• Journal of Digital Contents Society
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.585-592
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• 2011

Real Estate Auction Information System purposes on providing high quality information of auction customized to consumer's situation and preference. Especially, ever-changing real time information such as the number of hits and advanced analysis for expecting the winning bid are requiring of mobile information system based on context awareness. Therefore, this paper studies on Real Estate Auction Information System based on context awareness under a smart phone environment providing auction information such as consumer's current position, the number of hits to a specific real estate, and the number of bidder to anticipate the winning bid.

• Journal of Korea Society of Digital Industry and Information Management
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.299-309
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• 2016

This study proposed a logistics plan for sending supply to be distributed to areas other than producing areas to wholesalers and allocating supply to be distributed to areas near producing areas to local distribution center in the vicinity instead of shipping the entire quantity to wholesalers for fruits auction to increase the competitive edge of the domestic fruits and vegetables logistics market in the ear of infinite competition. A video auction-based short distance division logistics operation model was developed to enhance competitiveness related to the circulation of fruits and vegetables, reduce logistics costs, and rationalize logistics by distributing the items sent to wholesalers through field auction and the shipments at local distribution center to neighboring areas through video auction connected to wholesalers real-time. The study especially came up with a logistics rationalization plan by examining and analyzing the stages and costs of transportation between producing areas and wholesalers on the circulation routes of fruits.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.141-155
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• 2005

It is very important that sellers provide reasonable reserve prices for auction items in internet auction systems. Recently, an agent has been proposed to generate reserve prices automatically based on the case similarity of information retrieval theory and the moving average of time series analysis. However, one problem of the previous approaches is that the recent trend of auction prices is not well reflected on the generated reserve prices, because it simply provides the bid price of the most similar item or an average price of some similar items using the past auction data. In this paper. in order to overcome the problem. we propose a method that generates reserve prices based on the moving average. the exponential smoothing, and the least square of time series analysis. Through performance experiments. we show that the successful bid rate of the new method can be increased by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices compared with the previous methods.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.22
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• pp.231-254
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• 2007

This study is analyzed how much protected buying and selling service on Auction site affects to the customers' satisfaction. According to the results of it, First, considering that the aspects of the reliability of the Auction site, trade factor affects to the reliability of Auction website. Second, it shows the organized security of the site affects to the reliability. and it could be explained the escrow service has brought the customers to get the reliability of Auction website. Third, the execution of purchasing contract on website affects to the customers' satisfaction. and it makes customers confirm and rely on Auction. For example, carrying out of the escrow service, enhancement of the system for the policies for the buying protection of customers, and various concerns and efforts for the execution of the purchasing contract and so on affect to the customers' satisfaction.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.592-601
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• 2007

In the conventional double auction approaches, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, these assumptions are unrealisitc. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. We propose a double auction mechanism with resource allocation based on nonlinear utility functions, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where each participant can express a diverse utility function on the price and quantity. In order to optimize the total market utility consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, our study proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through several simulation experiments.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

Commercial internet auction systems have been successfully used recently. In those systems, because auction prices of auction items are given by sellers only, the success bid rate can be decreased due to the large difference between the reserve price and the normal price. In this paper, we propose an agent that generates auction prices to sellers based on past auction data and item prices gathered from the web Through performance experiments, we show that the successful bid rate increases by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices. Using the pricing agent, we design and implement an XML-based auction system on the web.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartD
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• v.9D no.1
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• pp.167-172
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• 2002

Recently, some of people are keep in research and development of the further more efficient and convenient auction systems using intelligent software agents in electronic commerce. The purpose of this thesis is that a simple auction system has web bulletin boards, is aided by intelligent agent, and generates pertinent auction duration time and starting price for auction goods of auctioneer into a auction system, then the auctioneer gets the highest margin. The seller who want to sell goods, is using internet sends mail that has information for goods to agent of internet auction system. The agent undertake filtering process for already learned information about similar goods. And it calculate duration time and start price from stored bidding history database. In this thesis we propose a mailing agent system pushing information in internet auction that enables to aid decision for auctioneer about the starting time and price which delivers the highest margin.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.61-93
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• 2014

This paper analyzes Onbid car auction data by employing various methods, including structural estimation, to identify main factors which decides auction prices and figure out what effects those factors are making on the auction price. I then discuss on how to maximize sellers' revenue in OnBid car auctions. The government and public institutes sell their assets through the OnBid auction, hence the optimal design of the OnBid auction is important. The paper's main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) The independent private value model explains OnBid car auction data better than the correlated private value model or the interdependent value model; (ⅱ) Both the number of bidders and the ratios of the auction price to the evaluation value were lower in the auctions posted by the Kamco than auctions by institutes other than the Kamco; (ⅲ) Some auctions require that at least two bidders should submit a bid no less than the reserve price for sale. In those auctions, both the number of bidders and each bidder's valuation on the auctioned object were lower than in auctions without that requirement; (ⅳ) The sum of sellers' revenue would be decreased in the simulation with the reserve price higher by 5%, 10%, and 20% across auctions by institutes other than Kamco.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.205-214
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• 2019

In Korea, the first-price sealed bid auction and the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction(buchal-je in Korean) have been used alternatively as procurement auctions. In this paper, we characterize the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction in the context of mechanism design. We consider the general ?-bidder case in which each bidder has private information. Under the assumptions of uniformly distributed valuations and linear strategies, we derive the equilibrium of the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency and the expected revenue of this auction mechanism in comparison with the first-price sealed bid auction. Finally, we conclude with the critical remarks on the practical intention of the government which uses this auction.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.