• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.21 no.7
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• pp.1276-1284
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• 2017

Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA) that was standardized as a lightweight block cipher was implemented with 8-bit data path, and the vulnerability of LEA encryption processor to correlation power analysis (CPA) attack was analyzed. The CPA used in this paper detects correct round keys by analyzing correlation coefficient between the Hamming distance of the computed data by applying hypothesized keys and the power dissipated in LEA crypto-processor. As a result of CPA attack, correct round keys were detected, which have maximum correlation coefficients of 0.6937, 0.5507, and this experimental result shows that block cipher LEA is vulnerable to power analysis attacks. A masking method based on TRNG was proposed as a countermeasure to CPA attack. By applying masking method that adds random values obtained from TRNG to the intermediate data of encryption, incorrect round keys having maximum correlation coefficients of 0.1293, 0.1190 were analyzed. It means that the proposed masking method is an effective countermeasure to CPA attack.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.383-389
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• 2023

The development of quantum computers and the emergence of quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm pose a significant threat to the security of existing cipher systems. Quantum algorithms can efficiently perform mathematical operations that take a long time on traditional computers. This characteristic can significantly reduce the time it takes to break modern cipher systems that rely on mathematical problems. To prepare for quantum attacks based on these algorithms, existing ciphers must be implemented as quantum circuits. Many ciphers have already been implemented as quantum circuits, analyzing quantum resources required for attacks and verifying the quantum strength of the cipher. In this paper, we present quantum circuits for LED lightweight block ciphers and explain each function of quantum circuits. Thereafter, the resources for the LED quantum circuit are estimated and evaluated by comparing them with other lightweight block ciphers.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.1163-1170
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• 2016

A hardware implementation of ultra-lightweight block cipher algorithm PRESENT which was specified as a standard for lightweight cryptography ISO/IEC 29192-2 is described. The PRESENT crypto-processor supports two key lengths of 80 and 128 bits, as well as four modes of operation including ECB, CBC, OFB, and CTR. The PRESENT crypto-processor has on-the-fly key scheduler with master key register, and it can process consecutive blocks of plaintext/ciphertext without reloading master key. In order to achieve a lightweight implementation, the key scheduler was optimized to share circuits for key lengths of 80 bits and 128 bits. The round block was designed with a data-path of 64 bits, so that one round transformation for encryption/decryption is processed in a clock cycle. The PRESENT crypto-processor was verified using Virtex5 FPGA device. The crypto-processor that was synthesized using a $0.18{\mu}m$ CMOS cell library has 8,100 gate equivalents(GE), and the estimated throughput is about 908 Mbps with a maximum operating clock frequency of 454 MHz.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.871-878
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• 2012

LBlock is a 64-bit ultra-light block cipher suitable for the constrained environments such as wireless sensor network environments. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on LBlock. Based on a random nibble fault model, our attack can recover the secret key of LBlock by using the exhaustive search of $2^{25}$ and five random nibble fault injection on average. It can be simulated on a general PC within a few seconds. This result is superior to known differential fault analytic result on LBlock.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.107-112
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• 2020

Ultra-lightweight password CHAM is an algorithm with efficient addition, rotation and XOR operations on resource constrained devices. CHAM shows high computational performance, especially on IoT platforms. However, lightweight block encryption algorithms used on the Internet of Things may be vulnerable to side channel analysis. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability to side channel attack by attempting a first power analysis attack against CHAM. In addition, a safe algorithm was proposed and implemented by applying a masking technique to safely defend the attack. This implementation implements an efficient and secure CHAM block cipher using the instruction set of an 8-bit AVR processor.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.05a
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• pp.171-173
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• 2016

