• 베이커리
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• no.7 s.360
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• pp.70-71
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• 1998

• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2010

This study aims to analyze the relationship between the expectation of franchisees to their franchisers before contracting and perceived performance after actually operation. The analysis data was collected from 789 franchisees located in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do of South Korea. The findings are as followings: first, the gap between expectation of franchisees and perceived performance was negative and it becomes an necessary for franchise managers to manage the expectation of franchisees by using various effective marketing strategies. Second, the gaps were different among different franchise industrial classifications and the gap in the food-service industry is the largest.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2008.05a
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• pp.339-342
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• 2008

Franchisors court additional franchisees as marketing partners for continued growth in sales revenue. Competitive climate, potential franchisees have their choice of suitors and are likely to scrutinize them carefully. As this research makes, franchisors affiliated with chains that forge strong partnerships are to achieve superior performance. The chain that promises a strong partnership is more have its choice of prospective franchise partners. Developing strong partnerships can use to recruit high quality franchisees. If franchisors with to experience the benefits of a strong franchise partnership, they must be willing to work on behalf of the partnership, perform roles that may extend beyond their traditional boundaries, and resolve their disagreement to the benefit of the partnership rather than to their own benefit. Strong partnerships require sacrifices on the part of both the franchisees and franchisors. However, These sacrifices have substantial payoffs in terms of franchisor performance as well as the performance of the relationship as a whole.

• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.105-131
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• 2010

This practical study is to propose a model for efficiently implementing franchise management by Franchise Enterprise in franchise industry. Franchise system is established and mutual relationship is also fulfilled based on bilateral contract between franchisor and franchisee. After contract and opening the franchisee store, franchisees are continually supervised and administered according to mutually agreed process and procedures. In this regard, franchisor should have well-managed system for supervising and assisting franchisee efficiently and effectively. The purpose of this study is to set-up the concept of enterprise contract management(ECM) in Franchise Enterprise and to promote the systemization of franchise management, and also to present and propose the development tool for franchise-specific IT program which is called " Franchise Contract Management'Supervising System".

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.217-235
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• 2010

In franchise industry, territorial restraint is a system that imposes exclusive right to franchisers in a certain business area. To the franchisers, this system guarantees monopoly profits in a local market and exclusive rights during the contract periods. In such a way, franchisee generates a big revenue at once on the basis of franchiser's initial investment such as interior cost and franchise fee, it must have supervised franchiser's moral hazard for the territorial restraint agreement. Rather than territorial restraint can be a system to give exclusive right to franchiser's so that they neglect their own sales and too much rely on headquarter's brand and marketing activities without their own efforts. This paper assesses the implication of territorial restraint by examining the effect on brand extension, degree of contract termination. Drawing on research in transaction cost agreement and opportunism, the authors suggest that franchisee is highly likely to launch similar brand which is not effected on previous contract when territorial restraint is set out in the contract system. Moreover, the authors find that the degree of contract termination will be high in the existence of territorial restraint due to the franchisee's opportunism. The results imply that territorial restraint induces franchisee's opportunistic strategy more aggressively so that the possibility of brand extension or new brand launching will be increased. At the same time, franchisee is aggressively seeking for the reason for contract termination due to the pursuit of its profit maximization. Based on some empirical findings, this paper concludes with policy implications and some necessary fields of future studies desirable.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.390-398
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• 2009

This study researches on the two types. First, Researched into important perception, relationship maintenance perception, relationship improvement, relationship recognition between franchisor and franchisee, Seconds, Researched into correlation between franchisor and franchisee at function achievement and relationship maintenance, conflict resolve and relationship maintenance, function achievement and compare with competitor. If franchisor with to experience the benefits of a strong franchise partnership, they must be willing to work on behalf of the partnership, perform roles that may extend beyond their traditional boundaries, and resolve their disagreement to the benefit of the partnership rather than to their own benefit. Strong partnerships require sacrifices on the part of both the franchisees and franchisors. However, These sacrifices have substantial payoffs in terms of franchisor performance as well as the performance of the relationship as a whole.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.42 no.5
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• pp.1-18
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• 2017

This study focuses on the recent case held as to control in franchising. On the basis of analysis of the recent case, it examines the validity of the decision and suggests practical advice. The extensive judicial precedent has held that the franchisor and the franchisee possess the independent contractor relationship. But Williams v. Jani-king of Philadelphia Inc. suggest the conversion of the franchisee's status to an employees instead of an independent contractor. Franchisees allege that they were wrongly classified as independent contractors instead of employees because Jani-King had the ability to control the manner in which franchisees perform their day-to-day tasks. The appeal court held that Pennsylvania law does not distinguish between controls put in place to protect a franchise's intellectual property and controls for other purposes, and a franchisee may be an employee or an independent contractor depending on the nature of the franchise system controls. However, some degree of controls by the franchisor over the franchisee is inherent in the franchise and may even be mandated by the federal and state laws. Moreover, the appeal court affirmed that the franchise agreement, policies manual, and training manual alone could be sufficient to resolve the employment status. But it seems appropriate that the right to control on the documents is considered with the actual control.

• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.173-199
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• 2011

A franchisee has to depend on the overall system, such as knowhow and management support, from a franchisor in the franchise system and the two parties do not start with the same position in economic or information power because the franchisor controls or supports through selling or management styles. For this, unfair trades the franchisor's over controlling and limiting the franchisee might occur and other side effects by the people who give the franchisee scam trades has negatively influenced on the development of franchise industry and national economy. So, the purpose of this study is preventing unfair trade for the franchisee from understanding the causes and problems of dispute between the franchisor and the franchisee focused on the dispute cases submitted the Korea Fair Trade Mediation Agency and seeking ways to secure the transparency of recruitment process and justice of franchise management process. The results of the case analysis are followed; first, affiliation contracts should run on the franchisor's exact public information statement and the surely understanding of the franchisee. Secondly, the franchisor needs to use their past experiences and investigated data for recruiting franchisees. Thirdly, in the case of making a contract with the franchisee, the franchisor has to make sure the business area by checking it with franchisee in person. Fourthly, the contracts are important in affiliation contracts, so enacting the possibility of disputes makes the disputes decreased. Fifthly, lots of investigation and interests are needed for protecting rights and interests between the franchisor and franchisee and preventing the disputes by catching the cause and more practical solutions of the disputes from the government.

• 베이커리
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• no.1 s.342
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• pp.104-108
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• 1997

• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-25
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• 2012

The studies of franchise companies are underway with the development of the franchise industry. Franchisor performance, franchisee performance, and relationship characteristics on performance, financial performance, non-financial performance, including research on the topic or purpose of the franchise performance and related discussions from a variety of perspectives have been proposed. Presented so comprehensive a discussion regarding the existing performance of the franchise and qualitative aspects such as satisfaction, long-term orientation to emphasize the limits. Therefore, this study was conducted by the franchise company's performance than the need to be clearly presented. Propose a quantifiable and quantified to reflect the characteristics of the franchise quantitative performance indicators. Franchise contract management systematically analyze the status of the enterprise contract management(ECM) and proposed contract management, leverage as an indicator for a more quantitative analysis. Contract management leverage is the franchise as an indicator of the merchant and the growth of the contract showing any significant changes in the coming changes in the Franchisee's sales growth target analysis results, notable implications could be found. This study are new methodology for the practical dimensions of performance of franchise companies.