디지털융복합연구 (Journal of Digital Convergence)

  • 제18권6호
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  • Pages.237-244
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  • 2020
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  • 2713-6434(pISSN)
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  • 2713-6442(eISSN)
한국디지털정책학회 (The Society of Digital Policy and Management)
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최대주주 변경의 유형이 적자보고에 미치는 영향: 기업위험을 중심으로

The Effect of Type of Largest Shareholder Change on Losses: Focusing on Firm Risk

  • 김혜리 (부산대학교 경영연구원)
  • Kim, Hye-Ri (Management Institute, Pusan National University)
  • 투고 : 2020.04.20
  • 심사 : 2020.06.20
  • 발행 : 2020.06.28
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초록

본 연구의 목적은 한국거래소에 상장되어 있는 KOSPI기업과 KOSDAQ기업을 대상으로 최대주주의 변경과 관련된 정보가 적자보고에 미치는 영향을 실증분석하는 것이다. 구체적으로, 최대주주 변경 유형 중에서 최대주주의 잦은 변경이 나타난 기업의 적자보고를 살펴보기 위하여 기업의 적자보고에 미치는 영향을 통제하고 로짓 회귀분석의 방법을 적용하여 실증분석한다. 분석결과, 회계기간 내 2회 이상 최대주주가 변경된 기업은 적자보고의 기업위험이 다른 기업 보다 더 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 한국거래소의 투자위험 공시사항인 최대주주의 잦은 변동이 적자보고와 같은 투자위험 상황으로 나타날 수 있음을 나타낸다. 본 연구는 상장기업을 대상으로 최대주주 변경과 관련한 변동이 시장위험에 영향을 미친다는 증거를 제시하여 한국거래소 전자공시(KIND) 투자유의사항의 정보적 역할을 확인하였다는 점에서 선행연구에 추가적인 공헌점을 가진다.

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the effect of information related to the largest shareholder's change on the likelihood of reporting a loss for firms listed on the Korea Exchange. Specifically, this study conducts a logit regression analysis to examine the firm's loss reporting with frequent changes in the largest shareholder among the largest shareholder change types. So, it controls the impact of a firm's loss reporting, such as the previous year's loss reporting and discretionary accruals. As a result of the analysis, firms whose largest shareholder have changed more than 2 times in the accounting period are found to have higher firm risk in loss reporting than other firms. The results of this analysis confirm that frequent changes in the largest shareholder, which are disclosures of investment risks on the Korea Exchange, may result in investment risk situations such as loss reporting.

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