 그리고 특히 환경정의 이론이 더욱 발전할 수 있는 기반을 도출하고자 한다. 본 논문은 제안된 몇 가지 중요한 점들은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 자본주의 사회 및 자연에 대한 맑스의 비판 그리고 사회주의 사회와 자연에 관한 그의 개념은 두가지 기본적인 정의 원리들, 즉 인간과 자연 간 관계에 관한 그의 생태적 개념화에서 도출될 수 있는‘필요’원칙과 ‘노동’원칙에 바탕을 두고 있다. 둘째, 도덕성의 이데올로기적 성격에 대한 그의 거부로 인해, 맑스는 자본주의 사회에 대한 비판으로 일관하면서 자본주의에서의 정의 이론을 발전시키지 않았지만, 반면 그는 사회주의 사회와 자연과의 관계에서 (환경)정의를 위한 이론적 기초를 제안했다. 그리고 끝으로 그의 환경정의에 관한 개념화는 단지 분배적 정의 패러다임으로만 이해되어서는 안되며, 그가 생산을 교환.분배 그리고 소비를 포함하는 유기적 전체로서 이해한 바와 같이 ‘생산적 정의’라고 부를 수 있는 것과 관련지어 이해되어야 한다.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.41
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• pp.223-246
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• 2014

The main concern of classical Confucianism, which has Kongzi as its main thinker, is how one can attain moral perfection. In this respect, all of the Confucian teachings can be characterized as an attempt to expound the nature of sages or gentlemen who are believed to attain moral perfection. In Confucianism, de 德 (moral virtue) refers to moral principles or the attributes of things, and it also signifies moral qualities and abilities of humans which are believed to be bestowed by the moral source. Kongzi substantiated the details and practical methods of de, through his teachings of ren as its internal principle and li as its external form. in this way, he put a special emphasis on moral practicality of de. To study Kongzi's practical moral teachings focusing on de can be understood as a reflection on current educational issues.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.50
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• pp.363-389
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• 2016

Any moral ideas get integrity upon their practices. Because in human society systems, morality have capability among human interactions, for it gives moral standards(good or bad/ right or wrong) to them. And when the society system is Korean, Koreans surely have developed unique styles of moral practice and moral education in their traditional ages. So reinterpretating and categorizing the moral tradition for taking advantage of it in contemporary context, make sense. In this study, Korean moral tradition is focused in its scope, as 'Confucian moral tradition in semi-modern era'. For convenience of study and the potentials of effective revision, Korean tradition have been resized. In Confucian moral tradition, semi-modern Korean moral ideas could be presented as ren(仁) and yi(義). Furthermore, ren and yi could be practiced with several moral virtues, like xiao(孝), di(弟), ci(慈), zhi(直) qin(勤) gian(儉). When compared with contemporary moral education idea systems, the traditional system can have affinity with the systems in moral ideas division('with-self morality', 'with-others morality', 'with-universe and transcendence morality'). And several fusion-style, integration-based education practices can be developed and applied at contemporary school moral education.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.213-238
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• 2016

This paper examines how Dasan Jeong Yak-yong developed self-healing and his perspective of happiness during the hardest point of his political and social career. Just after the death of King Jeongjo (正祖, reign. 1766-1800) the arrest and persecution of those who accepted Christian knowledge from the West began. Among them were Jeong's family members and friends. Jeong, who had learned but had not accepted Christianity as a religious belief, was exiled to Ganggin 康津 in southern Jeolla Province where he was to spend the next 18 years. The two things that helped Jeong through his exile were the Book of Changes 易經 and his commitment to the study of Confucian thought, political, and social reforms. His life-long commitment to writing and his progressive understanding of the principle of changes of the universe in the Book of Changes, represented processes of self-healing and cultivation, depriving Jeong of self-pity and enabling him to attain the highest level in self-realization. According to Jeong, there are two kinds of happiness; "secular happiness" (yeolbok 熱福) related to power and wealth, and "pure happiness" (cheongbok 淸福), a free and idyllic life. For Jeong, the latter was more valuable than the former. Jeong believed that life pursing ethical virtues only could bring authentic joy to people. Furthermore, his devotion to the issues of systematic, social reforms was out of his desire to bring the public happiness by "practical learning", silhak 實學.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.85
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• pp.53-76
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• 2009

Plato's Laws, Bk. 10 is made up of cryptically concise expressions and complex arguments, so that it is not simple to understand it. In this essay I would like to make use of Stoic perspective as an interpretative instrument, which would enable me, I hope, to reconstruct the main arguments of the Laws, Bk. 10 into an intelligible form. Through this approach we would have an opportunity to meet with some important philosophical ideas of Plato which did not reveal themselves clearly in other, especially early and middle dialogues. These ideas comprise the inseparability of the soul from the body, the intellectualization of nature, the human being as a part of the cosmos and the extensional overlapping of the moral law and the natural law. And at the same time my study would result in making a suggestion for history of reception. That is, in this paper I will find some grounds in the tenth book of the Laws that would show how great the influence of Plato upon the Stoics was. For we have but little knowledge about the possibility of the power of Plato's influence upon the Stoics, even though the scholarship on the Stoics until now shed some light on the features and range of Aristotle's influence upon them.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.96-105
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• 2011

This study analyzed literary works and references related to Dok-Rak-Dang(獨樂堂) and the attributes of managing the landscape in Dok-Rak-Dang Garden based on the assumption of position and the spatial structure revealed in the site. Hoe-Jae Lee Eon-Jeok(1491-1553), a distinguished scholar of Neo-Confusionism, built Dok-Rak-Dang and managed the surrounding areas during his retirement years. He called the mountains, stream, and rock along and near the Ja-Ge Stream Four Mountains and Five Platforms(四山五臺). Before he named these, they were not considered special. The Four Mountains which are Do-Duk in north, Mu-Hak in south, Hwa-Gae in east, and Ja-Ok in west enclose Dok-Rak-Dang and the surrounding areas. The Five Platforms, Se-Sim, Gwan-Eo, Yeong-Gue, Jing-Sim, and Tak-Yeong, in order from downstream, are places with beautiful scenery in Ja-Ge Stream. The attributes of managing the landscape in Dok-Rak-Dang Garden are the following: One is the spatial integration of what is natural and artificial as the attitude of aesthetic experience in accord with nature. Another is flexible territorialization as the way of organizing spaces in nature from the experiential aspect. The other is place making of personalized nature through a series of processes such as observing, choosing, and naming landscapes in nature. Four Mountains and Five Platforms function as landscape bases and elements to appreciate nature aesthetically. Those attributes are different from the attitude of constructing spaces. Rather, they originate from the traditional view on the appreciation of nature. Above all, place-making in nature was acquired from designed spatial structure and experiential aesthetic appreciation in the space through observing, choosing, and naming landscapes in nature reflecting creator's own ideological and aesthetic thoughts, and it might be explained as one of practical ways of Korean traditional gardening.