• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.237-244
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the effect of information related to the largest shareholder's change on the likelihood of reporting a loss for firms listed on the Korea Exchange. Specifically, this study conducts a logit regression analysis to examine the firm's loss reporting with frequent changes in the largest shareholder among the largest shareholder change types. So, it controls the impact of a firm's loss reporting, such as the previous year's loss reporting and discretionary accruals. As a result of the analysis, firms whose largest shareholder have changed more than 2 times in the accounting period are found to have higher firm risk in loss reporting than other firms. The results of this analysis confirm that frequent changes in the largest shareholder, which are disclosures of investment risks on the Korea Exchange, may result in investment risk situations such as loss reporting.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.41-46
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• 2022

Chinese stock market often rises and falls sharply. The impact of the stock price crash risk has become a hot research field to maintain financial stability. This study starts from the perspective of the proportion of largest shareholders holding shares, and studies whether largest shareholders have more incentive to supervise management and reduce self-interest behavior of management. We use the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as a sample, and study the relationship between largest shareholders and share price crash risk. Empirical research shows that the higher the proportion of largest shareholders of state-owned enterprise, the company's stock price crash risk can be significantly reduced. This study suggests that the higher the share of the largest shareholder, the lower the opportunistic behavior of managers and that information asymmetry between the company and the shareholders can be alleviated.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.277-293
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• 2015

Mutual Savings Banks generally have weaker governance structure than other financial institutions, so the possibility of earnings management by owner-largest or managements of mutual savings banks is higher than other financial institutions. This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and quality of internal control of financial reporting. If the expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis holds, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the weaker the internal control system by more likely the opportunistic earnings management by bank managers. On the other hand, under the convergence of interest hypothesis, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the stronger the internal control system by reduction in agency costs as owner-manager's holdings increases, and there a negative relationship is expected between internal control weakness and the holdings of the owner-largest shareholder. We find that mutual savings banks with higher owner-largest shareholder equity has significant positive relations with their internal control of financial reporting material weakness. This result suggests that the greater owner-largest shareholder equity, the more likely the opportunistic earnings management, so that decrease quality of internal control. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions corporate governance to verify whether governance system, especially, owner-largest and quality of internal control has significant positive relations.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.239-270
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• 2017

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and the intensity of R&D expenditures of a firm by analyzing the panel data composed of 553 manufacturing firms in KSE(Korea Stock Exchange) and KOSDAQ listed firms for the period of 2007-2014. The major findings are as follows; (1) Regarding the relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D intensity, we find the inverted-U shape relationship in KOSDAQ firms, consistent with the theoretical discussion and empirical studies on U.S. firms. The result suggests that management stockholding reduces agency problem at the R&D margin. On the contrary, the insignificant result in KSE firms seems to be due to the scant stockholding of most 'non-owner' CEOs. (2) Regarding the relationship between the largest shareholder's portion and R&D intensity, KSE firms exhibit negatively significant relationship, suggesting the existence of serious agency problem between the largest shareholder and the minor shareholders. This agency problem seems to be alleviated in KOSDAQ firms mainly because the founders with technology expertise are still in charge of the business. (3) Foreign investors seem to fail in effectively encouraging R&D expenditures in either KSE or KOSDAQ listed firms. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing for the first time that ownership structure affects R&D activities in different ways between KSE and KOSDAQ firms.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.257-278
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• 2017

The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.69-100
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• 2006

We examine the effect of controlling shareholders ownership structure and related-party transactions(hereafter 'RPT') of publicly traded companies on their firm values during the post-IMF period. In the multivariate regression analysis using control variables such as firm size, capital structure, investment, dividend, profitability and industry dummy that might affect firm values, we find that there exists a significant negative relation between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values proxied by Tobin's Q, and also find that there is a significant negative relation between RPT and the firm values. Those evidences seem to support the controlling shareholders' expropriation hypothesis. Additionally, we investigate the relation between ownership structure and rim value through the piecewise regression analysis. We find a significant 'inverse' U-shape pattern between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values. This result is quite different from the existing literatures that have usually reported an U-shape pattern. In conclusion, the findings in this study do not support the notion that the ownership concentration to the controlling shareholders does negatively affect the firm values monotonically.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.145-158
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the ownership structure of unlisted firms on KOSDAQ listing. There are few studies analyzing the characteristics of listing success based on ownership structure. For startup executives, there is not enough data to refer to the ownership structure that can increase the possibility of listing. This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on IPO success through comparison between listed successful and failed companies among the companies in application for KOSDAQ listing eligibility review. The major findings are as follows; (1) Venture capital investment and shareholding have a statistically positive effect on the success of KOSDAQ listing. This results indicate that the venture capital's investment alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, and it is a valid signal for market participants. The result means the role of venture capital seems to be important when companies are listed on the KOSDAQ. (2) The largest shareholder's stake has an inverted-U shape relationship with listing success. In other words, the ownership concentration mitigates moral hazard problem, which leads to listing success. However, if the ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, the chances of success in listing will decrease due to concerns over the pursuit of private interests. The result suggests that the largest shareholder's stake reduce agency problem. This study academically contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the ownership structure affects IPOs, and explaining the results based on agent theory and signal theory. Our results provide practical implications for companies preparing for an IPO on the KOSDAQ.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.141-176
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• 2008

