Environmental and Resource Economics Review (자원ㆍ환경경제연구)

Korean Resource Economics Association (한국자원경제학회)
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Welfare Analysis of Carbon Taxes and Tradable Permit Allocations: A Contest Theory Model

탄소세 정책과 배출권거래제 정책에 대한 후생 분석: 경쟁 이론을 중심으로

  • Received : 2016.05.04
  • Accepted : 2016.07.27
  • Published : 2016.09.30
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Abstract

I examine the situation in which the players compete to obtain economic rents which is generated by the market-based environmental regulation, such as carbon taxes or tradable permit allocations. Drawing on contest theory, I employ the sharing rules which is devised to motivate players best effort, and consider two models in carbon taxes: one model with observable sharing rules and the other model with unobservable sharing rules. I show that, first, the overall welfare of carbon taxes is always less than that of tradable permit allocations under the model with observable sharing rules. Second, depending on the share of the preassigned allocation in tradable permit allocations, the overall welfare of carbon taxes may be larger than that of tradable permit allocations under the model with unobservable sharing rules.

본 논문은 온실가스 저감 정책인 탄소세 정책과 배출권거래제 정책을 통해 창출되는 경제지대를 획득하기 위한 집단 간의 혹은 집단 내의 경쟁 상황을 분석한다. 집단 간의 경쟁상황인 탄소세 정책에 대해 구성원들이 결정하는 성과보수를 공시하는 경우와 공시하지 않는 경우로 나누어 분석하여, 배출권거래제 정책과 후생을 비교한다. 본 논문에서 나타난 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 본 논문은 집단들이 성과보수를 공시하는 경우 집단 간의 과열경쟁으로 인해 탄소세 정책이 배출권거래제 정책보다 항상 후생이 작게 된다. 둘째, 집단들이 성과보수를 공시하지 않을 경우, 탄소세 정책의 집단 간의 경쟁이 완화되어 탄소세 정책의 후생이 증가한다. 만약 배출권거래제 정책의 오염배출권 거래량이 상당히 많은 경우에는 오히려 탄소세 정책의 후생이 배출권거래제 정책보다 더 크게 된다는 것을 보였다.

Keywords

References

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