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대북경제제재의 효과성과 미래 발전 방향에 대한 고찰: 해상대북제재를 중심으로

An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea : Focusing on the Maritime Aspects of Economic Sanctions

  • 김상훈 (고려대학교 국제대학원)
  • Kim, Sang-Hoon (Korea University Graduate School of International Studies)
  • 투고 : 2020.01.09
  • 심사 : 2020.01.30
  • 발행 : 2020.02.28

초록

유엔 안전보장이사회(UNSC, United Nations Security Council) 주도의 경제제재는 초창기 '포괄적 경제제재(comprehensive sanctions)' 모델에서 '스마트 경제제재(smart sanctions)' 모델로 발전하고 있다. 유엔 안보리는 직접적인 무력개입(military intervention)보다 규범적 비용(normative costs)과 부담이 덜한 경제제재를 통해 대상 국가의 손익계산법(cost-benefit calculation)을 바꿔 행동변화를 이끌어내려고 했으나, '포괄적 경제제재'에 따른 비용 대부분이 일반 대중에게 전가되면서, 인도적 위기(humanitarian crisis) 사태를 초래하고, 대상 국가의 내부 결속력을 강화하는 역설적인 상황을 만들었다. 이에 따라 정책 결정 과정에 직접적으로 관여하는 지도자와 정치 엘리트를 대상으로 자산을 동결(asset freeze)하거나 여행금지(travel ban) 조치 등을 집중적으로 하는 '스마트 제재'가 탄생하였다. 대북한 경제제재 또한 '스마트 경제제재' 모델로 점차 발전하여 그 효과성을 나타내고 있다. 특히 최근의 결의안(resolutions)을 통해 석탄 수출을 전면 금지하고, 원유 수입을 제한함에 따라 지표상 가시적인 성과가 나타나고 있고, 2018년부터 한국, 미국과 평화협상에 나서면서 제재완화를 촉구하는 등, 위와 같은 '스마트' 대북제재가 북한의 행동변화를 이끌어내고 있음을 알 수 있다. 대북제재의 효과성은 북한의 대외무역규모(total trade volume) 변화량을 통해 측정할 수 있는데, '포괄적 경제제재'의 성격에 가까운 초기의 대북제재 결의안 채택 이후에는 북한 대외무역규모가 감소한 경우도 있지만 도리어 증대된 경우도 있었다. 그러나 석탄 수출 금지 및 원유 수입 제한 조치를 담은 2016, 2017년의 결의안 이후에는 북한 대외무역규모가 2016년 약 65억 달러에서 2017년 약 55억 달러로, 2018년에는 약 28억 달러로 대폭 감소한 사실을 발견할 수 있다. 북한의 대외무역은 정권의 자금줄과 같기 때문에 대외무역규모의 감소는 곧 '스마트 제재'의 효과와 같다. 대북경제제재의 효과성에 영향을 미치는 두 번째 조건은 중국의 대북제재 레짐(sanctions regime)에의 참여 여부다. 북한은 경제적으로 중국에 상당히 의존하고 있고, 이는 지표상으로도 명백히 나타나고 있다. 중국은 그 동안 북한의 지정학적인 가치 및 급변 사태 시 북-중 국경에서의 대규모 난민 발생 우려 등에 따라 직간접적으로 북한을 지지해왔지만, 북한 핵능력의 고도화에 따른 동북아시아 지역에서의 핵확산(nuclear proliferation) 우려, 미-중 무역분쟁에 따른 여파 등으로 대북제재 레짐에 성실히 참여할 것을 밝혔다. 실제로 중국의 대북한 석유 수출량이 감소하고, 북-중간 대외무역 총량 또한 2016년부터 지속적으로 감소하며, 대북경제제재에 중국의 참여가 제재 성공의 중요한 변수임을 증명했다. 효과적인 대북제재를 위한 마지막 요건은 북한의 경제제재 회피 노력 방지(prevention of North Korea's economic sanctions evasion efforts)다. 앞서 밝힌 바와 같이 석탄 수출과 원유 수입은 북한 정권의 자금줄이자 핵무력 고도화를 위한 필수 에너지원이다. 중국이 대북제재 레짐에의 참여를 선언한 상태에서 중국으로부터의 원유 수입량이 급감함에 따라 중동지역 등지로부터 바닷길을 통해 원유를 수입해야 하는데, 원유 수입량 제한에 따라 동중국해(East China Sea) 및 공해(high seas)상에서 선박 대 선박간 불법 환적(ship-to-ship illegal transshipment)을 실시하면서 대북제재를 무력화하고 있다. 유엔 대북제재위 산하 전문가 패널(Panel of Experts), 미 국무부(U.S. Department of State), 미 재무부 외부자산통제국(U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) 등은 보고서를 통해 북한의 해상 불법 환적 실태를 상세히 밝히고 있는데, 자동 선박 식별 장치(AIS, Automatic Identification System)의 허위 신호 송출(false signaling), 선박 등록 문서 위조(false certificate of registry)와 같은 방식으로 감시 및 단속을 회피하고 있는 실정이다. '스마트'한 대북제재 설계 및 중국의 참여로 대북제재가 북한의 행동 변화를 이끌어낼 수 있음이 확인되었지만, 국제사회의 눈을 피해 해상에서 만연하고 있는 불법 환적과 같은 행위는 효과적인 대북제재 실행의 마지막 퍼즐이라고 할 수 있다. 앞으로 해상에서의 불법 환적 행위를 막기 위해 다음 세 가지 정책적 함의를 도출해낼 수 있다. 첫 번째는 가장 강력한 조치라고 할 수 있는 해상봉쇄(maritime blockade)에 대한 고려다. 전세계 물동량의 40%가 지나가는 말라카 해협(Malacca Strait)은 북한에게도 중요한 해상 교통로이다. 북한이 계속해서 결의안을 위반하고 공해상에서 불법 환적 행위를 자행할 경우, 말라카 해협에서 북한과 연계된 의심 선박을 검문 검색하고 차단(interdiction)하여 강제적인 방식으로 북한의 제재 회피 노력을 근절할 수 있다. 남중국해(South China Sea)에서 중국과 미국 간, 중국과 주변국 간 갈등이 격화됨에 따라 다국적군의 말라카 해협 봉쇄는 중국에게 달갑지 않겠지만, 유엔 대북제재 결의안에 명시되어 있는 의심 선박에 대한 검문 검색 행위임을 명백히 함과 동시에 다자간의 협조를 바탕으로 하여 규범적 정당성(normative justification)을 높인다면 충분히 실현 가능한 방안이다. 두 번째는 공해상에서의 불법 해상 환적에 대한 감시 강화와 증거 수집이다. 마지막 세번째는 대한민국의 다국적 해상 감시 활동에의 참여다. 북한의 대북제재 이행 여부는 한국의 안보와 직결되는 사안이다. 대북제재의 최종 목표는 북한 비핵화에 있고, 협상 테이블에 북한을 이끌어내는 데 제재가 효과적이라는 것이 드러났기 때문에 핵 위협의 당사자인 대한민국 또한 효과적인 제재 이행 여부 감시에 책임감을 가져야 한다.

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

키워드

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