This study provides an analysis of ex post efficient outcome, which can be said an objective of distressed restructurings, using the stock return of listed companies. The findings of this study are as follows: First, upon completing the distressed restructurings, reorganization and workout cases showed positive announcement effects, which was statistically significant. Also, composition cases displayed a positive value, but it was not statistically significant. Second, with respect to post-restructuring long-run stock performance, reorganization and composition showed underperformance after completion. However, workout cases showed overperformance after the completion. Third, multiple regression analysis to find factors affecting post-restructuring long-run stock performance suggests that higher asset decrease(ASSETCH), shareholder concentration (OWNCEN), largest shareholders' stake(OWN) have more positive impacts on long-run performance. However, change of the largest shareholder(OWNERCH) has negative impacts on long-run performance. Finally, change of the largest shareholder is a negative factor in the performance of the distressed restructurings. Therefore, this study implies that if M&A is used as a way of early completing the distressed restructurings, prudent judgment is required on whether a firm can recover its competitiveness and is likely to be economically viable again.

• Venture DIGEST
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• s.114
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• pp.24-26
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• 2008

M&A(기업 인수.합병)가 활발하다. M&A에 대한부정적 인식이 사라진 듯 하다. 그러나 현실 속에 한 발을 내디디면 커다란 벽에부닥친다. 최근 필자가 만난 한 벤처 기업 CEO는 "M&A에 대한 필요성은 느낀다. 하지만 방법을 잘 모르겠다. 잘 할자신도 없다. 팔때는 헐값에 넘기는 것 같고,살 때는 속아서 비싸게 사는 것 같다"고 솔직한 심정을 털어놓았다. 개인과 마찬가지로 기업도 성장하는 과정에서 만나는 고비와 장애물을 뛰어 넘어 한 단계 업그레이드 되는 계기가 있게 마련이다. M&A는 앞에 놓여있는 장애물을 뛰어넘기 위한 지렛대일 수도 있고,도움닫기에 필요한 뜀틀이 될 수도 있고, 화학적 반응을 촉진시키는 촉매제로도 활용가능하다. 그렇다면 벤처기업이 M&A를 잘할 수 있는기술과 방법은 어떤 것일까. M&A의 기술과 방법은 다양한 전략과 전술을섞어 수십 가지 경우의 수도 만들 수 있다. 그러나 지난 10년 동안기업 M&A를 옆에서 지켜봐온 필자의 입장에서 모든 전략과 전술에 앞선 핵심요소는 최대주주의 '욕심 버리기'와 솔직함 이다. 최대주주가 회사에 대한 솔직한 평가를 내리고,본인의 욕심을 조금만 양보하면 가장 적절한 가격과 조건에 회사를 키울수 있는 M&A가 가능하다.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.143-147
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• 2013

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance structure on the cost of debt. Total sample is divided into the small sample, the medium sample and the large sample of equity concentration, based on the equity ownership of large shareholders. Our regression results show that foreign investors are not associated with the cost of debt in the small and medium samples of equity ownership, whereas foreign investors are significantly associated with the reduction in the cost of debt in the large sample of equity concentration. Academic implications of our findings are that as the ownership of dominating shareholders rises, they seek their private interests of perks causing an increase in agency costs and a decrease in firm's economic value, thus expanding borrowing costs. Practical business implications are that foreign investors may alleviate agency problem of dominating large shareholders in the firm through monitoring activities, thus enhancing the efficiency of business decision-makings.