128-비트의 마스터 키를 지원하는 블록암호 AES-128을 IoT 보안에 적합하도록 경량화하여 구현하였다. 키 스케줄러와 라운드 블록을 8 비트 데이터 패스로 구현하고, 다양한 최적화 방법을 적용함으로써 하드웨어를 최소화시켰으며, 100 MHz 클록 주파수에서 4,400 GE의 작은 게이트로 구현되었다. Verilog HDL로 설계된 AES 크립토 코어를 Vertex5 XC5VSX50T FPGA 디바이스에 구현하여 올바로 동작함을 확인하였다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.588-594
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• 2021

SIMON, a lightweight block cipher developed by the US National Security Agency, is a family of block ciphers optimized for hardware implementation. It supports many kinds of standards to operate in various environments. The counter mode of operation is one of the operational modes. It provides to encrypt plaintext which is longer than the original size. The counter mode uses a constant(Nonce) and Counter value as an input value. Since Nonce is the identical for all blocks, so it always has same result when operates with other constant values. With this feature, it is possible to skip some instructions of round function by pre-computation. In general, the input value of SIMON is affected by the counter. However in an 8-bit environment, it is calculated in 8-bit units, so there is a part that can be pre-computed. In this paper, we focus the part that can be pre-calculated, and compare with previous works.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2020.11a
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• pp.405-408
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• 2020

양자 컴퓨터를 활용한 양자 알고리즘은 우리가 현재 사용하고 있는 많은 암호들의 안전성을 깨뜨릴 수 있다. 그루버 알고리즘을 n-bit 보안레벨을 가지는 대칭키 암호에 적용한다면 보안레벨을 O(2^n/2)까지 낮출 수 있다. 그루버 알고리즘을 적용하기 위해서는 우선 대상 암호가 양자 회로로 구현되어야 한다. 때문에 대상 블록암호를 양자 회로로 최적화하는 연구들이 최근 활발히 진행되고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 국산 경량 블록암호 LEA를 양자 회로에서 최적화 하였다. 기존의 LEA 양자 회로구현과 비교하여 양자 게이트는 더 많이 사용하였지만, 큐빗을 획기적으로 줄일 수 있었으며 이에 대한 성능 평가를 수행하였다. 마지막으로 제안하는 LEA 구현에 그루버 알고리즘을 적용하기 위한 양자 자원을 평가하였다.

• Journal of IKEEE
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.233-241
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• 2018

This paper describes a lightweight implementation of a cryptographic processor supporting GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) authenticated encryption (AE) that is based on the two block cipher algorithms of ARIA and AES. It also provides five modes of operation (ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR) for confidentiality as well as the key lengths of 128-bit and 256-bit. The ARIA and AES are integrated into a single hardware structure, which is based on their algorithm characteristics, and a $128{\times}12-b$ partially parallel GF (Galois field) multiplier is adopted to efficiently perform concurrent processing of CTR encryption and GHASH operation to achieve overall performance optimization. The hardware operation of the ARIA/AES-GCM AE processor was verified by FPGA implementation, and it occupied 60,800 gate equivalents (GEs) with a 180 nm CMOS cell library. The estimated throughput with the maximum clock frequency of 95 MHz are 1,105 Mbps and 810 Mbps in AES mode, 935 Mbps and 715 Mbps in ARIA mode, and 138~184 Mbps in GCM AE mode according to the key length.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2019.10a
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• pp.449-452
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• 2019

초 경량암호 CHAM은 자원이 제한된 장치 상에서 효율성이 뛰어난 덧셈, 회전연산, 그리고 XOR 연산으로 이루어진 알고리즘이다. CHAM은 특히 사물인터넷 플랫폼에서 높은 연산 성능을 보인다. 하지만 사물 인터넷 상에서 사용되는 경량 블록 암호화 알고리즘은 부채널 분석에 취약할 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 CHAM에 대한 1차 전력 분석 공격을 시도하여 부채널 공격에 대한 취약성을 증명한다. 이와 더불어 해당 공격을 안전하게 방어할 수 있도록 마스킹 기법을 적용하여 안전한 알고리즘을 제안한다.