• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.77-105
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• 2004

Given the limitations of UI benefit and self-insurance through precautionary savings, this paper suggests a new scheme of income support for the unemployed, which offers unemployed workers not only UI benefit but also borrowings from their future pension incomes. Allowing individuals to have effective self-insurance through pension- borrowing, this scheme provides them with consumption-smoothing and reduction in risk burden while maintaining search incentives of the unemployed. Simulation study based upon household panel data in Korea suggests that a heavy reliance should be set upon self-insurance through pension-borrowings rather than upon UI benefit, even for the low-income individuals who are subsidized under UI system. This result provides us with insightful implications for a social safety net in (fast-growing) developing countries, where people cannot afford a good amount of UI benefit or of precautionary savings against unemployment although they expect their incomes to be much higher in the future. Indeed, it is consumption-smoothing effect of self-insurance through pension- borrowings, as well as its incentive-maintaining effect, that makes it a promising alternative of social safety net in developing countries.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.29-57
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• 2014

Using unemployment insurance and income-contingent loan (ICL) that conditions repayment by debtors upon their incomes this paper characterizes an efficient income support system for the unemployed, which maximizes their lifetime utilities by effectively enhancing inter-state and inter-temporal consumption-smoothing subject to incentive constraints on the part of the beneficiaries. This paper also emphasizes the generality of the argument for a mix of ICL and subsidy that may be applied potentially to many types of government welfare program.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.31-59
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• 2003

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving their search incentives while reducing risks. This paper identifies the conditions under which the integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. A fully integrated system is one in which no reliance is placed at all on a separate tax-funded unemployment insurance program. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves an exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that a joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated to each other.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.39-59
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• 2000

Given the constraint that the unemployment benefit is not allowed to vary freely over the unemployment duration, this paper examines the optimal UI benefit structure. In particular, identifying the conflicting effects of benefit amount and benefit duration upon incentive and insurance, this paper characterizes the optimal combination of UI benefit amount and duration. Based upon some important factors determining the optimal UI benefit structure that are derived from the model, a set of directions for UI reform in Korea have been proposed.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.131-169
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• 2010

I develop a matching model in which risk-averse workers face borrowing constraints and make a labor force participation decision as well as a job search decision. A sharp distinction between unemployment and out of the labor force is made: those who look for work for a certain period but find no job are classified as the unemployed and those who do not look for work are classified as those out of the labor force. In the model, the job search decision consists of two steps. First, each individual who is not working obtains information about employment opportunities. Second, each individual who decides to search has to take costly actions to find a job. Since individuals differ with respect to asset holdings, they have different reservation job-finding probabilities at which an individual is indifferent between searching and not searching. Individuals, who have large asset holdings and thereby are less likely to participate in the labor market, have high reservation job-finding probability, and they are less likely to search if they have less quality of information. In other words, if individuals with large asset holdings search for job, they must have very high quality of information and face very high actual job-finding probability. On the other hand, individuals with small asset holdings have low reservation job-finding probability and they are likely to search for less quality of information. They face very low actual job-finding probability and seem to remain unemployed for a long time. Therefore, differences in the quality of information explain heterogeneous job search decisions among individuals as well as higher job finding probability for those who reenter the labor market than for those who remain in the labor force. The effect of the extended maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows is investigated. The benchmark benefit duration is set to three months. As maximum benefit duration is extended up to six months, the employment-population ratio decreases while the unemployment rate increases because individuals who are eligible for benefits have strong incentives to remain unemployed and decide to search even if they obtain less quality of information, which leads to low job-finding probability and then high unemployment rate. Then, the vacancy-unemployment ratio decreases and, in turn, the job-finding probability for both the unemployed and those out of the labor force decrease. Finally, the outflow from nonparticipation decreases with benefit duration because the equilibrium job-finding probability decreases. As the job-finding probability decreases, those who are out of the labor force are less likely to search for the same quality of information. I also consider the matching model with two states of employment and unemployment. Compared to the results of the two-state model, the simulated effects of changes in benefit duration on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows are quite large and significant.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.1-24
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• 2014

This paper examines the changes in early reemployment bonus system in Korea and investigates its effects on job finding rates of the unemployed and on their reemployment outcomes. The analysis on the characteristics of the recipients reveals that, after the policy change, the probability of receiving the bonus increases among female, older, and less educated job seekers. This paper also shows that exit hazard from unemployment has not changed significantly while the stability of the subsequent jobs has been substantially improved.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.67-94
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• 2012

Despite continuous efforts of the government, youth joblessness in Korea has remained as a top policy priority. At this end, the study focuses on the causes of youth labor market problems and tries to seek for policy directions. While the previous research attempted to explain youth joblessness based on the labor demand and supply, this study follows a job search model which emphasizes a job matching process. A theoretical model and empirical results predict that a mean duration of unemployment could decrease if an implicit income of unemployment declines or a rate of job offer rises. From policy point of view, it is advisable to raise incentives for labor demand and to strengthen employment services because a policy to lower an implicit income of unemployment may not secure policy target efficiency.